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Abstract 
This doctorate provides a critical reassessment of Julia Kristeva's work on abjection, 
focusing on the abject as a form of writing. It brings Kristeva's work on abjection into 
dialogue with the writings of Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Paul Celan and Charlotte 
Delbo, the music of Diamanda Galas, the paintings of Francis Bacon, and a series of 
photographs taken by the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz. The overarching argument 
of the thesis is that these different mediums access the realm of the abject in distinct 
and effective ways. Centrally, I argue that Celine writes `towards, ' Celan from 
`within' and Delbo `back from' this realm. I begin the thesis with a consideration of 
the ethical ramifications accompanying Kristeva's decision to use the works of Celine 
as the primary exemplar of writing as a process of abjection. The chapter includes an 
engagement with Celine's anti-Semitic pamphlets. It also compares the work of 
Celine and Jean-Paul Sartre in terms of the sexual economy of their writing. In my 
second chapter, I argue for understanding the abject as a kind of noise that exists as 
the underside to language. I track the way noise manifests itself in language through 
detailed readings of works by Bacon, Galas and Celan. The third chapter explores 
Delbo's conception of anamnesis, drawing particularly on the works of Didier Anzieu 
and Brian Massumi to think through the notion of the `skin of memory'. I make a case 
for understanding Delbo's prose as a conduit for sensation as well as a mode of 
description. In my conclusion I consider the status of four photographs taken by a 
member of the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz as a form of bearing witness to 
atrocity. I argue that these images can be understood as a visual correlative to the 
writings of Celan and Delbo. 
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Introduction 
Finding a Way in Language 
Thinking definitely means gettinf words to appreciate one another, means 
secretly fostering their encounters. 
This is a thesis about writing. It works towards readings of a set of writings (both literary 
and visual) produced in response to traumatic events. These events are often conceived of 
as beyond description, as productive of a crisis in testimony. The poetry of Paul Celan, 
the poetic prose of Charlotte Delbo2, and the four photographs taken by a member of the 
Sonderkommando at Auschwitz, are all attempts to bear witness to the Holocaust. Each of 
them endeavours to write the horror through the use of words or of light. Theirs is a 
language that strives to emerge out of the horror. 
In trying to write about this writing of the crisis -a writing written from within a 
crisis in writing -I have sought, at times, to reduce my critical engagement with the ideas 
of others. This thesis is not a commentary upon commentary; it is a piece of writing about 
writing. It is therefore not a straightforward work of literary or visual criticism. Any 
interest displayed in thematics, in imagery and metaphor, in meter, whilst not incidental, 
is less important than the way that this interest is articulated. I am obviously not trying to 
write as Delbo or as Celan but I am also deliberately making an effort not to write over 
them or through them but instead towards them. This aspiration to avoid doing violence 
to the object of study also informs the theoretical underpinning of the thesis, which could 
broadly be said to be Kristevan. Whilst I do offer exegeses of aspects of Julia Kristeva's 
thinking it is my own belief that much commentary is, of necessity, `outside' theory. In 
such commentary the theory is explained and then applied in what might be called the cut 
1 Edmond Jabes, The Book of Resemblances 3: The Ineffaceable " The Unperceived, Trans. Rosmarie 
Waldrop, (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1992), p. 55. 
2 Delbo is a writer who has received relatively surprisingly little critical attention in Anglo-American 
writing on Holocaust Literature. I hope my thesis will play a small part in rectifying this neglect. To my 
knowledge there is only one book devoted exclusively to Delbo's writings, Nicole Thatcher's A Literary 
Analysis of Charlotte Delbo 's Concentration Camp Re-Presentation, (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2000). Lawrence Langer uses Delbo's distinction between common and deep memory as a kind of 
theoretical template in his well known work Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991), see particularly pp. 3-9. He provides a literary analysis of Delbo's trilogy in 
his earlier work The Age of Atrocity: Death in Modern Literature, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978). There is 
also a chapter on Delbo in Michael Rothberg's Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust 
Representation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 141-177. 
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and paste approach. This is a working practice which I have sought to avoid, attempting 
instead to illustrate the theory inside the writing. For example, I have sought to explain 
the insights a Kristevan understanding of language can bring to any effort to comprehend 
the literary projects of Celan and Delbo as much through a performative illustration as by 
simple explanation. 
In his essay `Julia Kristeva and her histories, ' Adrian Rifkin writes of the 
tendency to pillage Kristeva's texts for `conveniently sized "bleeding chunks " of theory, 
as is the fate suffered by the much abused concept of abjection'. 3 This thesis might be 
read as an attempt to return the spoils of theory - the concept of abjection - to its original 
situation. I seek to provide a critical reassessment of abjection through a sustained 
engagement with Kristeva's Powers of Horror. My opening chapter considers the often 
neglected final third of Powers of Horror. This relatively ignored section of Kristeva's 
text constitutes an analysis of the writings of Louis-Ferdinand Celine, focusing 
specifically on the ways in which his writings manage the abject. In secular society, 
writing provides `the ultimate sublimation of the unsignifiable'. 4 We are all haunted by 
that no thing out of which we became, a no thing which cannot be known, which `lies 
there, quite close' but `cannot be assimilated' .5 
In the absence of religion - with its 
`various means of purifying the abject'6 - literature acts as `an unveiling of the abject: an 
elaboration, a discharge'. 7 Through its capacity to expel the abject, literature shores us 
against our ruin. The link between abjection and literature which Kristeva develops, the 
way in which the abject appears in language, is often downplayed. Readers have, instead, 
tended to pick up on and develop Kristeva's descriptions of the physical, visceral 
manifestations of the abject. 8 In this thesis I want to place greater emphasis on Kristeva's 
ideas about the connections between writing and abjection. I will consider whether it is 
3 Adrian Rifkin, `Julia Kristeva and her histories, ' in parallax 8,43 (July-September 1998), p. 136. 
4 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 23. 
5 Ibid. p. 1. 
6 Ibid. p. 17. 
Ibid. p. 208. 
8 Barbara Creed's work on film and the monstrous feminine epitomizes this kind of approach. See Creed, 
The Monstrous Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis, (Routledge: London, 1993). More recently 
Sarah Ahmed continues this trend, privileging abjection's somatic dimension, whilst ignoring the 
relationship between language and the abject which Kristeva develops at length in Powers of Horror. In 
Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 86-88. 
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possible to think of writings about horror as writings out of horror. Theodor W. Adorno 
famously suggested that `to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric'. All literature that 
endeavours to bear witness to atrocity does so at the risk of being beautiful. It threatens to 
cause the reader pleasure. Words also mean things, whereas what the words describe, the 
actual events; were, perhaps, felt to be beyond meaning. I will argue that Celan and 
Delbo write against meaning, they write towards non-sense. Their language is abject 
rather than beautiful. It is only through this abject language that something of the horror 
can be carried to the reader. This language enables a glimpse of this horror to be attained 
in the everyday. It is a horror that cannot be communicated by a language which 
privileges the symbolic. It can only be `communicated' by accentuating the semiotic 
element; it can only be communicated through the non-communicative. 
The abject writer whom Kristeva chooses to focus upon in Powers of Horror, 
Celine was, however, a fascist, a misogynist and a rabid anti-Semite. My first chapter 
therefore considers the ethical implications of Kristeva's decision to mark out Celine as 
the writer of abjection par excellence. For Kristeva, Celine's writing gives us `the most 
daring X-ray of the "drive-foundations " of fascism'. 9 If the powers of horror that 
constitute abjection are not cathected through literature or religion then they may be 
expelled through violence. It is these impulses which were harnessed by National 
Socialism. Celine writes on the cusp of these impulses whereas I will argue that both 
Celan and Delbo write out of the devastation wrought by their discharge. Celine writes 
himself out of language whilst Celan and Delbo must write their way back to language. 
They have been forced to occupy an `exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the 
scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable'. 10 My second and third chapters 
explore the efforts of these two authors to rethink writing and, in so doing, to bring the 
intolerable into language. I will argue that Celan and Delbo do not write away the horror 
but write from within it. In the thesis I have chosen to describe this horror in a variety of 
ways, at times calling it abjection, noise, nothingness and shapelessness. " This should 
not be perceived as indecision on my part but may rather be understood as a 
9 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 155. 
10 Ibid. p. 1. 
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manifestation of the difficulty of writing the horror (as distinct from writing about it). 
This horror is always presumed, but never known as such. I use a combination of 
metaphors in my efforts to find a way in language to open the reader to a thinking of the 
thinking of a no thing beyond the signifying process. Celan and Delbo break the pellicle 
of language - the symbolic skin - they wound words to enable some of the horror to 
surface. The words are made to mean less, to unmean. Cathy Caruth writes in Unclaimed 
Experience that what returns to haunt the victim of trauma is `not only the reality of the 
violent event but also the reality of the way that its violence has not yet been fully 
known'. 12 This horror can never be known, but I will argue that it can be shown. 13 In a 
famous passage, the psychoanalyst Dori Laub put forward the argument that the 
Holocaust is an `event without a witness'. 14 He describes how, because of the conditions 
within the camps, the subject broke down: `the Holocaust created... a world in which one 
could not bear witness to oneself . 
15 Laub is only one of many thinkers who have sought 
to elaborate the difficulties that inhere in efforts to bear witness to traumatic events. Here 
I will briefly explore two other attempts to theorize the problem of attesting to horror, 
those of Lawrence Langer and Edith Wyschogrod. This will help to foreground some of 
the issues that this thesis seeks to address. In Holocaust Testimonies, Lawrence Langer 
explores the value of video-testimony as a means of bearing witness. Langer understands 
spoken testimony to be less mediated - more immediate - than literary accounts of the 
Holocaust. Holocaust literature is stylized. Through this stylization it closes the gap 
between the unfamiliar world of the camps and the familiarity of the present. Langer 
writes that `written memoirs, by the very strategies available to their authors - style, 
chronology, analogy, imagery, dialogue, a sense of character, a coherent moral vision - 
strive to narrow this space, easing us into their unfamiliar world through familiar (and 
11 The status of `nothing' in the thesis requires clarification. The word is used constantly in everyday 
language with reflection. In the context of this work nothing, however, is not null but instead describes a 
disturbing something, a matter that refuses to be pulled into the shape that is any and all signification. 
12 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, History, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), p. 6. 
13 1 mean `shown' in the sense that Kristeva uses it in the opening chapter of Powers of Horror. There 
Kristeva describes how the corpse shows rather than signifies death. To show is to present the 
reader/spectator with unmediated horror. See Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3. 
14 Dori Laub, `An Event without a Witness: Truth, Testimony and Survival, ' in Shoshana Felman & Dori 
Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, (London: Routledge, 
1992), pp. 75-92. 
15 Ibid. p. 82. 
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hence comforting? ) literary devices'. 16 Writing involves `the conscious choice of 
phrasing one's words'. '? Video testimony is less reflexive and hence less mediated. 
Mediation opens gaps between the experience of the event and efforts to articulate that 
experience. Langer wants to bridge these gaps. Holocaust Testimonies explicitly sets out 
`to undo a negation - the principle of discontinuity which argues that an impassable 
chasm permanently separates the seriously interested auditor and observer from the 
experiences of the former Holocaust victim'. 18 The notion of unsayability, the belief that 
the experience cannot be preserved and communicated through speech, is not 
countenanced. The addressee may, however, institute a self-created gap as a form of 
protection against the recounting of the event. 19 
During the discussion of what he terms `humiliated memory, ' Langer recognizes 
the problem of translation that exists for the survivor. He suggests that at times memory 
exists as content without a form. 20 Memory can sometimes exist as a differend for which 
there is not an adequate idiom, as an experience for which words are found wanting. 21 
The words that do exist cannot carry the feelings. The phrase cannot be followed. This 
intimates that there is an element of unsayability to the event. The language of the present 
is informed by contemporary value systems which make it impossible for the survivor to 
`establish meaning through analogy'. 22 To achieve the requisite analogical potential 
would require revising the languages of history and moral philosophy. 23 Langer's work 
prefigures that of Giorgio Agamben in Remnants ofAuschwitz in that it acknowledges the 
insufficiency of contemporary moral language for giving an account of Auschwitz. 24 
Holocaust Testimonies concedes that the task of reformulating moral language may be an 
impossible one. It opens up the possibility of a break between the world of the camps and 
the present and, by extension, between the inhuman and the human. 
16 Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 19. 
17 Ibid. p. 129. 
" Ibid. p. xiv. 
19 Ibid. p. 82. 
20 Ibid. p. 113. 
21 Here I am drawing on Jean-Francois Lyotard's notion of the differend. See Lyotard, The Differend, 
Trans. Georges van den Abbeele, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
22 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, p. 1 13. 
23 Ibid. p. 120. 
24 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999). 
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Langer's understanding of witnessing, however, resides almost exclusively on the 
side of meaning. For him, memory resides in the sense of the words not in their mode of 
delivery. It is what is said rather than how it is said that is of prime importance. Towards 
the end of Holocaust Testimonies, Langer does acknowledge the `manner of 
presentation' of Holocaust testimony in addition to its content but in his accounts of 
testimony throughout the book he is attentive to sense at the expense of non-sense. 25 He 
is less interested in the gaps and rhythms of the testimonies than in their words. The 
silences, the stutters, the slowing and speeding up of delivery, the placing of 
stresses... those aspects of speech which are integral to communication but do not 
communicate in any simple way are not of interest to Langer. Nor, by extension, is the 
potential absence of those aspect; the flat, monotone delivery. Holocaust Testimonies 
does not admit the style of speech. Langer institutes a context for receiving Holocaust 
testimonies through the various classifications of memory he devises. It could be argued 
that the conception of language employed within this context is one which pays 
insufficient attention to drive investment (or lack of it) in testimonial texts. This 
insufficiency, which I will return to later in the thesis, is one that is also shared by 
Agamben. 
In Spirit in Ashes, Edith Wyschogrod also considers the relationship between 
language and testimony at length. Wyschogrod distinguishes between death-worlds and 
life worlds. In the death-world `a massive intervention in a taken-for-granted system of 
meanings' takes place as a result of which `new meanings become affixed to the body 
through the systematic substitution of pain for the ordinary complex of meanings that 
constitutes our corporeal transactions'. 26 Ordinary language is replaced by a new 
language of pain which `lies outside any linguistic referential system' and which is `first 
noticed as a gap in linguistic possibility'"27 The inmates have never encountered 
experiences analogous to those in the camps. Their life-world vocabulary of experience 
proves inadequate in the death-world. They possess the vocabulary of a life-world where 
"thirst" is a brief irritation, where "hunger" is easily sated, in which "pain" is uncommon 
and "death" is a rarity. In the life-world death means because it is infrequent; it 
25 Ibid. p. 204. 
26 Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 30. 
27 Ibid. 
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constitutes an event. In the life-world only the doctor, the undertaker and the grave- 
digger are familiar with death and even then it is a respected death. It does not pass 
unnoticed. The camp inmates live in a world which they cannot contextualize. They 
cannot make those connections and linkages which are necessary to place an experience 
in context, to form an experience. The camp is a compressed space. It is a reduction of 
experience. Wyschogrod suggests the linguistic process reflects this shrinkage. 28 In the 
death-world the old language persists but it becomes a palimpsest. It is over-written by 
new and contradictory meanings. The number of words remains the same but the 
meaning of each word is multiplied. Wyschogrod proposes that `a systematic effort is 
made to create confusion in regard to accepted, taken-for-granted meanings by 
developing opposed meanings in order to produce the widest possible discrepancy 
between alleged and actual significations'29 Meaning is muddied in the camps. For 
example, the word "work" is used cynically `to suggest productive effort even though 
[... ] it means unremitting hard labor'. 30 As Maurice Blanchot explains in The Writing of 
the Disaster, for the camp inmate `work has ceased to be his way of living and has 
become his way of dying'. 31 The word "work" which in the life world means an activity 
through which a living is earned in the death-world becomes instead a means to the end 
of life. In the death-world the old signification of each word endures but every word also 
comes to signify death; `for each and every signifier the range of obsolete meanings is 
retained together with the new signified, death'. 32 The old language becomes a dead 
language. This dead language in which all words lead to death is specific to the death- 
world. The language of the life-world is alive and expansive. It would need to collapse 
inwards to capture the experience of the death-world within itself. 
In the death-world death ceased to be dignified. In the space of mass-death death 
ceased to mean anything other than itself. It is, for instance, no longer "heroic". There are 
no alternative linkages. The signifier "death" signifies only "death". The gap between 
signifier and signified has, in fact, ceased to be. There is no ambiguity. There is no free- 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. p. 208. 
31 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, Trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995), p. 81. 
32 Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes, p. 31. 
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play. There is no meaning. There just is this cessation. This is a death beyond context. As 
such it is a death that is not present. The possibility of man-made mass death exemplified 
by what occurred in the camps creates the potential of a `negation so profound that all 
presence would be snuffed out' and thereby `all difference as well'. 33 The camps open up 
the idea, impossible to contemplate before, of absolute silence. 
Wyschogrod recognizes that for the death-world to succeed it needs witnesses; 
`the scheme of annihilation must exhibit to a token number of victims the nullity of their 
symbolic structures, to force them to comprehend their loss'. 34 There must be death and 
there must be living-dead. The reference here is not, however, to the figure of the 
Muselmann. The living-dead who bear witness to their own death do so consciously. 
They are not unthinking. They think of themselves as animals and excrement. The death- 
world `attempts to divest (the inmate) of the complexity of consciousness and reduce him 
as far as possible to animal status'. 35 Wyschogrod gives the example of Victor Frankl but 
we could equally refer to Robert Antelme's account of Gandersheim. These are inmates 
who see themselves as inhuman - who confirm the perception held of them by their 
oppressors - but who still see themselves. They still have the capacity to think. They 
think but not reflexively. There is no cogito ergo sum. There is, instead, "I think I am 
not". There is dead thinking. This resonates with Laub's view that there were no "I" 
witnesses from within the event. The inmates no longer had a secure sense of self and 
hence were incapable of bearing witness. If, as Laub goes on to suggest, the only way to 
bear witness is to return to a fuller self-hood, a return that is enabled by the occurrence of 
that testimony (a somewhat paradoxical notion) then a central aspect of the camp 
experience - the loss of self - is lost in the account. There is a gap between the death- 
world and the life-world, between the world of shit and the world of self, between the 
inhuman and the human that must be crossed before witnessing is possible. To provide 
the context that their testimony brings us about the experience of the camps the survivors 
must part with a part of that very context. They must lose their loss of self. In my analysis 
of the work of Charlotte Delbo I will consider how writing attests to this loss of self 
whilst also marking a return back to subject-hood. 
33 Ibid. p. 94. 
'a Ibid. p. 114. 
's Ibid. p. 147. 
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The conclusion is partially a response to Giorgio Agamben's Remnants of 
Auschwitz, with its worrying emphasis on the figure of the Muselmann. Agamben argues 
that the Muselmann is the sole aspect of the camps that needs to be attested to, this 
because if `the survivor bears witness not to the gas chambers or to Auschwitz but to the 
Muselmann, if he speaks only on the basis of the impossibility of speaking, then his 
testimony cannot be denied'. 36 In the conclusion I consider the four photographs taken by 
a member of the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz in August 1944 (photographs which 
were subsequently smuggled out to the Polish resistance) as offering an alternative means 
of bearing witnessing to the `impossibility of speaking'. These photographs are not 
simply figurative (unlike Agamben's Muselmann) but operate at the edge of figuration. 
They do not signify horror, they show it. They show `something' which cannot be 
recognized as a thing, something that is at the limits of the perceptible, next to nothing. It 
is the next to nothing that this entire thesis seeks to catch in language. 
36 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 164. 
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Chapter One 
Execrable Speech: Reading the Pamphlets of Louis-Ferdinand Celine 
In 1980, Julia Kristeva's Pouvoirs de I 'horreur was first published in France by Editions 
du Seuil. ' The work was swiftly translated; an English translation appearing in 1982.2 
Pouvoirs de 1 'horreur or Powers of Horror is, perhaps, Kristeva's best-known work in 
the Anglo-American world. 3 It has been highly influential across many disciplines. The 
concept of abjection as it is developed in Powers of Horror has proved useful in fields as 
diverse as anthropology, art history, criminology, film studies and literary studies. 4 In 
Powers of Horror, Kristeva uses the writings of the French author Louis-Ferdinand 
Celine as the mainstay for her argument that avant-garde literature has replaced the 
sacred as the site where abjection is sublimated. The choice of Celine as exemplar has 
provoked a hostile response from many commentators. This is because of the writers 
virulent anti-Semitism and avowed support for fascism. Later in this chapter the validity 
of some of these highly critical responses will be assessed. Beforehand, however, a 
proper understanding of the project that constitutes Powers of Horror cannot be 
accomplished without situating the text within the context of Julia Kristeva's work both 
before and subsequent to its publication. Specifically, how should we understand Powers 
' Julia Kristeva, Pouvoirs de 1'horreur: Essai sur /'abjection, (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1980). 
2 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982). From now on I shall refer to the text by the English title. I will use translations for 
all French texts unless none exist. 
When this was put to her in a recent interview conducted by John Lechte, Julia Kristeva disagreed stating 
that whilst Powers of Horror was popular with artists many others were interested in different aspects of 
her work. See Julia Kristeva, `Interview: Sharing Singularity, ' in John Lechte & Maria Margaroni, Julia 
Kristeva: Live Theory, (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 154-55. 
4 See for example, James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the 
Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Carol Ockman, Ingres :c Eroticized 
Bodies: Retracing the Serpentine Line (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Claire Valier, 
`Punishment, Border Crossings and the Powers of Horror, ' in Theoretical Criminology, 6: 3 (2002), pp. 319- 
37., Tina Chanter, 'The Picture of Abjection: Thomas Vinterberg's "The Celebration", ' in parallax 30,10: 1 
(January-March 2004), pp. 30-39, Barbara Creed, The Monstrous Feminine: Film, Feminism, 
Psychoanalysis, (London: Routledge, 1993) and Susan E. Gustafson, Absent Mothers and Orphaned 
Fathers: Narcissism and Abjection in Lessings Aesthetic and Dramatic Production, (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1995). 
of Horror in relation to the works La revolution du langage poetique and Histoires 
d'amour; published in 1974 and 1983 respectively? 5 
Powers of Horror might be thought of as a transitional text for Kristeva. It is `the 
in-between, the ambiguous, the composite'. 6 The interest in the philosophy of language so 
manifest in Revolution in Poetic Language has almost disappeared as have many of the 
Marxist elements of Kristeva's earlier analysis. These have been replaced by an increased 
emphasis on the psychoanalytic component which was previously operating within 
Kristeva's conception of language. The work, however, maintains a strong focus on the 
status of the semiotic in signification. In Tales of Love, this focus will be shifted towards 
the symbolic. Kelly Oliver has suggested that a change can also be read from a 
concentration on rejection in Revolution in Poetic Language and Powers of Horror 
towards one on identification in Tales of Love and Soled Noir. 7 Powers of Horror also 
contains the seed of the idea of the `imaginary-father' which Kristeva will go on to 
develop in much more detail in Tales of Love. 8 
The transitional nature of Powers of Horror within the framework of Kristeva's 
thinking is somewhat fitting given the subject-matter of the text itself. The abject, that 
which causes the experience Kristeva labels abjection, is `what does not respect borders, 
positions, rules'. 9 Powers of Horror is, itself, not easily positioned within the evolution 
of Kristeva's thinking. It shares affinities with both earlier and later works. It continues 
the interest with the rejection of the symbolic that Kristeva elaborated in Revolution in 
Poetic Language yet here this interest concerns how rejection makes identification 
possible. It is a work that explores how the path to the mirror-phase and the Oedipus 
complex is cleared through a prior rejection of the mother. Powers of Horror seeks to 
5 Julia Kristeva, Revolution du langage poetique, I'avant-garde ä la fin du seizieme siecle: Lautreamont et 
Maliarme, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974), translated in part as Revolution in Poetic Language, Trans. 
Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Julia Kristeva, Histoires de amour, 
(Paris: Editions Denöel, 1983), translated as Tales of Love, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987). From now on I shall refer to the texts by their English titles. 
6 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-bind, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993), p. 1 1. Julia Kristeva, Soled noir: depression et melancholie, (Paris: Gallimard, 1987) translated as 
Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989). 1 will henceforth refer to this text by its English title. 
" In Powers of Horror, Kristeva speculates, for example, about a "possession previous to my advent: a 
being-there of the symbolic that a father might or might not embody". Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 10. 
9 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
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account for how the entry into the Symbolic realm is made possible in the first place. 
Kristeva contends that prior to the mirror-stage (in which the child identifies with an 
image outside of itself and begins to recognize what it lacks and what it desires, and 
begins to imagine fulfilling those desires) there must be an earlier stage in which the 
child ejects itself from the mother. As Kristeva explains, even `before being "like, " "I" 
am not but do "separate, " "reject, " "abject "'. 1 ° The child must leave the orbit of the 
mother before the mirror-image can fascinate. The most archaic experience of abjection 
is therefore related to the maternal. It is the process by which provisional borders 
between the infant and the mother are established through repeated efforts by the infant to 
expel the mother. These borders must be brought into being before the misrecognition 
that characterizes the mirror-stage becomes possible. The child must already have some 
sense of difference and distance in order to see beyond the realm of plenitude that is the 
Mother to an image outside this realm. The lack of lack that is the mother must cease to 
be before the mirror-stage occurs. " 
That which is expelled is never, however, wholly voided. The mother never 
abandons the subject. The abject persists as a kind of constitutive outside to the subject. It 
is an outside that poses a perpetual threat to the inside whilst also acting as its guarantor. 
When the subject encounters instances of material or moral ambiguity - when the subject 
encounters what is abject - the memory of the abject mother is triggered. Our encounters 
with the abject in the everyday are carefully regulated. That which is abject poses a threat 
to the subject because it reminds the subject of its provisional nature. It has the potential 
to undo the separation between inside and outside that the infant fought so hard to 
establish. For this reason all societies have developed taboos and laws which work to 
police the way the abject is experienced. Much of the middle section of Powers of Horror 
is concerned with elaborating the psychic underpinnings of these means of governing 
interactions with the abject. Kristeva focuses particularly on the ways in which these 
interactions have been regulated within a Judeo-Christian context. The means by which 
abjection is controlled alters in response to changes in religious structures. In the chapters 
`Semiotics of Biblical Abomination' and `... Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi' Kristeva explores 
10 Kristeva, Powers of Honor, p. 13. 
"I will provide a fuller discussion of this process later. 
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these changes. She argues that biblical purity laws form an extension of more ancient 
traditions of defilement. These purity laws are most fully articulated in the books of 
Leviticus and Numbers. The differentiations between the pure and the impure which are 
laid out in these books bear witness to nascent Judaism's struggles with paganism and in 
particular with maternal cults. The impure is often associated either implicitly or 
explicitly with the maternal. The taboo against incest forms the originating mytheme 
which generated the purity laws. 12 This is exemplified by the exhortation in Exodus that 
`Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk' (Exodus 23: 19). 13 It is not milk as 
nourishment that is at issue here but rather the symbolic value of the milk in question. It 
is not abominable to drink milk but milk does become abominable when it is used for 
seething or cooking the young goat; when it is used as part of a `cultural culinaryfancy, 
which sets up an abnormal bond between mother and child'. 14 The prohibition is a 
metaphor for incest. This metaphor is repeated in Leviticus in the ban on sacrificing a 
cow or ewe along with their young on the same day: `And whether it be cow or ewe ye 
shall not kill it and her young both in one day' (Leviticus 22: 28). 
Kristeva concedes that some of the biblical prohibitions appear to serve a more 
immediate and practical purpose such as those laws which relate to leprosy. She writes 
that it is certain that `leprosy does objectively cause serious damages in a people with a 
strong community life and, moreover, an often nomadic one'. 15 In fact, however, the 
practicality of the prohibitions that surround leprosy are less certain than Kristeva 
believes thereby lending further support to her understanding of the purity laws as 
guarding against fusion with the feminine, with the mother. The impurity subsequently 
translated as leprosy is unlikely to correspond to the contagious, flesh-eating disease of 
that name. In Ritual and Morality, Hyam Maccoby points out that the word lepra used in 
the Septuagint does not translate as leprosy; the Greek word for which is actually either 
elephas or elephantiasis. 16 Lepra refers instead to skin diseases of various kinds such as 
eczema or psoriasis which are not usually transmissible or life-threatening. The taboo 
12 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 106. 
13 All biblical quotations are taken from the King James Version of the Holy Bible. 
14 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 104. 
15 Ibid. p. 101. 
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which is ostensibly against leprosy is therefore probably less practical than Kristeva 
thinks. Maccoby goes on to explain that many diseases which are far more infectious 
were not included in the ritual purity system. He believes that the banishment of the so 
called leper stems from his or her appearance. It is the visible breaking down of inside 
and outside at the level of the skin which must be removed from sight. In her discussion 
of this prohibition Kristeva also highlights the visibility of skin disease and the 
troublingly evident breaking down of the most basic of boundaries between inside and 
outside that accompanies it. 
Maccoby lends further support to Kristeva's claim that the purity laws work to 
purge Judaism's roots in the religions of the archaic Mother Goddess in his discussion of 
the rite of the Red Cow. In this rite a Red Cow is sacrificed and its ashes (once mixed 
with water) provide a source of purification against the most severe form of impurity 
which is corpse-impurity. This purification rite manifestly mixes both purity and impurity 
because in the preparation and performance of it the participants become unclean. This 
admixture reinforces Kristeva's assertion that the pure and the impure are logically 
complicit. A complicity which she believes can be located within the Hebrew word t'bh 
or to'ebah which demonstrates the `economic inseparability of pure and impure in the 
Bible, ' and means an abomination that is also a prohibition, a defilement that is also a 
law. 17 
In the ritual of the Red Cow the expression which the scriptures use to designate 
the purifying water-cum-ashes is mei niddah which is usually translated as `waters of 
purification'. Maccoby, however, explains that `(... ) the word "niddah " has been used in 
Leviticus with only one meaning, "menstruation ". (... ) the Red Cow's ashes when mixed 
with water, are called "water of menstruation"'. '$ He reads the rite as one which bears 
witness to a prior age in which menstrual blood was revered for its healing and purifying 
power. Menstrual blood is usually defined as impure within Leviticus but recoded as 
water and ashes it is able to function as a substance of purification. The ceremony is `the 
16 Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and its Place in Judaism, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 118-19.1 return to Kristeva's and Maccoby's thinking around the 
status and significance of skin in my chapter on the writings of Charlotte Delbo. 
17 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 107. 
" Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, pp. 106-07. 
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last vestige in the religion of the Israelite Sky-God of the earth-goddess'. 19 It provides a 
further example of the disavowed feminine within the purity rituals of Judaism. 
In the chapter `... Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi, ' Kristeva shifts her analysis from 
Judaism to a consideration of Christian articulations of the abject. In Christianity she 
suggests that the threat of the abject `comes no longer from outside but from within'. 20 
This interiorizing of the abject produces a Christian subject riven by an inner division. As 
Kristeva explains, `evil, thus displaced into the subject, will not cease tormenting him 
from within, no longer as a polluting or defiling substance, but as the ineradicable 
repulsion of his henceforth divided and contradictory being'. 21 In contrast to Judaism, 
where it is thrust aside, Christianity spiritualizes the abject. Impurity is now man's 
responsibility, it originates in personal conduct. The impure is `subordinated to judgment 
and dependent upon the subject' and as such `assumes the status not of a substance that 
is cut off but of an action that is indecent'. 22 
This brief summary of Kristeva's social history of differing religious responses to 
the abject demonstrates the changing ways in which the subject experiences abjection. 
These are culturally and historically specific. The question that arises for Kristeva after 
this historical detour is how abjection comes to be coded in a secular world. The 
contemporary Western world is one in which religious structures have ceased to hold the 
power and relevance previously associated with them. It is now the avant-garde literature 
which acts to safeguard the subject from the abject. In the present, `owing to the crisis in 
Christianity, abjection elicits more archaic responses that are culturally prior to sin; 
through them it again assumes its biblical status, and beyond it that of defilement in 
primitive societies'. 23 This crisis is one precipitated by the collapse of the Other; the 
symbolic death of God or the Father. In the shadow of this demise the aesthetic task 
becomes `a descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct' and `amounts to 
retracing the fragile limits of the speaking being, closest to its dawn, to the bottomless 
`primacy" constituted by primal repression'. 24 Modern literature writes into the abyss. It 
19 Ibid. p. 112. 
20 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 114. 
21 Ibid. p. 116. 
22 Ibid. p. 1 19. 
23 Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
24 Ibid. p. 18. 
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writes towards the abject, approaching symbolic collapse, not in order to resist it but 
rather to unveil it. This literature provides `an elaboration, a discharge, and a hollowing 
out of abjection through the Crisis of the Word'. 25 Literature works to articulate the 
abject and thereby void it. The author Louis-Ferdinand Celine provides Kristeva's 
primary example of this kind of literature although other writers including Artaud, 
Baudelaire, Bataille, Borges, Dostoyevsky, Joyce, Kafka, Lautreamont, Proust and Sartre 
are also mentioned. 
It is important to note that Kristeva privileges writing as the site within which the 
abject is at once hypostatized and hollowed out. In a number of readings of Powers of 
Horror the importance of writing as a way of manifesting the abject in contemporary 
society is neglected. The focus is instead placed on the kind of physical demonstrations 
of the abject detailed in the book's opening chapter. The abject is too simply equated with 
piss, shit, vomit, viscera, and corpses. For Kristeva the abject is also intimately connected 
with language and specifically with avant-garde literature. It cannot be disputed that shit 
and death often form the subject-matter of the kind of abject writing that Kristeva goes on 
to analyze but it is also certain that the style of this writing is as important as its content. 
This chapter attempts to redress the neglect that the final third of Powers of Horror has 
met with. It is here that abject writing is examined in some detail by Kristeva. The 
chapter will also assess the merit of the reservations some have expressed about 
Kristeva's choice of Celine as her privileged example of this kind of writing. 
Before undertaking this analysis it will, however, be necessary to briefly 
summarize how Kristeva conceived of language at the time when Powers of Horror was 
written. The key text to consider in this context is Revolution in Poetic Language, which 
formed Kristeva's doctoral thesis. It explores the way that poetic language can destabilize 
the symbolic aspect of signification. As Kristeva elaborates in her thesis, language 
possesses both a semiotic and a symbolic aspect. The semiotic is composed of the 
`rhythm, intonation, and echolalias of the mother-child symbiosis'. 26 It is marked by the 
drives, which are channeled through the guidance of the mother; thereby becoming 
discursive and socially conditioned. The symbolic is that place within the Symbolic order 
25 Ibid. p. 208. 
26 Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 34. 
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wherein the subject can take up a position and provides the mode of communication 
rather than the means by which communication takes place. The voice as the material 
support of speech - the tone, the rhythm - would be on the side of the semiotic whereas 
the words themselves - not the way they are articulated - would be on the side of the 
symbolic. The two aspects aggravate each other and thereby animate language. The 
semiotic and the symbolic are not solely present in speech, they also both manifest 
themselves in literary texts which comprise of both a phenotext and a genotext. The 
phenotext is allied to the symbolic whilst the genotext is associated with the semiotic. The 
two can `be separated only for the purposes of exposition'. 27 The phenotext is that part of 
the text concerned with communication whilst the genotext describes the style by which 
that communication is carried out. In avant-garde literature stylistic innovations can often 
act to privilege the semiotic element of language. To lose the symbolic element entirely, 
however, would be to descend into psychosis; it would be to lose the self. The avant- 
garde writer therefore often flirts with psychosis. Theirs is a writing that endangers the 
self. The two examples Kristeva uses to illustrate the writing practice of the avant-garde 
and its revolutionary potential are the French poets Stephane Mallarme and the Comte de 
Lautreamont. The part of Revolution in Poetic Language where this exposition occurs has 
not so far been translated. Revolution in Poetic Language is divided into three parts, of 
which only the first part has so far been published in full in English. 28 
As part of the analysis of Lautreamont's Les Chants de Maldoror, Kristeva 
describes how numerous passages in the poetry describe a poetic subject that is divided. 
The subject embodies a lived dialectic. This divided subject demonstrates that "I" is no 
longer an instance but is instead `un mouvement rythmique, une dynamique 
ondulatoire'. 29 The "I" never is but is always in the process of becoming. The kinetic 
force behind this rhythmic becoming is created by the perpetual tension that exists 
between the semiotic and the symbolic. The two aspects of signification function to 
sustain each other in a continual oscillation. This dialectic is not one wherein the terms 
can become reconciled through the advent of a third term. The disappearance of either 
27 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, (Durham, Duke University Press, 
1992), p. 114. 
`K For a discussion of the translation of Revolution in Poetic Language see Sara Beardsworth, Julia 
Kristeva: Psychoanalysis and Modernity, (Albany: SUNY, 2004), fn. 1, p. 278. 
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term would also be disastrous. The absence of a symbolic dimension to signification 
would cause the subject to descend into psychosis. The removal of the dynamic semiotic 
element would result in stasis and totalitarianism. The semiotic and the symbolic co-exist 
in a productive antagonism. 30 This antagonism is, however, never constant. At certain 
instances either the semiotic or the symbolic is privileged and ascendant. 
In her analysis of Mallarme and Lautreamont, Kristeva examines how the two 
poets worked in different ways to disrupt the advantageous position occupied by the 
symbolic in language. The underside to this dominant mode of signification offered the 
glimpse of an alternative state of things, it held a revolutionary potential. The poets 
worked to overturn convention, to liberate verse from culturally concretized laws of 
meter and prosody. 31 Mallarme freed the semiotic aspect of language suppressed by 
traditional verse structure. This was achieved through the `division du sens, de la 
proposition, du mot; perte de leur identite au profit d'un rythme, dune musique, d'une 
melodie'. 32 In the case of Mallarme, however, this renewed sonorousness in verse, this 
revealed musicality, was also supplemented by a graphic dimension. As Kristeva 
explains, `ä ces resources proprement vocaliques sejoignent les "procedes graphiques: " 
les traits d'un grapheme, la disposition dans la page, les longueurs des lignes, les blancs, 
etc, etc., qui contribuent ä construire une "totalfite semiotique " interpretable dans des 
directions multiples, substitut de 1'unite thetique, disposition provisoire et fragile du 
proces signifiant'. 33 Mallarme therefore works language at both the level of appearance 
and sound, introducing fractures in the symbolic and thereby causing the semiotic 
29 `(... ) a rhythmic motion, an undulating dynamic'. Kristeva, La revolution du langage poetique, p. 320. 
'0 See Lechte & Margaroni, Julia Kristeva, p. 17. 
31 See Kristeva, La revolution du langage poetique, pp. 212-13. 
32 `Scission of sense, of clause, of the word; the loss of their identity in favour of a rhythm, of a music, of a 
melody'. Ibid. p. 212. 
33 `These properly vocal resources are joined by graphic processes: the lines of lettering, their layout on 
the page, the length of the lines, the blanks etc., which go towards constructing a semiotic totality open to 
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underside to rise to the surface. The stasis at the level of meaning which the symbolic 
functions to ensure is disrupted and sense proliferates. The visual dimension to the 
practice of writing which Kristeva details here will be explored further in relation to 
Celine's pamphlets and also in the context of the manuscripts which were buried by 
members of the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz. 
The analyses of both Mallarme and, to a lesser extent, Lautreamont, in Revolution 
in Poetic Language demonstrate the way language can be reinvigorated through syntactic 
invention. The interference that avant-garde literature effects at the level of grammar and 
meter, the noise it introduces into language, contains a revolutionary potential because it 
opens the symbolic to a possible reappropriation on improved terms. In a writer like 
Celine, however, this reappropriation does not take place. 34 The noise is never eliminated. 
Mallarme and Lautreamont demonstrated that language was not fixed and that convention 
should not be mistaken for concretion. The liberation of the semiotic in their literature 
acts as a reminder that language is malleable and meaning is multiple. Celine's writing 
shares many traits with the work of the two Nineteenth century poets. It occurs in a 
different historical context, however, at a time when the spirit of revolution had been 
replaced by the torpor of signification that accompanied totalitarianism. Totalitarianism 
introduces the inertia that is a telos; it provides a point of fixity for meaning. It is against 
this backdrop that Celine writes towards the abject and the loss of the symbolic. He 
writes towards the horror; the horror which Kristeva describes as forming `the "drive 
multiple interpretation and substituting a provisional and fragile mode of signification for one of thetic 
unity'. Ibid. p. 219. 
'4 See Julia Kristeva, `On Celine, Music and the "Blunder", ' in Julia Kristeva, Interviews, Ed. Ross 
Mitchell Guberman, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 231. 
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foundations " of fascism'. 35 It may be this writing towards the horror which causes him to 
identify so strongly with the politics of fascism in his everyday life. He writes towards 
the reason for his own political failings. Yet this writing offers an alternative to extreme 
politics because it demonstrates that the abject can be mastered in the aesthetic realm 
through `literary devices and writing style'. 36 Totalitarian politics does not seek to purge 
horror but, instead, manipulates the powers of horror to its advantage. The crisis in 
subjectivity posed by the potential for unmediated contact with the abject causes a desire 
for identification with an authority figure, a personage embodying the paternal function; a 
Duce, a Franco, or a Führer. The dictator shores up the symbolic. Modernist art and 
literature is shunned by totalitarian regimes because it provides a space within which 
catharsis can take place. The aesthetic realm by elaborating the abject also evacuates it. It 
purges and purifies. Perversely Celine's writing practice posed a significant threat to the 
politics he endorsed because it could potentially render the role those politics served in 
the psycho-social realm redundant. 
Celine's journey towards the abject, towards the outside of the subject, is one 
Kristeva retraces in her own writing. Powers of Horror is a sinking into horror, a descent 
towards the abject. The abject is the outside to inside and outside; the before of language 
and the beyond of difference. It is not the trace of the Real as it is manifested by the 
drives in language. It is the drives before they are divided and mapped, before they are 
bound to the symbolic. It is matter before it is made to mean. It is matter unnamed. It is 
the noise of the semiotic prior to its meshing and shaping within the symbolic. Abjection 
is the process by which the abject is cast outside. It is the banishment of the unbounded. 
35 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 155. 
36 Kristeva, `On Celine, ' p. 231. 
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It is the means by which a boundary is brought into being. The experience of abjection 
both protects and imperils. It safeguards because it causes the subject to retch and reject 
the abject. It imperils because it brings the subject into a state of intimacy with its origins. 
The abject is unsettling because it refuses to be positioned and ruled. It is elusive. The 
uncertain nature of the abject may explain why there is a lack of conceptual clarity in 
Kristeva's own theorization of it. This conceptual slippage that characterizes the abject in 
Powers of Horror is also reflected in this thesis. The abject by its very nature refuses 
definition therefore the definitions that are given at various times in the chapters that 
follow should be understood as provisional. The `meaning' of the abject is in perpetual 
flux and it is into this fluxion that Kristeva was pulled by her own fascination with 
horror; a horror that is unfixed and unfixable, the horror of unfixity. Kristeva mirrors 
Celine's journey into the night. She herself descends into darkness. Tales of Love, 
however, marks her return from the night. It constitutes the reappropriation of the 
paternal function that Celine failed to accomplish. In Tales of Love, Kristeva postulates 
the existence of a non-symbolic third in the Imaginary realm, an imaginary father. The 
imaginary father has the status of a non-object that attracts the proto-subject. The subject- 
to-be identifies with the imaginary father. This identification takes place before the 
rejection of the mother. As Kristeva explains, the identification with `the imaginary 
father, who is such a godsend that you have the impression that it is he who is transferred 
into you, withstands a process of rejection involving what may have been chaos and is 
about to become an "abject "'. 37 The mother is rejected but a connection is maintained 
with the figure of the imaginary father. This connection protects against the `emptiness of 
37 Kristeva, Tales of Love, p. 41. 
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separation'. 38 The imaginary father is a `forming presence' that draws the infant into the 
imaginary exchange. 39 It enables the mirror-stage to take place. In Tales of Love, Kristeva 
posits the existence of a third term prior to the role of the Father in the Oedipus complex. 
This third term embraces the infant as it looses its bond with the mother. It acts as an 
antidote to the solitude that attends rejection. 
Celine's writing is one that rejects without establishing the requisite connection 
that would ward of this emptiness. There is no tale of love in his writing, only hatred and 
loathing. He is a hate-filled writer, committed to exposing the Jews for the villains he 
perceives them to be and through this to saving France. He tries to mask his hatred 
behind morality; by writing the pamphlets he is doing the `right thing'. As Theodor W. 
Adorno writes - as part of his critique of Sartre's What is Literature? - there `was no foul 
deed committed even under fascism that did not clothe itself in a moral justification'. 40 
The modern reader usually reads through Celine's dissembling (as indeed did many of his 
contemporaries) to the inexcusable and irrational hatred that underlies the pamphlets. The 
sensible reader gags at Celine's loathing, manifesting what might be termed a visceral 
ethics. The reader physically recoils at the content of the pamphlets. This content is often 
extreme: 
Les Juifs, racialement, sont des monstres, des hybrides loupes, tirailles qui 
doivent disparaitre. Tout ce qu'ils trafiquent, tout ce qu'ils manigancent est 
maudit. Dans 1'elevage humain, ce ne sont, tout bluff ä part, que bätards 
gangreneux, ravageurs, pourisseurs. Le Juif na jamais ete persecute par les 
Aryens. II s'est persecute lui-meme. II est le damne de sa propre substance, des 
tiraillements de sa viande d'hybride. D'oü cet etat de plastronage perpetuel, de 
31 Ibid. p. 42. 
39 Ibid. p. 43. 
40 Theodor W. Adorno, `Commitment, ' in Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature: Volume 2, Trans. 
Shierry Weber Nicholson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 92. 
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dervicherie compensatrice, cette arrogance, cet extravagant culot, cette jactance 
saoulante, cette effronterie brailleuse, si degueulasse, si repugnante. 41 
This kind of writing encourages hatred of the Jews (although precisely who the Jews are 
varies throughout the pamphlets) and demonstrates Celine's sympathy with some of the 
policies advocated by Hitler. Indeed a general sympathy with the leaders of European 
fascism is made explicit, `personellement je trouve Hitler, Franco, Mussolini 
fabuleusement debonnaires, admirablement magnanimes, infiniment trop ä mon sens, 
pacifistes belants pour tout dire, ä 250 Prix Nobel, hors contours, par acclamations! '. 42 
There is something hyperbolic about this admiration, as there is with the hatred. An 
excessive admiration is evinced which needs to be considered. Even if the intention is to 
exaggerate things for effect, this excess in the language may work to undermine the 
ostensible point that Celine is trying to make. The written resists the intention of the 
writer. Bagatelles pour un massacre was interpreted as an immense joke by Andre Gide 
who praised the pamphlet. 43 He did not express similar sentiments about the two 
subsequent pamphlets but Gide demonstrates that the meanings writing accrues exceed 
the author's intent. Writing will not collaborate with its author. 
Who was the author of the pamphlets? Louis-Ferdinand Destouches (1894-1961) 
was one of France's most important authors in the inter-war years. He usually wrote 
under the pseudonym Louis-Ferdinand Celine (his mother's first name was Louise- 
Celine). His earliest novel Voyage au bout de la nuit (Journey to the End of the Night) 
published in 1932 was a best-seller. It follows the life of the character Ferdinand 
Bardamu, beginning with his experiences in the First World War - through journeys to 
French colonial Africa and the United States of America - ending up with an account of 
41 `Racially, the Jews are monsters, flawed half-breeds, a plague that needs to disappear. All that they 
peddle and scheme is cursed. In terms of human breeding they are, all kidding aside, gangrenous hybrids, 
pests, putrefactors. The Jew has never been persecuted by the Aryans. The Jew persecuted himself. He is 
damned by his own body, by the tugging of the hybrid meat that he is. From this comes a state of perpetual 
swaggering, of compensatory uppitiness, the arrogance, the incredible cheek, the head-spinning conceit, 
the vociferous effrontery, which is so disgusting and repellant, originates. ' (translation my own). Louis- 
Ferdinand Celine, L'ecole des cadavres, (Paris; Denöel, 1938), p. 108. 
42 `Personally I find Hitler, Franco and Mussolini to be wonderfully good-natured, admirably 
magnanimous, in fact in my opinion far too much so, bleating pacifists really, to the tune of 250 Nobel 
Prizes, awarded outside of the competition, by acclaim! ' (translation my own). Ibid. p. 62. 
43 See Philippe Almeras, `feline's Masquerade, ' in feline and the Politics of Difference, p. 75. Hannah 
Arendt discusses Gide's reaction to the pamphlet in The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, 
1950), p. 335. 
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his time as a doctor working in one of the poorer districts of Paris. His second novel Mort 
ä Credit (Death on Credit), from 1936, was more stylistically innovative and less well 
received. Both books are based loosely on Celine's own life. From his first-hand 
knowledge of the sufferings of the Parisian poor Celine might have been expected to 
sympathize with socialism but instead he identified increasingly with rightwing politics 
both in the run-up to and during the Second World War. Between 1936 and 1942, Celine 
wrote four `pamphlets'. These book length compositions were ostensibly satirical tracts. 
The first, Mea Culpa, is an attack upon communism and the USSR. The remaining three, 
Bagatelles pour un massacre (1937), L'ecole des cadavres (1938) and Les beaux draps 
(1941) are all primarily anti-Semitic diatribes. It is these works which chiefly contributed 
to Celine's pariah status after the war. During the Occupation he had friends in the 
German authorities and was considered by the French SS leader Helmut Knochen as a 
possible member of the Advisory Committee for the Office Central Juif. 44 Not all those 
German who knew Celine, however, were entirely taken by him. Ernst Jünger, for 
example, stated in his journal that `there is in him the look that maniacs have, turned 
inward, which shines as from the bottom of a hole'. 45 Celine also did not always turn his 
back on opponents of the occupation. In 1941 he lobbied the Prefet of Finistere to try and 
prevent the execution of a Breton, Noel L'Helgouarch who had cut a telephone cable 
leading to a German post. His intervention was unsuccessful. He was also reputed to have 
given medical treatment to members of the Resistance. 46 In June 1944 Celine did, 
however, turn his back on France, leaving for Germany accompanied by his wife Lucette 
and his pet cat Bebert. In Germany they went first to a hotel in Baden-Baden as guests of 
the Reich Foreign Ministry, then to a country estate at Kränzlin, ending up at 
Sigmaringen with most of the rest of the collaborators who had fled France. Celine felt 
unsafe at Sigmaringen and moved to Denmark in March 1945. He was to remain there in 
exile until 1951 when he returned to France after he was granted an amnesty for the 
sentence of one year's imprisonment handed down at his trial in absentia in 1950. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, in his essay `Qu'est-ce qu'un collaborateur?, ' written in 
August 1945, provides a psychological appraisal of the collaborator which might 
44 Nicholas Hewitt, The Life of Celine, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 213. 
45 Ibid. fn. 71. p. 318. 
46 Ibid. p. 215. 
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potentially provide some insight into Celine's character. 47 In the essay, Sartre 
understands collaboration to be a normal phenomenon equitable with crime and suicide. 48 
The collaborator lives in ignorance of their collaborationist tendencies until favourable 
conditions for the trait to manifest itself arise. Collaboration cannot be confounded with a 
single form of politics (e. g. fascism) nor can it be linked to a particular class (e. g. the 
bourgeoisie). Rather for Sartre, it is a decision taken by an individual uninfluenced by 
such factors. In fact membership of a class or a strong political affiliation would probably 
make collaboration less likely. The fact that many of the collaborators originated in the 
bourgeoisie might, therefore, be understood to demonstrate the fragility of such a class 
identity. The collaborator usually originates in the unassimilated elements of society, in 
what we might call society's constitutive outside. For Sartre, those with a propensity for 
crime and those likely to commit suicide also derive from the social margins, hence the 
connection he establishes between the three. The collaborator may come from the fringes 
of the main political parties, from the upper echelons of the clergy (unhinged by the 
influence of Rome, hence out of touch with the grassroots of French Catholicism) and 
from royalist remnants in the bourgeoisie. For Sartre, the collaborators mainly emerge 
from the `dechet social, ' the detritus of the social. 49 
Having examined the social origins of collaboration, Sartre goes on to study its 
psychological aspect. He finds that the collaborator will submit to any fait accompli 
whatever form it takes. These traitors confuse the fact that one must live with an event 
with the morality of its occurrence. Because it has happened the traitor presumes it is for 
the best. He has only a vague notion of progress, in which all change is perceived as 
progressive. The quisling goes with the flow, unconcerned by where current events will 
lead him. With the defeat of France he turned morality on its head, `le collaborateur 
realiste fait une morale renversee: au lieu dejuger le fait ä la lumiere du droit, ilfonde le 
droll sur le fait'. 50 The fact of the occupation of France is not judged by its legitimacy, 
rather the fact of the occupation is what lends it legitimacy, is what legitimates. 
47 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Qu'est ce qu'un collaborateur?, ' in Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations III, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1949). 
4£ Ibid. p. 43. 
49 Ibid. p. 49. 
So `The collaborator who is a realist constructs a reverse morality: instead ofjudging the fact in the light of 
its legitimacy, legitimacy is founded on the fact' (translation my own). Ibid. p. 55. 
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Legitimacy occurs after the fact. Sartre perceives the collaborator as someone who seeks 
to replace the juridical relations of reciprocity and equality between men and nations with 
a return to a kind of feudal bond between lord and vassal. He elaborates: 
... tres certainment 
la liaison feodale du collaborateur ä son maitre, a un aspect 
sexuel. Pour autant qu'on puisse concevoir 1 'etat d'esprit de la collaboration, on 
y devine comme un climat de feminite. Le collaborateurparle au nom de la force, 
mais il n 'est pas la force: il est la ruse, /'astute qui s'appuie sur la force, il est 
meine le charme et la seduction puisqu'il pretend jouer de 1'attrait que la culture 
francaise exerce, d'apres lui, sur les Allemands. II me parait qu'il ya lä un 
curieux melange de masochisme et d'homosexualite. Les milieux homosexuels 
parisiens d'ailleurs, ontfourni de nombreuses et brillantes recrues. 51 
This relation between the master and the bondsman has a sexual aspect to it. For Sartre, 
the question of collaboration is not one of class but of sexuality. The collaborator - who 
seems to be exclusively male given the examples Sartre lists throughout his essay - is 
female. Celine's pamphlets seem too ugly to fit this gendering - their language is too 
forceful and vulgar - and do not display the tergiversation that Sartre finds in the 
feminine. The meaning of the pamphlets is not insidious. These are not feuilles-fatales 
luring the unsuspecting reader to hate. In the final third of L'ecole des cadavers, Celine 
mocks the reader who is contemptuous of his work, writing, 'Si vous m'avez lu jusqu'au 
ici c'est deja du temperament, c'est dejä la preuve d'une haine solide'. 52 The politics of 
the pamphlets are given to the reader up front. The reader who reads more than a few 
lines knows something of the author's viewpoint, of the writing's content, and can choose 
not to go on. Celine intimates that the reader who has read so far into the pamphlet must 
be taking some kind of pleasure from their reading. 
The kind of writing that would fit Sartre's description of the collaborator would 
be one which was more duplicitous than the prose of the pamphlets. It would be an abject 
writing in the moral sense of the term. The collaborator is a mistress of deception. 
51 `... most definitely the feudal relationship between the collaborator and his master has a sexual element 
to it. In as much as we can conceive of the state of mind of the collaborator, one would guess it to be 
feminine in nature. The collaborator speaks in the name of power but is not that power, he is the cunning 
one, the shrewd one who finds support in power, he is even spell-binding and seductive because he asserts 
and uses the attraction he believes French culture exerts over the Germans. To me it appears that a curious 
mixture of masochism and homosexuality exists there. Paris's homosexual meeting places provided a 
number of talented recruits in fact' (translation my own). Sartre, `Qu'est-ce qu'un collaborateur?, ' p. 58. 
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Collaborationist writing would therefore be expected to display similar artifice. Kristeva 
describes the turncoat as abject in Powers of Horror. Abjection involves `the traitor, the 
liar, the criminal with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is 
a savior... '. 53 It is `immoral, sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, a 
hatred that smiles, a passion that uses the body for barter instead of inflaming it, a debtor 
who sells you up, a friend who stabs YOU... 1.54 The closest writing to abjection - to a 
collaborationist writing - that Sartre defines is poetry. Poetry is described as a `trap to 
capture fleeting reality, ' which does not act upon the world but rather receives it. 55 The 
poetic word is an image not a sign, the world is reflected in the word rather than the word 
reflecting the world. The poetic word seduces the world, entices it into language, it is a 
space waiting for the world. It bears some of the characteristics of the collaborator. 
Perhaps this is why Sartre will not even countenance the poetry of the resistance fighter 
Pierre Emmanuel as an example of committed literature; it is polluted with feeling. It is 
too feminine. The words have `ambiguous properties' which get in the way of 
communication. 56 But Celine does not appear to be a poet by Sartre's definition. Sartre 
explicitly contrasts the writing of poetry with the writing of pamphlets. Pamphlets 
express things whereas in poetry the words dispossess the writer of expression. 
Qu'est ce qu'un collaborateur? also workd to frame the collaborator as 
homosexual. 57 Homosexuality is equated with femininity by Sartre. In Vichy France the 
collaborators used their powers of seduction - their feminine wiles - to gain acceptance 
by the German occupying force. Their allure is based upon the cultural make-up of 
France, its learned appeal. Sartre finds evidence for the feminization of the French nation 
in the work of several writers, amongst them, Robert Brasillach and Pierre-Eugene Drieu 
La Rochelle. 58 He writes that these writers use queer metaphors `qui presentent les 
52 'If you've read this far you've already shown character, there's already proof of a sound hate'. Celine, 
L'ecole des cadavres, p. 213. 
53 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, Trans. Bernard Frechtman, (London: Methuen & Co, 1967), p. 6. 
56 Ibid. p. 10. 
57 The homosexual also became the collaborator (e. g. scapegoat) in the United States during the McCarthy 
era although this time their bedfellow was communism. See Axel Madsen, The Sewing Circle, (London: 
Robson Books, 1998), p. 193. 
5" Sartre, `Qu'est-ce qu'un Collaborateur?, ' p. 58. Drieu La Rochelle was a well known writer in France in 
the inter-war years. He was director of the Nouvelle Revue Francaise during the occupation and committed 
suicide in 1945. Coincidentally, La Rochelle wrote an extended essay on the subject of suicide, entitled 
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relations de la France et de 1 Allemagne sous 1'aspect d'une union sexualle oü la France 
joue la role de la femme'. 59 The woman here is a woman-man as Sartre's subsequent 
comments about masochism and homosexuality make clear. The choice of Brasillach is 
therefore far from accidental, not because he feminized the French Republic - describing 
it as `an old syphilitic whore, stinking of patchouli and yeast infection' - but because he 
was a homosexual. 60 Brasillach is a gay collaborator. In her book The Collaborator, Alice 
Yaeger Kaplan discusses the connections that were made by the prosecution at 
Brasillach's trial between collaboration and sexuality. The author was accused of 
`horizontal collaboration' with the Nazis, a charge usually leveled against French women 
who had slept with German soldiers . 
61 Kaplan reads this preoccupation with 
homosexuality as symptomatic of a crisis in masculinity in France in the immediate 
aftermath of the occupation, a crisis generated because French men had `felt defeated and 
powerless for four years'. 62 The French man had felt passive, had felt `feminine'. France 
felt shafted. Sartre's essay would seem to support such an interpretation. His essay also 
acts to delineate the collaborator - the collaborator is delineated as without delineation, as 
ambiguous, as a person who doesn't fit in anywhere, as an outsider - in order to construct 
a clear demarcation between the men of the resistance and the `women' who supported 
the Vichy regime. As Jean Amery explains, this is because `the resistance movement 
during and right after the war became the psychic foundation upon which the nation 
rested'. 63 Clear distinctions are needed. The collaborators must be clearly demarcated in 
order to secure the legacy of the resistance. 
`Recit Secret, ' which was published posthumously. See Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Recit secret, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1961), pp. 6-44. Sartre also mentions Drieu La Rochelle's collaboration in What is Literature?, 
pp. 46-7. & pp. 145-46. 
59 Metaphors `which present Franco-German relations as a kind of sexual union in which France plays the 
role of the woman' (translation my own). Ibid. 
60 This quotation from Brasillach is taken from Alice Yaeger Kaplan's The Collaborator - The Trial and 
Execution of Robert Brasillach, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 41. This does not seem to 
mirror the kind of enticing femininity Sartre describes. It is not the content of Brasillach's writing that 
interests Sartre so much as the sexuality of the author. 
61 For a discussion of `horizontal collaboration' in this context, see Megan Koreman, The Expectation of 
Justice: France 1944-1946, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 108-114. On p. 112. Koreman 
offers a symbolic reading of horizontal collaboration as a form of perceived `conquest' by the Germans. 
62 Kaplan, The Collaborator, p. 164. 
63 Jean Amery, Preface to the Future: Culture in a Consumer Societe', (London: Constable, 1964), p. 18. 
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M(anus)cripts 
The anxiety Sartre manifests about sexuality in his essay on collaboration seems 
to have manifested itself prior to the fall of France. We can trace his uneasiness back to 
the War Diaries which were written towards the beginning of the war. It is here that 
Sartre first articulates his fascination with holes in a discussion which he will later 
incorporate into Being and Nothingness. In these passages written in December 1939 
Sartre seeks to reclaim `holes' from the Freudian school of psychoanalysis, `Freud will 
consider that all holes, for the child, are symbolic anuses which attract him as a function 
of that kinship - whereas for my part I wonder whether the anus is not, in the child, an 
object of lust because it is a hole'. 64 He claims that the infant's fascination with holes 
originates in a holeness that is anterior to their relation to that `lyrical hole' of the anus. 65 
This meditation on holes occurs immediately after some paragraphs about viscosity and 
disgust. Sigmund Freud's own initial arguments about the anus-hole in On Sexuality 
appear straight after a section titled `Sexual Use of the Mucous Membranes of the Lips 
and Mouth, ' a section which is primarily about the `feeling of disgust'. 66 Sartre may well 
have been sleeping with Freud's writings on sexuality in December 1939. The 
philosopher certainly demonstrates an interest in sexuality some years prior to writing 
Qu'est-ce qu'un collaborateur? In the diaries Sartre writes that `the child who holds back 
his faeces in order to enjoy the pleasure of excretion' has `no means of guessing that he 
has an anus, nor that this anus presents a similarity with the holes into which - 
immediately - he seeks to put his fingers'. 
67 The hole precedes the anus-hole. The 
fascination with the posterior opening is not a fascination with the posterior but with its 
holeness. The hole `is first and foremost what is not'. 68 The hole is negation. The hole 
opens us to nothingness. There is nothing there in the hole. The hole is a nonentity. The 
hole as `not' attracts us, `the vertiginous thrill of the hole comes from the fact that it 
64 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939-40, Trans. Quintin Hoare (London: 
Verso, 1999), p. 149. 
6s Ibid. 
66 Sigmund Freud, On Sexuality, Trans. James Strachey, (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 63-64. 
67 Sartre, War Diaries, p. 149. 
6" Ibid. p. 150. 
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proposes annihilation, it rescues f om facticity'. 69 The hole takes us out of the world. We 
go from something to nothing. In this sense suicide is a becoming hole. The person who 
commits suicide holes themselves. They become an absence in the world. This attraction 
for the hole is `accompanied by repulsion and anguish'. The thought of escape into the 
infinite not is tempered by the love of life. We abject the hole in order to continue to be. 
Sartre removes the hole from a discourse about sexuality but the hole is not placed 
outside gender. The hole often resists, `it must be forced, in order to pass through' and as 
such `it is already feminine'. 70 The hole is modest. This is why `it attracts sexuality' . 
71 
The act of poking into a hole `is rape, breaking-in, negation'. 72 The hole is feminine, 
although here femininity is not passive for Sartre, femininity is equated with resistance. 
The hole is described as a `nocturnal female organ of nature, skylight to Nothingness, 
symbol of chaste and violated refusals, mouth of shadows which engulfs or assimilates'. 73 
The hole is poetry. It seems to form part of the poetic language Sartre describes in What 
is Literature? It is a `mirror of the world'. 74 The hole is a nothing that Sartre fills with 
images of the world. The word is a mirror which the poet passes reflections in front of. 
Here Sartre passes reflections across the word-hole. All mirrors are holes and all holes 
are mirrors. The mirror which had nothing to reflect - which reflected nothing - would 
not be. It would become the hole. The hole beneath holes. Sartre never knows the hole - 
his writing always already fills the hole - the word `hole' is a hole cover. To see a `hole' 
and know it as such is to fill it up, to not its notness. To describe the hole is to make it 
something. The word without image within or sign without would be the hole; the 
impossible word that would word nothingness without destroying it. 
In the War Diaries the sexual hole is the vagina. The anus-hole if it is sought out 
for sexual pleasures is therefore a pseudo-vagina. A man who desires another man's hole 
actually desires a man-woman's hole. The poking into a hole is `pre-sexual' but the hole 
is always already sexed. 75 There seems to be a tension in these passages around holes and 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. p. 151. 
" Ibid. 
72 Ibid. Sartre goes on to say that breaking into a hole is not solely a violation but also a fulfillment. To plug 
a hole is to make good a lack, to achieve a feeling of plenitude, a sense of wholeness. 
" Ibid. p. 152. 
74 Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 6. By filling the hole Sartre is, of course, asserting his masculinity. 
75 Sartre, War Diaries, p. 149. 
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sexuality. Sartre writes of the hole taking on sexual significance only at a secondary level 
when the hole becomes `the basic layer of signification for the various species of sexual 
hole' but then finds holes innately feminine because of their quality of modesty. 76 The 
hole hides `nothing' from us. It resists giving up this nothingness, hence we poke it or 
peer into it. We coax it into revealing what it hides. Nothingness is therefore, by 
extension, also feminine. Woman is not in Sartre's world. Or woman is only as 
resistance, as a refusal to reveal the nothingness concealed behind the modesty. 
Resistance - like collaboration - is feminine. It differs from collaboration in that it is 
active; even in the appearing passivity of reticence. Modesty resists exorbitance. The 
collaborator and the resistor are both similar and different. What is certain is that in the 
War Diaries Sartre represses the possibility that a same sex hole might be fucked. 
On the Muscle 
The unease Sartre's writings manifest about sexuality should be understood as 
evidence of a more general malaise about masculinity that arose in the inter-war years. 
Celine (an epigraph from whose L'Eglise prefaces Sartre's Nausea), displays a similar 
unease about homosexuality in his pamphlets. The homosexual in the pamphlets is 
invariably Jewish. Celine believes the Jews subjugate those around them through acts of 
anal-penetration. As Thomas C. Spears writes, for Celine the Jew is `the most frightening 
incarnation of power: a menacing (negroid) phallus capable of relegating the Aryan, the 
Jew's victim and prey, to a position of subservience'. 77 In L'ecole des cadavres Celine 
quotes from a letter he supposedly received from an angry Jewish reader, `Les Youtres to 
deplanquent dans le trou du cul et si tu veux to faire enculer, tu Was qu'a nous avertir'. 78 
For Celine the Jew poses a threat to his masculinity. Having his hole filled by another 
man would be a form of emasculation. Celine is too `modest' to acknowledge that there is 
nothing in his hole; that he is already a woman although his very desire to resist the 
76 Ibid. p. 151. 
77 Thomas C. Spear `Virility and the Jewish `Invasion' in Celine's Pamphlets, ' in Eds. Rosemarie Scullion, 
Philip. H. Solomon & Thomas C. Spear, Celine and the Politics of Difference, (Hanover: University Press 
of New England), p. 99. 
78 'The Yids will reveal you through your arsehole and if you want to get fucked, you just have to let us 
know'. Celine, L'ecole des cadavres, p. 17. 
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exploration of his hole suggests this. The women that Celine admires are not passive, 
unlike the man-woman Sartre describes in Qu'est-ce qu'un collaborateur? Celine likes 
strong women, women who are not women within the parameters of femininity that 
Sartre sets out in his essay on collaboration. These are women who might rather be 
understood as women-men. Celine expresses a preference for muscular, puissant women. 
This fascination is manifested as early as Celine's first novel when Bardamu recollects 
his former lover Molly, he remembers `her kindness as if it were yesterday, and her long, 
blond, magnificently strong, lithe legs, noble legs' . 
79 In Mort ä Credit there is an episode 
in which the young Bardamu is waylaid on his way to boarding-school by a street vendor 
called Gwendoline who wants to make love to him, he describes her as not `ugly 
looking.. . she 
had charm in her way, even a kind of elegance... She had an ass on her and 
muscular thighs and cute little boobies'. 80 He adds later that she `could take care of 
herself, she was built like a wrestler, she would have turned me like a pancake if I'd 
started getting real mean! '. 81 This preoccupation carries on in the pamphlets. In 
Bagatelles pour un massacre there is a depiction of the young Russian agent called 
Nathalie who was assigned to guide Celine during his visit to the Soviet Union: 
`Physiquement, eile etait mignonne, une balte, solide, ferme, une blonde, des muscles 
82 comme son caractere, trempes'. 
Celine likes women of steel; he likes tempered, hardened bodies. Making sense of 
this desire is difficult. It might be argued that Celine fulfils the characteristic disposition 
that Sartre finds in the collaborator; he is a woman-man but wants a man-woman instead 
of a straight man. Celine is in denial. Is the strong woman necessarily a man-woman 
though? In her book about women's bodybuilding Bodymakers, Leslie Heywood believes 
the woman bodybuilder83 to be neither man nor woman, female bodybuilders show how 
`contradictions - between, for instance, hard bodies and soft ones; masculine bodies and 
79 Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Journey to the End of the Night, Trans. Ralph Manheim, (London: Calder, 
1997), p. 206. 
so Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Death on Credit, Trans. Ralph Manheim, (London: Calder, 1989), p. 214. 
81 ibid. p. 215. There are several other examples of Celine's fixation in the book, amongst them there is a 
maid whom Bardamu confesses to liking, described as having `an ass so muscular it was almost square' 
(p. 490) and another woman portrayed as having done hard labour that `had given her biceps that were no 
joke... they looked like hams' (p. 494). 
82 'Physically she was cute, a Bait, a blonde, heft', firm, with muscles like her personality, steely' 
(translation mine). Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Bagatelles pour un masscare, (Paris: Denöel, 1937), p. 362. 
83 A phenomenon absent during Celine's lifetime but one that would most likely have appealed to him. 
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feminine ones; bodies that seem like you can't mess with them and bodies that seem like 
you can; bodies shaped by hours and hours of hard work or by plastic surgery and bodies 
that are dull and shapeless and fat; bodies that own and create themselves and bodies 
that are created by someone and something else; bodies that act upon others and bodies 
that are acted upon by others; bodies that are made through technology like weights or 
surgery and bodies that refuse those things - are part of us all, both sides of the equation 
in us'. 84 The muscular `woman' is an undecidable. S/he brings to the surface a series of 
`contradictory cultural meanings' such that `it is impossible to reduce the female body 
and the femininity associated with it to one particular, natural, unchangeable thing'. 85 
S/he cannot be fixed within any of the oppositions or antinomies which are used to 
account for `her', rather s/he resists and disorganises them. Celine by desiring muscular 
women desires neither men nor women but both men and women, or perhaps a set of 
bodies that remain beyond either category, neither woman nor not-woman. What Celine 
wants resists pigeonholing. This resistance resists gendering, resists Sartre's gendering of 
resistance. 
Celine craves contour and matter more than sex. It is not breasts or buttocks he 
likes. Rather it is their texture, their firmness and solidity. He writes of a maid's breasts, 
`you can't imagine how hard they were... The more you shook them, the harder they 
got... They were solid rock'. 86 It would be possible to read this hardness as a fetish, a 
stand-in produced to make good the lack, the threat of castration. The firmness is a 
substitute for the mother's penis. 87 Muscles are pseudo-penises. Such a reading, whilst 
certainly a possibility; is not, however, obligatory. The desire for flesh that stands out, for 
hard bodies, might equally be interpreted as a desire for androgyny (despite the usual 
equation of hardness with masculinity, with the erection). Nathalie Gassel suggests that 
`une femme athlete superpuissante n'est plus une femme. C'est un mutant, un troisieme 
sexe, une androgyne'. She wishes that her own athletic body `soil tout entier comme un 88 
84 Leslie Heywood, Bodymakers: A Cultural Anatomy of Women's Bodybuilding, (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1998), pp. I 1-12. 
Rs Ibid. p. 1 1. 
86 Celine, Death on Credit, p. 490. 
"' See Sigmund Freud's `Fetishism' in Sigmund Freud, On Sexuality, Trans. James Strachey, (London: 
Penguin, 1991), pp. 351-57. 
8" `An extremely strong woman athlete is no longer a woman. She is a heteroclite, a third sex, 
androgynous' (translation my own). Nathalie Gassel, Musculatures, (Asnieres: Le Cercle, 2001), p. 92. 
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sexe qui bande'. 89 The body becomes an erection but not a sexed one, or if it must be 
sexed then one of a third sex. Celine desires matter first and foremost; he desires a body 
that has risen above and beyond itself, that has becomes a second skin resting upon the 
normative aforeskin. The primary body, the inherited body, the cultural body, the body 
that is no body, is anybody, the anonymous body, is not the body Celine looks for and at. 
He likes a cultured body that stands out from itself. The `sexiness' of these bodies resides 
not in the sex but in the flesh itself. These are bodies `a priori en dehors de toutes 
classifications sexuelles, et entierement sexues'. 90 These are bodies that have broken with 
the cultural template, bodies that push against the expected and the accepted, bodies like 
that of the woman who cracks `nuts with her fists... a staggering blow from way up, 
enough to split the table wide open. The whole work-shop shook.. . She was quite a 
number ... a 
former model ... I 
found that out later... The type appealed to me'. 91 These are 
bodies that are unexpected. Celine is seduced by the substantial. He desires the body that 
has definition. His prefers women with profiles. He seeks shape amidst the shapeless and 
likes women who appear to have given form to their bodies rather than allowing their 
bodies to be formed for them. These women design their bodies, consciously, 
unconsciously, or perhaps not at all, perhaps solely in the mind of the author. Design is a 
practice of outlining, a production of contours. 92 Celine likes women with curves, women 
with lines. His is a passion for circumscription. 
Celine's love of contours is motivated by the fear of a loss of contour. The 
muscular body has a certainty to it which Celine enjoys seeing. He appreciates the 
integrity of these bodies. They are inviolate. They provide `a demarcation between 
outside and in that you can rely on'. 93 Celine, however, lives in constant fear of corporeal 
violation, of having the boundaries of his body broken, intruded upon by another. He is 
afraid of losing his edge. This is what motivates him to takes pleasure in outlines. He 
likes to appreciate bodies, but from a distance. Celine's pleasures are often scopophilic. 
The recurring theme of voyeurism in his writings originates in this wish to savour the 
"9 She wishes that her body `was wholly like a hard member' (translation mine). Ibid. p. 55. 
90 These are bodies `before all else, outside of any sexing although entirely sexuate' (translation my own). 
Ibid. p. 46. 
91 Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Death on Credit, p. 158. 
92 For a discussion on design as outline see Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth- 
Century Italy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 139-141. 
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boundaries of bodies rather than breach them. His love of ballet derives from the 
possibility of seeing shapely women from a distance. 94 The temptation to touch the body 
and break with the bodily integrity that is guaranteed by separation is removed. 
Penetrative sex is a two becoming one. It involves the temporary sacrifice of identity. As 
Leo Bersani writes, sex involves a `self shattering and solipsistic jouissance'. 95 Celine's 
fear of the selfless act of sex manifests itself in his phobia of being fucked in the anus. 
Bersani writes that in anal sex the one who is penetrated embraces `the suicidal ecstasy of 
being a woman'. 96 If woman is taken to be `nothing' - as Sartre intimates she `is' - then 
this ecstasy is the ecstasy of a touching nothingness, of a becoming nothing, or perhaps of 
an unbecoming. Celine however wishes to remain something. He will not be fucked. He 
wants to be a man. He asserts his manhood through his writing. 
Both Celine and Sartre find the man who likes men seductive. Celine locates this 
seductiveness in their writings. He understood most writing to be written in a dead 
language, one which seduced through illusion. Its ruse was in its over-ornamentation. 
Celine illustrates this kind of attraction by deception through the imagined response of 
the literary critic Yves Gandon to a piece of contemporary writing. Gandon is impressed 
by `... d'ornements indicibles en cascades exquises ... de passages sublimes en plus 
sublimes encore... en chutes vertigineuses ... ces textes de maitrise ... litteralment magiques 
se revelent ruisselants d'apports infinis esthetiques... '. 97 As Celine demonstrates, the text 
proves irresistible: 
Gandon, lui-meine transpose cependant, par la foi qui I'embrase, n'en peut 
plus ... Il se rend! ... Il se 
donne! 
... II nous adjure ä son secours. Ah! Vite! Agissons, 
93 Heywood, Bodymakers, p. 16. 
94 Rosemarie Scullion provides an insightful reading of Celine's love of ballerinas. See her essay 
`Choreographing Sexual Difference, ' in Celine and the Politics of Difference, pp. 140-168. 
95 Leo Bersani, `Is the Rectum a Grave?, ' in AIDS: Cultural Analysis / Cultural Criticism, Ed. Douglas 
Crimp, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 222. For Bersani the sodomist and the traitor cannot be intimate 
as they are `excluded from all triumphant communities, ' and are therefore `reduced, or elevated, to a kind 
of objectless or generalized ejaculation, a fucking of the world rather than each other'. Leo Bersani, 
Homos, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 166. 
96 Ibid. p. 212. Jane Gallop, on the other hand, reads anal intercourse as an act during which sexual 
difference is denied. Gallop, Thinking through the Body, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 
p. 67. 
97 Gandon is impressed by `an exquisite stream of indescribable embellishments ... passages that 
become 
more and more sublime ... vertiginous cadences... these masterful pieces... are literally magical, a revelatory 
flow of incalculable aesthetic contributions... '(translation mine). Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, 
p. 162. 
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assistons! Soutenons Gandon!... Prevenons le pire! Devancons quelque atroce 
denoument... Pitie! Detaillons! Partageons son exstase! L'humanite le commande! 
Courage! Vaillance! Pour lui tout seul, c'est bien simple s'il insiste, s'il s'obstine! 
C'est la mort! Dans les phrases! Par les phrases! Trepasse de beaute!... de Beaute 
phrasuleuse! Gandon! Ah! 98 
The critic, the reader, dies in the pleasure of reading, a little death. In the instant of 
orgasm - in the `ah' - Gandon comes to be language. The one seduced becomes a part of 
the seduction. This ejaculatory reading is an unmanning. 
Gandon is unmanned by a dead language. His is a necrophiliac pleasure in the 
text. The text which so impresses him is produced by writers who are enjuive. It is 
written in `francais juif a bachots, francais d'Anatole l'enjuive, le francais goncourt, le 
francais deguelasse d'elegance, moule, oriental, onctueux, glissant comme la merde, 
c'est 1'epitaphe de la race francais'. 99 Gandon gets off on reading a tombstone or worse, 
he couples with a corpse, Celine also describes contemporary literature as `bien plus 
morte que la mort'. 100 Sartre shared the belief that the critics were people who had `found 
a quiet little job as cemetery watchmen, ' but here not because they read dead language 
but instead because they read writers who were literally rather than literarily dead. 101 For 
Celine, writing itself is dead. It is deader than death. The reader dies into it in a self- 
shattering literary copulation. The vertiginous elements of the text that impress Gandon 
and lead him on evoke the `vertiginous thrill of annihilation that is black magic, ' the 
thrill that is the hole. 102 The reader does not fill or satisfy the hole but is filled and 
satisfied by it. The reader is holed. 
Celine describes these kinds of readers, the readers who cannot resist reading, as 
robots. 103 The robotization of the individual is a phenomenon that Hannah Arendt 
9" `Gandon, transformed in the interim, inflamed by the dedication, cannot take it any longer... He 
surrenders!... He gives himself!... He begs us to help him. Ah! Quick! Do something, help! Hold on 
Gandon!... Expect the worst! Anticipate a grisly end... Mercy! We want all the details! Let's share the 
climax! Humanity demands it! Hang in there! Be brave! It's easy, the choice is his, either he does or he 
doesn't! It's death! In language! By language! Overcome by beauty! 
... 
by linguistic Beauty! Gandon! Ah! ' 
(translation my own). Ibid. 
99 It is written in `Jewish high-school French, Anatole the Jewified French, Goncourt French, French that 
is disgustingly elegant, calligraphic, exotic, unctuous, slippery as shit, it's the epitaph of the French race' 
(translation mine). Ibid. p. 167. 
100 Contemporary literature is `much more dead than death'. Ibid. p. 172. 
101 Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 17. 
102 Sartre, War Diaries, p. 151. 
10' Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, p. 167. 
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discusses in The Origins of Totalitarianism. It is symptomatic of the increasing 
magnetism the mass has for the individual. It marks the disappearance of the individual 
into the mass. Robotization was a product of the nationalization of man, it arrived when 
the belief arose that the divine origin of man had become bound to the nation . 
104 The rise 
of mass movements leads to a situation in which `the difference between ends and means 
evaporates together with the personality, and the result is the monstrous immorality of 
ideological politics'. ' 05 The flow of the mass movements is reminiscent of Sartre's 
collaborator (who is carried along by the tide of history) except that no reversal of 
principles is involved. The mass is unprincipled. 
Paper Cuts 
For Celine most contemporary authors are afraid of direct emotional contact with 
their readership. Emotion is perceived by these authors to cause certain death. It is a 
social disease to be avoided at all costs. They avoid encountering emotion by hiding 
underwater in diving suits, only communicating with the social surface by way of 
microphones. 106 These authors are either Jewish or Jewified. The Jew is afraid of real 
emotion `comme le serpent de la mangouste'. 107 One of the few authors to believe he can 
confront real emotion is, of course, Celine. His hate is obvious in the pamphlets, as is his 
fear. Sartre writes of the author's anti-Semitism: 
Look at Celine: his vision of the universe is catastrophic. The Jew is everywhere, 
the earth is lost, it is up to the Aryan not to compromise, never to make peace. Yet 
he must be on his guard: if he breathes, he has already lost his purity, for the very 
air that penetrates his bronchial tubes is contaminated Does that not read like a 
diatribe by a Manichean? If Celine supported the socialist theses of the Nazis, it 
was because he was paid to do so. At the bottom of his heart he did not believe in 
them. For him there is no solution except collective suicide, nonreproduction, 
death. ' 08 
104 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, 1994), p. 234. 
105 Ibid. p. 249. 
106 Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, p. 168. 
107 `The Jew is afraid of real emotion like the snake of the mongoose' (translation mine). Ibid. p. 183. 
108 Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate, Trans. George J. Becker, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1995), p. 41. 
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These comments provoked Celine's fury when they were published in 1946, not because 
he was labeled an anti-Semite but because Sartre accused him of being paid to write the 
pamphlets. Sartre is right that for Celine the Jew is all pervasive. The Jew is everywhere 
and nowhere. 109 This is because the mark of his difference is invisible. `He is a white 
man, and, apart from some rather debatable characteristics, he can sometimes go 
unnoticed'. ' 10 This ability for the Jew to pass as an Aryan might be what prompts 
Celine's desperate efforts to `colour' him. Celine's fear, however, may not just be 
because of the perpetual possibility of encountering the Jew. Earlier I suggested Celine's 
love of the shapely body, the hardened flesh, did not necessarily need to be understood as 
a form of fetishism, as a means of warding off the fear of castration. It is clear however 
that the author does manifest castration anxiety in the pamphlets. Spear notes that the 
Jews for Celine present `the frightful spectre of his own castration (circumcision) and 
mirror his own persecution complex but are also worthy of his envy because of the virile 
force of mastery and influence that they represent for him and that he clearly seeks for 
himself 
. 
"' Celine at once fears the Jews and admires them. He was himself 
circumcised. 112 
Freud writes about the connection that exists between circumcision and the fear of 
castration in footnotes to the case study of Little Hans (1909) and the essay on Leonardo 
da Vinci (1910). 13 In a footnote to `Little Hans' Freud analyses Otto Weininger's hatred 
of Jews and women. An Austrian Jew, Weininger wrote the once influential Sex and 
Character in which he proposes that femininity and Jewishness are profoundly linked. ' 14 
Weininger killed himself in the same year that it was published. Freud writes that 
'09 The critic Paul Vandromme writes that the Jew is not just everywhere and nowhere in Celine, the Jew is 
also something and nothing: `feline utilise le mot juif sans savoir ce qu 'il signifre au juste. Il commet meme 
ä son propos tant de meprises qu'il ne signifie plus rien'. `feline uses the word Jew without knowing 
exactly what it means. He commits so many mistakes in regard to it that it comes to signer nothing at all'. 
Vandromme, Louis-Ferdinand Celine, (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1963), p. 77. 
110 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, Trans. Charles Lam Markmann, (New York: Grove Press, 
1967), p. 115. 
1" Spear, `Virility and the Jewish "Invasion" in the Pamphlets, ' in Celine and the Politics of Difference, 
p. 110. 
112 Ibid. p. 109. 
113 See Sigmund Freud, `Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy ('Little Hans'), ' in Sigmund Freud, 
Case Histories 1, (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 169-305., and Sigmund Freud, `Leonardo da Vinci and a 
Memory of his Childhood, ' in Sigmund Freud, Art and Literature, (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 151-231. 
114 For a short discussion of Sex and Character see Eric L. Santner, My Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul 
Schreber ;s Secret History of Modernity, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 108-110. 
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Weininger, whom he identifies as a neurotic, was `completely under the sway of his 
infantile complexes; and from that standpoint what is common to Jews and women is 
their relation to the castration complex'. ' 15 The Jewish male is related to the castration 
complex through circumcision, it is `the deepest unconscious root of anti-semitism; for 
even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis -a piece of 
his penis, they think - and this gives them the right to despise Jews'. ' 16 Celine, like 
Weininger, despises the Jews and although not Jewish himself he shares the mark of 
Jewishness with the Austrian. Either for aesthetic or hygienic reasons, Celine was 
circumcised, a rare occurrence outside of Judaism in France at that time. Celine cannot 
ignore the religious connotations inscribed upon his body (he is incapable of overlooking 
the Jew in him). His hatred of the Jews is a hatred of himself. His fear of the Jews is a 
fear of the cut he shares with them. He seeks to paper over his exposed glans with 
writing, to `uncircumcise' his self, to make good his lack and restore his racial purity. It 
is through hatred that he cultivates a new skin. 
Celine's preoccupation with the circumcised prepuce is emphasized by Kristeva 
in Powers of Horror. She provides an example from Le Beaux Draps to illustrate this, ' 17 
but references to circumcision are plentiful in the pamphlets. Celine believes that 'Si 
Bergson n'etait pas coupe, si Proust n'etait que breton, si Freud n'avait pas la 
marque... on en parlerait ni des uns ni des autres... '. h18 He states that `les Juifs circoncis 
sont en train de chätrer 1'Aryen de son rythme emotif naturel'. 119 This written by a 
marked man. How is Celine's articulation of hatred towards the Jews influenced by his 
own affinity with them? Perhaps this affinity is manifested by the way Celine hides it. He 
desires bodies that stand out, that are well-defined, whilst he conceals his own body 
which he feels to be incomplete. The cut has compromised his contours. The cut has 
created a hole in his identity. He feels himself, his self, incomplete. The writings are 
journeys into this hole. He uses language to try and fill it. Sartre's eagerness to make 
good his holes could be seen as similar to Celine's, both writers share a perceived lack. In 
' 15 Freud, `Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy ('Little Hans'), ' in Case Histories 1, pp. 198-99. 
116 Ibid. p. 198. 
117 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 182. 
118 `If Bergson was not cut, if Proust was only Breton, if Freud did not have the mark... we would not speak 
of any one of them... ' (translation mine). Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, p. 66. 
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this context the child's need to expel faeces which Sartre understands to be motivated 
solely by the `pleasure of excretion, '120 might also be a manifestation of the need to 
create a `phallus with which the infantile imagination provides the feminine sex'. 121 The 
hole is therefore correctly identified with the feminine by Sartre but not because of its 
modesty, rather for what it is not, it is not the penis, it lacks. Filling the hole means 
making it whole. Sartre's writing is filler. 
The horror, the horror 
The collaborator for Sartre functions in a similar way to the Jew for Celine, both 
are holes which these writers fill with their personal anxieties and with the anxiety of an 
age. The fact that the Jew is a form of figuration does not mitigate Celine's actions. The 
Jew can, in one sense, never be anything more than a ceaseless figuring but this kind of 
reading ignores the Jews outside the text, those who must live with its effects. We do not 
live our lives as metaphors. '22 It is not enough to say that Celine writes out his fears 
rather than acting upon them. Writing is a doing; it is `sensuous human activity '. 123 It is a 
practice. When Karl Marx writes that `the philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point is to change it, '124 he writes that. He invites change through 
writing. He changes through writing. The moment Feuerbach, Hegel or Marx put their 
interpretations to paper, form their characters, their words, they move across and within 
the world-stage. Sartre in making a distinction between the prose-writer and the poet 
writes that `there is nothing in common between these two acts of writing except the 
movement of the hand which traces the letters'. ' 25 It is this movement that moves the 
world. It is the way the hand advance across the page, the turns it performs, that at least 
partially governs the outcome of its gestures. Does it write in hate or love? Spontaneously 
or pensively? Does the hand and the pen it guides (or the pen that guides it) ever look 
119 `The circumcised Jew is in the process of castrating the natural emotional rhythm of the Aryan'. Ibid. 
p. 191. 
120 Sartre, War Diaries, p. 149. 
121 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 71. 
122 Even if I is ultimately always a metaphor for the impossibility of ever being me. 
123 Karl Marx, `Concerning Feuerbach, ' in Karl Marx, Early Writings, Trans. Rodney Livingstone & 
Gregor Benton, (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 421. 
124 Ibid. p. 423. 
125 Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 10. 
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back, ever return to try and undo what has already been done? The author must be 
responsible for the movement of the hand, whatever he writes. We must not cut off the 
hand that writes for us, we must not think of the writer as a `hand, cut off from any voice'. 
Celine had a hand in what he wrote. 
Celine and Sartre are collaborators in a project designed to assuage their anxieties 
about identity. They allow the margins of society to bear the burden of their fears, the 
homosexual, the Jew, the homosexual Jew. To identify the impulses that underlie these 
writings does not assist us in gauging the role of the writing itself in the communication 
of extreme sentiments though. How much are the words to blame? Can writing work 
against the words that form it? Can it fight the content that it is? In his lecture Lecons, 
Barthes recommended reading Celine because of the `travail de deplacement qu'il exerce 
sur la langue'. 126 Celine produces shifts in emphasis within language, moves things 
around, makes words mean in new and different ways ... 
he is a language shaker. This 
work of displacement is a force of freedom within language and exists independently of 
the politics of the author. '27 Barthes, displaying the growing influence of Kristeva's work 
upon his own, states that language is its own politics and the best way to engage with its 
politics is on the plane of language, `non par le message dont eile est V instrument, mais 
par lejeu des mots dont eile est le theätre'. 128 In Lecons, the agency of the author has 
increased substantially. The author finds a new lease of life. With the help of the author - 
an author who pays attention to style as much as subject-matter - writing can resist itself. 
Style can subvert subject-matter. Language is not exhausted by the meaning it effects, 
`eile peut survivre ä ce message et faire entendre en lui, daps une resonance souvent 
terrible, autre chose que ce qu'il dit'. 129 Writing can challenge the words that constitute 
it. It does this through style. Style for Celine is `une emotion, d'abord, avant tout, par- 
dessus tout'. 130 He adds that style is `music'. The writing that resists has rhythm and 
feeling. Barthes's discussion of displacement in language is drawn from works like La 
126 The `work of displacement he exercises on language'. Roland Barthes, Lecons, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1978), p. 17. 
127 Ibid. 
'2' `Not by the message for which it is the medium, but by the word play for which it is the . stage'. Ibid. 
pp. 16-17. 
129 `Language can survive the meaning it carries and make audible in it, through an often terrifying echo, 
something other than what it says'. Ibid. pp. 13-14. 
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revolution du langage poetique. 13' In La revolution du langage poetique, Kristeva 
describes how an unstable thetic (often the product of a resistance to the discovery of 
castration 132) tends to remove language from its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and then 
exhibit it in a semiotic articulation through a material support such as the voice, `this 
semiotic network gives "music" to literature'. 133 The thetic phase is the period when the 
child takes up a position within language; it marks the break that produces subject and 
object. 134 It is the moment in which the gap is instituted that makes enunciation possible. 
An unstable thetic is a thetic that is troubled by the drives and their articulations, by the 
semiotic. This musical troubling of the symbolic is only relative, `the thetic continues to 
ensure the position of the subject put in process/on trial'. 135 
The position of the subject is maintained by the thetic but the irruption of the 
semiotic within the symbolic places the subject en proces. Poetic language `puts the 
subject in process/on trial through a network of marks and semiotic facilitations'. 136 If 
Celine employs poetic language in the pamphlets then he courts desubjectification 
(without ever quite achieving his aim) through the displacements that he creates within 
his writings, the openings he provides for the semiotic to erupt into the symbolic. He 
attempts annihilation through writing - seeks to murder his self (sui caedes) - but the 
thetic constantly rescues him. He cannot reach the end of the night, just journey towards 
it. Only death could bring him to this end, to the heart of darkness. This is what Joseph 
Conrad's Kurtz glimpsed in his final moments, when he `cried in a whisper at some 
image, at some vision - he cried out twice, a cry that was no more than a breath: "The 
horror! The horror! "'. 137 The horror is the night. Horror is the abject. '38 For Kristeva 
`abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the 
immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order 
130 `For Celine style is first of all, before all else, above all, an emotion'. Celine, Bagatelles pour un 
massacre, p. 164. 
13' Julia Kristeva, La revolution de langage poetique, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974). 
132 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 63. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. p. 43. 
135 Ibid. p. 63. 
136 Ibid. p. 58. 
137 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, (New York: Dover Publications, 1990), p. 64. 
138 Abjection is linked to the thetic in that it is what makes the thetic break possible. It is the process of 
separation that makes the mirror-phase and the identification of the subject and its object possible. 
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to be - maintaining the night in which the outline of the signified thing vanishes and 
where only the imponderable affect is carried out'. 139 Abjection mediates the subject's 
relationship with its impossible origin. In the absence of such mediation the subject 
would cease to be. The vision Kurtz has is of having no vision, he sees darkness, the 
unseeing I. He sees his self ending. 
Celine was one of Arendt's surplus men - `the scum of the big cities' 
140 
- who 
went to Africa because in Europe they were merely `human debris, ' a body of 
'superfluous working power'. '41 He came from the unemployed edge of the community 
which in the Sartrean schema would give him good credentials for becoming a 
collaborator. His Journey to the End of the Night mirrors Conrad's Heart of Darkness 
(1902), the novel of which a reading enabled Arendt to reveal the nature of those men 
who formed the bulk of the European exodus to Africa. 142 Africa was, for the scrambling 
European, a world without accepted social values. It was a breeding ground for the 
oppressive personality, men for whom `the only talent that could possibly burgeon in 
their hollow souls was the gift of fascination which makes a splendid leader of an 
extreme party'. 143 In this environment members of high society and criminal elements 
were fused together such that a refined atmosphere developed around wrongdoing. For 
the criminal, this `refinement, the very contrast between the brutality of the crime and the 
manner of carrying it out, becomes the bridge of deep understanding between himself and 
the perfect gentleman'. '44 Crime develops a veneer of civility in colonial Africa. It 
dissembles. In this deceit that lends it its abject quality it is similar to collaboration. 
Imperialism - the building of an Empire - took men outside the boundaries of a familiar 
culture with inherent (if unnoticed) rites of purification and longstanding classifications 
of concrete and moral forms of defilement into a world without bounds. It left the subject 
open to the abject. It is out of this environment that Celine's ideology of hate may have 
originated. In the pamphlets the Jew is often equated with the African: `Le Juif est un 
negre, la race semite n'existe pas, c'est une invention de franc-mason, le Juif n'est que le 
139 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 10. 
140 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 151. 
14' Ibid. p. 150. 
142 Ibid. p. 189. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. p. 190. 
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produit d'un croisement de negres et de barbares asiates'. 145 He is nothing but `une 
perpetuelle brute en tam-tam'. 146 Celine does not always conceive of the Africans in 
negative terms though, he writes of the Africans whose presence upsets him in France 
that: 
En Afrique, chez les memes negres, ou leurs cousins, au Cameroun, j 'ai vecu des 
annees seul, dans un de leurs villages, en pleine foret, sous la meme pailotte, ä la 
meme calebasse. En Afrique, c'etait des braves gens. Ici, ils me genent, us 
m 'ecourent. 147 
Everything must be in its place. The Africans are fine in Africa but not in France. They 
must not exist at the centre of Celine's world, only at its margins. They are his 
constitutive outside, an outside that the Jews are also supposed to embody. In Celine's 
world the Jews do not know their place, which is to be `out of place'. In journeying to 
Africa Celine `had not stepped out of society but had been spat out by it, ' abjected. 148 As 
the solitary Frenchman he was gifted an identity. His identity was secured, surrounded as 
he was by the other. On his return to France he became one amongst many, all the same. 
The African in France occupies a similar position to the one Celine once did, they 
become the singular individual who stands out. Unlike Celine however they are not in a 
position of presumed superiority but must endure being perceived as inferior. Celine 
dislikes the African in France because he envies them. He dislikes the Jew because whilst 
at one level he cannot distinguish himself from them (he is circumcised) at another he 
cannot be at one with them. He is not Jewish. His envy of the Jew - whilst provoking his 
resentment - manifests his desire to be at one with the Jew, to become Jew. Whilst he is a 
part of society in France he feels apart from society. He feels he does not belong. He is 
alone. 
145 'The Jew is a nigger, the Semitic race doesn 't exist, it was invented by the freemasons, the Jew is just the 
result of interbreeding between niggers and Asian savages'. Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, pp. 191- 
92. 
146 He is nothing but `an eternal beast in tom-toms'. Ibid. p. 186. 
147 `In Africa with the same blacks, or their relatives, in Cameroon, I lived alone for years, in one of their 
villages, in the middle of the forest, under the same straw-roof, sharing the same gourd. In Africa they are 
decent people. Its over here that they get on my nerves, that they disgust me'. Ibid. pp. 202-03. 
148 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 189. 
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Celine's loneliness exhibits itself in his increasing use of the three points of 
suspension... holes in writing which hold a nothingness. Sartre wrote a passage that is 
important for making sense of these holes...: 
The abyss is a hole, it proposes engulfment. And engulfment always always 
attracts, as a nihilation which would be its own foundation. Of course, attraction 
for a hole is accompanied by repulsion and anguish. But the hole's nothingness is 
coloured: it's a black nothingness, which causes another nature to intervene here, 
another cardinal category - Night. 
'49 
The black hole offers a journey into the night. It is the apocalypse. The hole... is the hole 
we all have within the Self. .. even as we think of ourselves as whole. The 
hole is the 
negated ground of the I; the sty that torments it. It is the before of our becoming. The 
`one story the "I" cannot tell is the story of its own emergence as an "I150 The `I' in 
any story (and Celine's is no exception) `constitutes a point of opacity and, indeed, in 
that sense, constitutes an interruption of sequence, a break in the narrative, the eruption 
of the non-narrativizable in the midst of the story'. 15 1 The `I' is figured through the 
ellipses-the breaks in Celine's narrative. The points of suspension represent the ripples 
that cloud the reflection of Narcissus in the pond, `that muddle its bed, '152 the dots 
demonstrate that the `more or less beautiful image in which I behold or recognize myself 
rests upon an abjection that sunders it as soon as repression, the constant watchman, is 
relaxed'. 153 The holes suggest I am not whole. They call to mind Sartre's conception of 
the Being-for-Itself when a person places himself at a distance from someone or 
something else so he can acknowledge their alterity and in the same instant generate the 
`gap' that is freedom. There is emptiness and anguish in this action. The hole denotes the 
internalization of this act. I acknowledge I am other than I, that I exist as and through a 
gap. The matter that is me is not. There is no gap in that this experience of separating that 
made me is within me still. To acknowledge what was left behind but is still before me 
would be to end me. The (M)Other that I rejected to become Self cannot be known to me. 
149 Sartre, War Diaries, p. 150. 
150 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself: A Critique of Ethical Violence, (Assen: Royal Van 
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I is condemned to solitude. I must however work to preserve this loneliness that is I. I 
must continually abject the Mother. 
The increasingly secular society in Europe in the early twentieth century led to a 
breakdown in the efficacy of the religious mechanisms which existed to cathect the 
abject. In this secular climate the abject encroached upon the individual, imperiled the 
subject. The loneliness that Arendt describes as a by-product of society's competitive 
structure might also be understood as symptomatic of a mass identity crisis bought on by 
a horror that can no longer be pushed aside but instead ferments within. The nothingness 
kept at the edges of the social now threatens to 'engulf' t from within. The self becomes 
aware of the separation that founds it; it comes to know it is alone. It knows that it has 
lost but not what it has lost. Arendt understands totalitarian domination to be founded 
upon the exploitation of this loneliness, this `experience of not belonging to the world at 
all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man'. 154 Man is cut off 
from what matters. He lives within the mirror. In loneliness `self and world' and the 
`capacity for thought and experience' are lost. 155 This loss is only known by looking to 
the other for confirmation of it. It is when we are alone in company that we truly learn of 
our loneliness. ' 56 
Totalitarianism exploited the loneliness of man in Western Europe. Kristeva is 
correct to identify `the "drive foundations " of fascism' in abjection. 157 Abjection `is the 
economy, one of horror and suffering in their libidinal surplus-value, which has been 
tapped, rationalized, and made operative by Nazism and Fascism'. 158 The mass 
movements offered a form of logic for a society of individuals slipping into psychosis, 
they offered a sense of belonging and a set of contours. Arendt explains that `the only 
capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor the world in 
order to function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking is 
the ability of logical reasoning whose premise is the self-evident'. 159 National Socialism 
and the other mass movements give the human mind a consistent set of rules to adhere to 
154 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 475. 
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and to think by. They provide a logic to keep the individual company. Totalitarianism 
offers a `suicidal escape' for the individual from their reality of being alone. 160 The mass 
movement is a closing of space - the destruction of contradictions forming one aspect of 
this - designed to nullify `even the productive potentialities of isolation'. 
161 'The "ice- 
cold reasoning" and the "mighty tentacle" of dialectics which "seizes you as in a vise" 
appears like a last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied 
upon'. 162 Abjection is the irrational which provides the impulse to rationalize but also 
offers a means by which to trouble the rational. Celine's writings develop across this 
space of support and disruption. 
The epigraph from Celine's L'Eglise which prefaces Sartre's Nausea is one which 
emphasizes the solitude of the individual - `C'est un garcon sans importance collective, 
c'est tout juste un individu. ' - existing in a `state of absolute desolation'. 
163 Kristeva 
draws attention to this connection with solitude in her chapter on Sartre in The Sense and 
Non-Sense of Revolt. She reads the character of Roquentin in Nausea as sending us `back 
to the depressive solitude of the contemporary individual'. 164 This loneliness is `rooted in 
the personal experience of the impossible link to the other that is ultimately the maternal 
object, although the dissolution of all social links follows from this microuniverse'. 165 A 
link between abjection and loneliness is implicit in this passage. The personal experience 
of the impossible link to the mother is one of abjection. The mother is the nothing within 
the subject which is `accessible only in nausea'. 166 The `spasms and vomiting that protect 
mei167 from the mother are also my most intimate moments with that object. 
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Celine writes towards this nothing, this darkness, approaching the edge of the 
night. In the pamphlets the figure of the Jew poses a continual threat to Celine's bodily 
integrity. This occurs at the level of content. At the level of style, Celine enacts the very 
threat that he claims to be afraid of. He seeks to write himself into the hole out of which 
he became. He compromises his self. He writes into the twilight, his language carrying 
him close to `the place where meaning collapses'. 168He writes himself to the brink of 
psychosis and `risks the loss of identity' that accompanies it., 69 The style (when 
supplemented by a material support such as the voice) permits the reader (and the writer 
reads) to sample this proximity to psychosis and to become bathed in the attendant 
semiotic excess. The reader looks through the night to its end but does not touch that end. 
It is reading on a tightrope, you see the ground but the aim is to keep the relation a 
specular one. The ground of the self is glimpsed not known. To fall is to die. The reader 
risks falling in with Celine's style; falling out of self. Kristeva describes what is involved 
as going beyond `the content of the novels, the author's biography or his indefensible 
political stands (fascist, anti-Semitic); the true "miracle" of Celine resides in the very 
experience of one's reading - it is fascinating, mysterious, intimately nocturnal, and 
liberating by means of a laughter without complacency yet complicitous'. 170 The laughter 
discharges the semiotic. Laughter preserves the self. It is a kind of vomiting. 
Celine exposes the beneath of language, the `substrat infrasignifiant de la 
langue'. 171 Signifiance is the `unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through 
language'. 12 The drives that carry language and exist as its underside in the everyday are 
bought to the surface by Celine. He shows us the semiotic; that side to language which 
has sense without significance. The semiotic is the lining that holds language together 
and allows for meaning. It is the rhythms of the tongue - the sounds around words - 
integral to language but also eternally elusive within it. The shimmer of words on a page, 
the energy within the characters and between them. Literature like that of Celine acts to 
bring the drives, which are usually clothed by the symbolic, to the forefront of language. 
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He bares language for us. Perhaps this is what Emmanuel Levinas meant (without 
meaning it) when he wrote that it `is the great merit of Celine's "Journey to the End of 
the Night ", thanks to a marvelous flair for language, to have undressed the universe in a 
sad and desperate cynicism'. ' 13 Beneath the ostensible calm of the words floating upon 
the page, there is an immemorial violence at play. 
Like it was going out of style... 
In the inter-war years the social mechanisms designed to keep the semiotic from 
flooding the symbolic (and thereby engulfing culture) were in crisis. The abject (the 
repressed maternal, the fount of the semiotic) threatened to overwhelm the subject. In 
Powers of Horror Kristeva uses the writings of Celine as the mainstay for her argument 
that - in the contemporary western world - literature has replaced the sacred as the site 
where abjection is sublimated. For Kristeva, abjection is a key process during the 
formation of the subject. It is the action of separation which is a necessary precursor to 
the mirror-stage. Lacan describes the mirror-stage as a drama `whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation'. 174 The child exists within a somatic 
maelstrom -a mess of bodily functions - and lives only as its insides. The mirror 
provides the child with a passport to the outside, the reflection it affords anchors the 
fragmented body-image to `a form of its totality' that exists exterior to it. 175 This is not, 
however, the first journey the infant undertakes. Lacan does not delve deeply enough into 
the pre-history of the subject. He accounts for the stage at which the child `is' but `is' 
only as `frustration', `is' as a body that baffles and bewilders but which is felt as a 
singular insufficiency. I am not up to the task of being me but I know that I am. The child 
is already a desiring being, a wanting self-sufficiency. The time of maternal plenitude has 
passed and will shortly become the past. 176 Kristeva seeks to explain how the child 
"Z Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 17. 
173 Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, Trans. Bettina Bergo, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 64. 
174 Jacques Lacan, `The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as revealed in Psychoanalytic 
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separates from the mother in order for the mirror-stage to take place; she describes how 
for the infant prior to the `that's me in the mirror' of the mirror-stage there must also be a 
recognition of `that's not me' in relation to the mother. Abjection `is a precondition of 
narcissism'. '77 `Even before being like, `I' am not but do separate, reject, abject'. '78 
Abjection, the series of partial and provisional separations from the mother that make the 
mirror-stage possible, is repressed by the subject, as not to do so would require it to 
confront its own brittleness. `The more or less beautiful image in which I behold or 
recognize myself rests upon an abjection that sunders it as soon as repression, the 
constant watchman, is relaxed'. ' 79 That abject is a part of us but a part of us that it is 
dangerous to acknowledge; it is a part of us that must be kept apart, that must be 
managed. This management role was previously performed by the sacred. Abjection 
`accompanies all religious structurings' and the `various means of purifying the abject - 
the various catharses - make up the history of religions'. 
180 In the predominantly secular 
society that exists in the contemporary Western world, the role of purification falls to the 
artist. The `aesthetic task' in the present `amounts to retracing the fragile limits of the 
speaking being, closest to its dawn, to the bottomless `primacy' constituted by primal 
repression' . 
18 1 This is the terrain of the abject, a terrain over which great modern 
literature unfolds: `Dostoyevsky, Lautreamont, Proust, Artaud, Kafka, Celine'. 182 
Celine writes back to the mother out of which he became. He also unwrites the 
symbolic in the process, therefore opening it up to a possible rewriting. Such a challenge 
to the symbolic function could potentially lead to psychosis but Celine's texts are `able to 
master this latent psychotic state' through their `literary devices and writing style'. 183 
Modernist writing, as exemplified by Celine, must of necessity touch the void that is 
psychosis. The modernist aesthetic functions to sublimate the abject, that which would 
otherwise destroy the subject through overwhelming the symbolic and rendering the 
subject psychotic. The abject is that which exceeds the rational; it is the force of unreason 
the present. There is no looking back for the infant once looking forwards and backwards become 
possibilities, once the reflection has supplemented the child's rhythmic temporality with a linear one. 
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that Michel Foucault describes in the conclusion to Madness and Civilization, a force that 
must be cathected. `There is no madness except as the final instant of the work of art - 
the work endlessly drives madness to its limits; where there is a work of art, there is no 
madness; and yet madness is contemporary with the work of art, since it inaugurates the 
time of its truth'. ' 84 The work of art plays out psychic violence in language rather than in 
reality. Kelly Oliver writes of this cathection: `... poetic murders are better than real 
murders'. 185 The defence of Celine is that he writes hatred rather than enacts it. 
But was it this flirtation with psychosis that prompted Celine's identification with 
fascism? Does Celine compensate for the effects of this writing into the night by 
affiliating himself with a mass movement? Does he regain a sense of identity through his 
anti-Semitism and his politics? Is the poetic murder instead of the real murder (as Oliver 
suggests) or, instead, a step in the direction of the real murder? The murder of the Jews 
takes place within words. These words, however, are disrupted. The message of hate 
finds that the medium resists it. Sartre felt that style was not something the politically 
committed writer should foreground; it should rather `pass unnoticed. 186 The aesthetic 
qualities of a text are perceived by him as of secondary importance. For Kristeva, 
however, style is a key component in the production of change. Through his style Celine 
does battle with the symbolic function. He does not collaborate with the symbolic like a 
bondsman bending to the will of his master, rather he resists it. He breaks free from it, 
opening up the possibility of reappropriating it. 187 The calling into question of language 
in its symbolic aspect `represents a microrevolution' and `is something that affects the 
social fabric and can potentially challenge the entire social framework'. 188 Style, which 
is on the side of the aesthetic, likes to follow its own path. It is individual and therefore 
anti-totalitarian. Writing in style provides evidence of an author who chooses a path for 
language to follow rather than following the path of language. This author is 
unconventional. The author who has a distinct style (that is to say any style at all, unless 
an absence of style becomes stylish) creates himself in language. He is his style. A stylish 
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author is involved with language. Celine has style and through it he deprives the symbolic 
of its privileged status but he fails to carry out its reappropriation. His writings exist in a 
semiotic limbo. The cost of partially undoing the symbolic without renewing its authority 
was an identity crisis that required the author to identify with extreme politics. He lost 
himself. 
It is within Celine's style -a style best registered through reading his work aloud, 
although the internal voice of the mind lends sufficient support - that the way language 
resists the oppressive politics it is sometimes burdened with becomes evident. The use of 
ellipsis dots are one of Celine's most famous stylistic traits. But what are these three 
dots.. 
. 
bridges between groups of words-points of suspension... puncture holes in the 
prose...? All... and none-of the before. Are these holes...? If they are, then where are 
the holes? Are the holes the black spots upon the page-the dots? Are they in the 
spaces... between the dots? Are they in the caesuras. . . the pauses they 
institute in the 
speaking or reading of a passage.. . the 
interruption in the arc of the eye as it travels right 
across the writing? Are these. . . the 
holes? The holes which were present in Journey to the 
End of the Night.. . 
but not so much as to be especially noticeable... the holes that end a 
number of lines in L'Eglise... the holes.. . that are 
increasingly... in evidence.. . 
in Death on 
Credit... and omnipresent in Rigodon. 189 What do these holes do? If indeed they are 
holes. If they are dots they are marks, a kind of presence. The hole is an absence. Or a 
word - `hole' - hiding an absence, hiding emptiness. Gilles Deleuze reads the three dots 
in Celine's novel Guignol's Band as working alongside exclamatory sentences to `do 
away with all syntax in favor of a pure dance of words'. 190 This seems, at least partially, 
to accord Kristeva's understanding of the ellipses, she suggests that in pure literary style 
`all that remains is the tune, without notes.. . 
Not even the worship of Death... The three 
dots... Less than nothing, or more... Something else... The consuming of Everything, of 
Nothing, through style... The greatest homage to the Word that was not made flesh in 
189 Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Rigodon, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1969). 
190 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco, 
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order to hoist itself up into Man with a capital letter but to join, body and language being 
mingled, those intermediate states, those non-states, neither subject nor object, where 
you is alone, singular, untouchable, unsociable, discredited, at the end of a night that is 
as particular as it is incommensurable'. 191 Both Deleuze and Kristeva find a rhythm in 
Celine's prose, a dance or music. The three dots constitute an asemantic element in the 
texts. 192 They carry the reader out of the comforting contours of meaning - the symbolic - 
and into the throb of the semiotic. 
To read into this throbbing prose is to place oneself at risk. We usually search for 
meaning; we do not seek out its dissolution. This is perhaps why some readers are 
unwilling to join in the dance, why some readers never want to step beyond the content of 
the writing. Celine's pamphlets, and to a lesser extent his novels, are shaped by his 
politics. His style, however, does not run to form but away from it. In Celine's writing 
there flows through meaning `the nonsemanticized instinctual drive that precedes and 
exceeds meaning'. 193 The exclamation marks and the three dots point to `this surge of 
instinctual drive: a panting, a breathlessness, an acceleration of verbal utterance, 
concerned not so much with finally reaching a global summing up of the world's 
meaning, as, to the contrary, with revealing, within the interstices of predication, the 
rhythm of a drive that remains forever unsatisfied - in the vacancy of judging 
consciousness and sign - because it could not find an other (an addressee) so as to find 
meaning in this exchange'. 194 Celine's writing attempts to liberate what foments beneath 
the symbolic structure - to free up the semiotic - and thus to discharge it. His writing 
explodes in response to the pressure of a semiotic excess, a non-sense that needs an 
outlet. Kristeva writes of the pamphlets that they demonstrate how `it is not enough to 
allow what is repressed by the symbolic structure to emerge in a "musicated" language 
to avoid its traps'. 195 The extreme politics provide a sense of identity in a time of crisis. 
The politics counter-balanced the descent into non-sense, the falling into formlessness of 
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the writings. The writing is, however, in part, beyond the politics it ostensibly espouses. 
The political is a shaping of the social. The music in Celine's prose is anti-social and 
unshaped; it is underneath, outside and beyond politics. It is a noise where no slogans can 
be heard, a non-space apart from all parties. 
This noise - this interference - which Celine feeds into the symbolic is the cause 
of a loathing which power can tap into. As Jacqueline Rose explains: `Celine's writing is 
a symptom. It reveals horror as a matter of power - the power of fascination when we are 
confronted with the traces of our own psychic violence, the horror when that same 
violence calls on social institutions for legitimation, and receives it'. 
196 His writing 
allows the reader access to the horror out of which we become whilst also revealing the 
dangers we confront when that same horror (which forever haunts us as subjects) can find 
no release. The horror within ourselves then becomes projected onto another. In Celine 
this other is multiple, but in the pamphlets it is primarily embodied in the figure of the 
Jew. The pamphlets demonstrate how drive force can be voided through language but 
also point towards the potential for a violent projection of these impulses onto others if 
they are not expelled. 
Celine Out of Context 
The holes in Celine... seem to slow writing. . . to slow reading.. . to 
break it up... to 
make movement difficult-to bring it to our attention... that fact that we move through 
writing... This writing within the pamphlets.. . 
is about movement... mass 
movements ... totalitarianism. 
A movement which relies upon motion... `the only thing 
that counts in a movement is precisely that it keeps itself in constant movement'. 197 In the 
same motion.. . with the same 
hand-that Celine uses to lend support to 
totalitarianism ... with which 
he produces the political content of his writings. . . 
he writes 
against it. The potentially subversive nature of Celine's style was obviously recognized in 
wartime Germany where the stylistic innovations of Bagatelles pour un massacre were 
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removed in translation. 198 Arendt recognized the totalitarian movement's dislike of 
artistic innovation, this because total domination does not permit `free initiative in any 
field of life, ' and does not allow `for any activity that is not entirely predictable,. ' 99 
Celine may have produced writings whose content lent support to totalitarian objectives 
but how much influence his work actually contributed to those objectives is open to 
question. As Arendt indicates of those from the elite `who at one time or another have let 
themselves be seduced by totalitarian movements, and who sometimes, because of their 
intellectual abilities, are even accused of having inspired totalitarianism, it must be 
stated that what these desperate men of the twentieth century did or did not do had no 
influence on totalitarianism whatsoever'. 200 The pamphlets did not inspire the politics. 
The politics distrusted the pamphlets. But whilst the occupiers and many of those with 
fascist sympathies disowned the pamphlets this should not detract from the fact that they 
were read. Celine is not excused simply because he was not fully accepted by those in 
authority. His writings had effects. The language of Celine gains its driving force from a 
feeling of loneliness. The absence of an other (of which the absence of the mother 
provides the model) against which to identify causes a self-fragility. Celine's language is 
complicit with his politics, carrying as it does an other who is everywhere - the all 
encompassing hate-figure of the Jew201 - to a wider audience. 
This `carrying to a wider audience' as a sign of guilt, as a part of evidence for the 
case of the prosecution against Celine, could also be extended to an accusation against all 
those who engage with Celine's pamphlets in whatever capacity. They are all carriers of 
his ideas even when they condemn them. Je m'accuse. Julia Kristeva therefore should 
also be on trial here. Kelly Oliver, whilst troubled by Kristeva's use of Celine, is willing 
19' `The German version deleted Celine's punctuation, neologisms, crude language, and any passages that 
criticized Aryan decadence (except where applicable solely to France), the Nazi conception of war, and, of 
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to give the thinker the benefit of the doubt. 202 This benevolence is not universally shared. 
For example, Jennifer Stone writes in her essay `The Horrors of Power: A Critique of 
Kristeva, ' that Kristeva `has no political or ideological bearings when faced with 
Celine's cadaver' and accuses her of having a `hypnotic and nauseating fascination with 
fascism'. 203 Stone abjects Powers of Horror, she is inclined to vomit at the writer's 
perceived attraction to fascism. She reads with her stomach. This reaction is of note 
because Kristeva describes abjection - which is characterized by a feeling of disgust - as 
possessing a moral aspect during the first chapter of Powers of Horror. Stone's sentiment 
might be understood as a manifestation of what could be called a `visceral ethics'. In her 
book Reproductions of Banality Alice Yaeger Kaplan also expresses disquiet with 
Kristeva's `rescue of Celine'. 204 The `aesthetic links in "Powers of Horror" are 
specifically to prehistorical, authorless forms of language production' which means that 
the `historical context drops out of the picture'. 205 This presents severe problems for any 
effort to understand of the nature of Celine's fascism. For Kaplan, Kristeva's approach is 
an ahistorical one which reduces fascism to the status of an aberration which can be 
readily dissociated from an aesthetically radical modernist agenda. 206 Kaplan wants an 
approach that places Celine's writings in their historical context, and pays closer attention 
to how the pamphlets were received and read in France when they were published. She 
points out that the fascist appreciation of Celine's texts extended beyond their subject- 
matter to the syntax itself and quotes from a review of Bagatelles pour un massacre 
written by the journalist Lucien Rebatet in 1938, in which he describes how he and his 
newspaper colleagues at Je Suis Partout performed collective readings of parts of the 
pamphlet. Rebatet writes: `let us read Celine in chorus... I want to make you hear.. . this 
202 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 102. 
203 Jennifer Stone, `The Horrors of Power: A Critique of Kristeva, ' in The Politics of Theory, Eds. Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen & Diane Loxley, (Cochester: University of Essex, 1983), p. 47. 
204 Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality, p. 108. 
205 Ibid. p. 109. 
20. Stone shares Kaplan's concern with the lack of attention Kristeva pays to the historical circumstances 
within which the pamphlets were produced. `Celine's political pamphlets, when read in a 1980s context, 
may seem to be divorced from the social conditions which led to their emergence and which made their 
racist programme possible. But if one considers the historical place ofproduction of these anti-Semitic 
writings, one cannot miss the signs to the factories of genocide' Stone, `Horrors of Power, ' p. 46. Kristeva 
would understand both fascism and modernist literature to be symptoms of the identity crisis precipitated 
by our era having put `rationality into question' Henric & Kristeva, `On Celine, in Interviews, p. 230. The 
pamphlets are indubitably of their time. 
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joyous and formidable voice'. 207 In 1938 Bagatelles pour un massacre existed not just as 
printed pages, but as a shared experience, and the sound of the prose was celebrated as 
much as the content. Kristeva fails to adduce the importance of Celine's personal politics, 
nor does she pay sufficient attention to the way in which his work was received. 
Stone is critical of Kristeva for engaging with a contagious text, for catching 
Celine's right wing politics. 208 Kaplan, on the other hand, is troubled by her failure to 
engage with the politics of Celine and his contemporaries. Kaplan and Stone raise 
important questions about the relationship that exists between the writer and the written, 
the writer and the reader, and the reader and the written. For Stone, Celine is the source 
of a disease (fascist politics) for which his pamphlets are the means of transmission, 
retaining the potential to infect their readers. Kaplan however does not suggest that 
Kristeva has become contaminated by the politics of the pamphlets but rather that her 
way of reading them is irresponsible precisely because she avoids engaging with those 
politics. For Stone, Celine and Destouches seem to be one and the same whereas Kaplan 
opens up the possibility that, whilst Destouches is tied to a historical moment, Celine is 
not. Celine can be read out of context. Kaplan sees this reading out of context as highly 
problematic although not without value. 
Meaning and Morality 
Any consideration of the politics of texts like Celine's pamphlets would seem to 
need to be grounded upon the responsibility for meaning. We measure the content of any 
text against the ethical template we have inherited, and then judge it as either good or 
bad. We form an opinion of the text based upon what it means to us, but where does that 
meaning originate? Does meaning come from the writer, the written or the reader? Or 
does it emerge somewhere in-between? 209 Both Kaplan and Stone emphasize the 
207 Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality, p. 126. 
208 Stone is not alone in her belief in textual contamination The ability of certain writings to pollute their 
readers is given credence by some Romany, for example. Writing can literally be abject. This is briefly 
considered in Calum Carmichael's essay `Gypsy Law and Jewish Law, ' in Gypsy Law: Romani Legal 
Traditions and Culture, Ed. Walter 0. Weyrauch, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 125. 
209 This is what a reader like Hans-Georg Gadamer would suggest. Linda Martin Alcoff explains how, for 
Gadamer, `understanding occurs at a point of interaction between text and reader, and not at the point of 
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importance of an attention to historical context in any reading of the pamphlets. This does 
seem to suggest that meaning is contingent; in any given text it is not something that is 
inherent and unchanging. Meaning shifts with the moment. A context is, of course, not 
itself inherent and unchanging, and indeed it may even be argued that it too is 
authored. 21° This would seem to privilege the reader as the locus of meaning. The reader 
decides the context within which the text should be read. The reader decides how the text 
will mean. This way of understanding texts calls for a contextual ethics. The context 
Kristeva produces for her reading is not sufficiently historical for Kaplan and Stone, 
hence it is an unethical one. Stone however does seem to hold out the possibility that the 
text contains something of the politics that produced it, that its politics transcend the 
historical moment within which it was produced. Its history is a part of it, not apart from 
it. Kristeva is seduced by the content of Celine's writings; for Stone she does not produce 
that content. Stone does not countenance the possibility that the pamphlets written in the 
name of Celine might not be fascist. This is either because Celine, as a fascist writing at a 
time when fascism was in the ascendancy, has permanently infected the words he used 
with his own political ideas, or because the words in the pamphlets have a particular and 
perpetual politics of their own. The author and his time either have some authority, or 
language is itself authoritative. The latter understanding would, for Foucault, be an 
example of the reintroduction of an author-function by a sleight of reading, in which `the 
empirical characteristics of the author' are transposed into the text in the form of `a 
transcendental anonymity'. 211 The words possess a unique hidden meaning if only you 
work hard enough to tease it out. 
Celine did not seem to believe in his own authority over what he wrote, 
professing fears about his inability to control the text he `authored'. In Bagatelles pour un 
massacre he writes of his fear that his work will be plagiarized: 
the text itself . 
Alcoff, Real Knowing: New Versions of Coherence Theory, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), p. 29. 
210 I will return to the question of context in my final chapter. 
211 Michel Foucault, `What is an Author?, ' Trans. Josue V. Harari, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics: The 
Essential Works 2, Ed. James Faubion, (London: Allen Lane, 1998), p. 208. 
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Si mon petit ou gros navet contient quelque authentique substance, emotive, 
lyrique, il sera par eux promptement decortique, degluti... Les Juifs sont plutöt 
mal doues pour les arts, biologiquement, du fond meine de leur nature. 212 
Celine is afraid that the body of his text will be skinned, that what he writes will be taken 
from him and incorporated into the work of others. He is frightened that the `Jews' will 
steal from his own work to make up for their own lack of originality. As with so often in 
the pamphlets; Celine is projecting aspects of his own behaviour onto others. Kaplan has 
revealed that Bagatelles pour un massacre is `but a hastily compiled collection of 
references that lend the text an erudite veneer that is pure simulacrum'. 213 The author has 
liberally stripped from the work of others to furnish his own text. His pamphlet is `a 
tissue of quotations drawn from innumerable centres of culture'214 but with a marked 
emphasis on weaving the material written by Celine's anti-Semitic literary precursors 
into the end product. His pamphlet is not his own. If the politics of the pamphlets exist in 
the words on the page then this politics precedes Celine. The writer is indeed only 
imitating `a gesture that is always anterior, never original'. 215 This kind of understanding 
of writing seems to invite an abnegation of responsibility on the part of the author: I write 
what is always already written, therefore I never really write. Writing is unoriginal, the 
writer acts as conduit not creator. Celine is afraid that his work might be appropriated by 
other just as he has misappropriated other people's writings. He does not explicitly 
express the concern that his work will cease to mean in the same way if it is `resited' by 
someone else somewhere else, but I think we can entertain the possibility that this is what 
is troubling him. I will return to this anxiety around appropriation later. Kaplan also 
suggests that the style of the pamphlets is in fact integral to their ideology. It is the 
rhythm of the prose as much as its purport that gives the pamphlets their politics. Style is 
political, and the style of these pamphlets is one that is allied to fascism. She does not 
read the style as working to undermine the meaning. 
Zit `If my pulp fiction has any originality to it, sentimentally or stylistically, it will swiftly be stripped and 
swallowed by them... The Jews are really no good at the arts, it's biological, and goes to the heart of their 
character'. Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, p. 69. 
213 Kaplan, `Sources and Quotations, ' p. 37. 
214 Roland Barthes, `The Death of the Author, ' in Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text, Trans. Stephen 
Heath, (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 146. 
215 Ibid. 
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A Putrid Poetics 
If we accept that the style as well as the subject-matter of the pamphlets is 
morally reprehensible, then does this mean that what we might call Celine's `putrid 
poetics' should be placed into permanent quarantine? Kaplan and Stone are critical of 
Kristeva because she is not condemnatory enough of the ideological content of the 
pamphlets. Is it therefore ethically sound to engage with a work like Bagatelles pour un 
massacre as long as the writer distances themselves from the politics of the work? Is 
commentary permissible if the requisite tone of disdain is maintained throughout, so long 
as it is made explicit that Celine's politics are objectionable? Would this kind of reading 
be an ethically acceptable one? Or would this kind of reading merely help to fortify the 
fascist politics it seeks to censure? The citing of passages from Celine's pamphlets within 
the context of a critical essay could be understood to provide a source of reinvigoration 
for those passages. The `critic reanimates'. 216 Celine is still worth writing about, even in 
a negative sense. The condemnatory essay is always, in some sense, complicit with that 
which it seeks to castigate. It must repeat the writing it wishes to hold to account. The 
denunciation outright of the content of the pamphlets also sentences hundreds of pages of 
words to a singular meaning. A simple proscription of the pamphlets as anti-Semitic and 
fascist serves to confirm them as such. The possibility that language might resist the 
politics it was intended to support is not entertained. Kaplan and Stone seek to preserve 
the pamphlets in their fascist context and thereby perpetuate that context. They do not 
consider the possibility that parts of the pamphlets could be made to mean differently if 
they were taken out of context. 
In her book Excitable Speech, Judith Butler describes how the contexts of the 
speech act are `never fully determined in advance' and explains that there is always `the 
possibility for the speech act to take on a non-ordinary meaning, to function in contexts 
where it has not belonged'. 217 Through the process of `reappropriation' (the putting into 
play of the speech act in more favourable contexts) a negative term can undergo an 
affirmative resignification. Butler illustrates this process through a discussion of the term 
216 Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 18. 
217 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 161. 
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`queer' in the final chapter of her book Bodies that Matter. 218 Can what Butler writes 
about the performative be applied to Bagatelles pour un masscare? There is a big 
difference between a single term and several hundred pages of text. Celine himself 
however seemed troubled by the possibility of reappropriation. We might understand his 
reluctance to acknowledge his influences in Bagatelles pour un masscare - the silent 
citations throughout the pamphlet - as a manifestation of his desire to preserve the 
illusion of intention in his work. The hatred in the pamphlets which Kaplan and Stone 
accord such authority to, accumulates that `force of authority through the repetition or 
citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices'. 219 Hatred exists as quotation. The 
hatred in the pamphlets succeeds because it draws upon the accumulated force of its 
previous expressions. Kaplan and Stone do nothing to challenge this cumulative power 
by their attitude. Kristeva, in Powers of Horror, at least refuses to unquestioningly 
promulgate a politics of disapprobation through her desire to read the pamphlets outside 
of their usual context. She therefore instigates a rupture in the usually uninterrupted line 
of citational descent which lends Celine's language its perceived power. Like speech acts, 
the written word is separated from its future effects by a gap. Kristeva works within this 
gap. She does not assume a position of sovereignty in relation to the pamphlets, the 
reader is not rendered master of meaning here. Kristeva exercises her agency within the 
constraints of a language which always already antecedes and constitutes her. Butler 
believes that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. `The one who acts (who is not the 
same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as 
an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the 
outset'. 220 The act of `reappropriation' is not the birth of the sovereign reader. The reader 
who writes hate-speech out of context, who writes hatred in order to contest it, does not 
have ultimate control over the language they employ. This absence of control is part of 
the `subversive promise' of agency. 221 It is our ethical responsibility to make good this 
promise. But there is the matter of the pamphlets themselves... 
210 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", (London: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 223-242. 
19 Ibid. p. 227. 
220 Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 16. 
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The matter of the pamphlets themselves 
Celine prohibited the republication of the pamphlets and his descendants have 
continued this interdiction. 222 This voluntary suppression took place to prevent the 
pamphlets from continuing to cause harm after the war. Bagatelles pour un massacre sold 
well prior to this self-censorship, with Celine estimating that he earned 60,000 to 80,000 
old francs in royalties from the pamphlet. 223 Despite the fact that by the end of the war 
75,000 copies of the work had been sold in France alone224, it is now difficult to find and 
gain access to the work. This has helped to contribute to its mythic status. 225 The more 
these works are engaged with the less the legend of their evil brilliance can continue to 
gain currency. In this sense projects like those of Kaplan and Kristeva are both of value, 
in that they contribute to the ongoing operation of debunking the fictions that surround 
Celine's pamphlets. I would not however advocate a reprinting of the pamphlets were it 
to become permissible, nor do I find the quotation of parts of the works (in whatever 
context) entirely unproblematic. 
Little attention in any of the writings about the pamphlets is given to the 
materiality of these texts, the matter of the words themselves and the surface upon which 
they are inscribed, the printed page. To read the original pamphlets is a very different 
experience from reading about them. The dialogue between the reader and a copy of 
Bagatelles pour un Massacre is one beyond words. The pamphlet exceeds the words that 
are a part of it. The words are bounded by margins, floating above and between the 
yellowing paper upon which they are printed. The yellow paper... yellow... a colour 
`associated with degradation and discredit' and also the colour associated with ageing. 226 
The pamphlets are growing old. The eyes that scan across the page see this 
discolouration, this sign of the paper in decline. The eyes see the broken corners of some 
pages. They register the insult of the white threads that bind the pages together, their 
unsettling appearance of newness. The fingers feel the textured and relatively thick paper. 
2`1 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 241. 
222 Philippe Almeras, Je suis le bouc.: Celine et 1 'antisemitisme, (Paris: Editions Denoel, 2000), pp. 7-8. 
223 Almeras, `Celine's Masquerade, ' p. 76. 
224 Hewitt, Life of Celine, p. 171. 
225 Henri Godard, Celine scandale, (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 96. 
226 Steven Conner, The Book of Skin, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 164. 
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It is dry and fragile. There is a smell to reading that exists in excess of this feeling and 
seeing. There is the dry smell that bespeaks the maturity of the paper. At the moment, 
when Celine's prose is read in its original type-setting, the pamphlets exist as a state of 
decay. They are dying. 
This experience of the pamphlets is lost when extracts from them are read in 
quotation. Citations from the pamphlets, in or out of what is perceived to be a suitable 
context, provide the prose with a renewal, a rejuvenation. This is where the limitations 
inherent in transposing Butler's ideas onto a text like Bagatelles pour un Massacre are 
revealed. To cut any of the text from its musty paper and to paste it into a publication in 
the present, is to smooth the wrinkles that bear testimony to its past. The print on this 
page, in its haecceity, in its here and nowness, obscures the original paper in its now and 
thenness. Butler is sensitive to this problem of reinvigoration. The one who recites hate- 
speech is responsible for the manner in which that repetition is carried out. 227 It would 
seem in this instance that the responsible act would be not to repeat Celine's prose. 
Outside the increasingly fragile pages of the pamphlets, the passages Celine composed or 
appropriated gain a new lease of life. It is true that they may be made to mean differently 
yet this attempt at reappropriation is also open to failure. The writer cannot control the 
response of the reader. The content of texts like those by Kaplan and Kristeva, which 
contain quotations from the pamphlets, may be deployed against the grain of the usage 
they were originally intended for (as a condemnation of fascism, or as an illustration of 
the psychic underpinnings of modern literature respectively) in the future. Any citations 
will always exceed the parameters set around their interpretation in the present. 
The act of quotation, the work of repetition, always entails a loss, something is 
invariably left behind. This loss is what occasions the potential for resistance in 
repetition. The loss is necessary for there to be any hope of change. This privation at the 
heart of repetition should therefore usually be understood as a positive characteristic. In 
the case of the pamphlets however, perhaps the loss is greater than the gain. It is not only 
the age of the prose that becomes buried in the action of citation though. There are other 
forfeitures. The quotations from the pamphlets reproduced in books about Celine are 
likely to be unfaithful to the way the text they apparently simply reiterate actually 
22' Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 27. 
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appeared on the page. The technology of the printing press has advanced greatly since the 
Thirties and Forties. In 1938 the mediation of the printing process, the gap between the 
writer and the reproduction of his writing, created a significant possibility for errors to 
occur. Error is a form of resistance. The printing press is supposed to repeat the writers 
words over and over again but there is always the potential for this process of 
reproduction to go astray. It is this straying from the typescript which is lost when Celine 
is cited in the present. Like an old record, Celine is cleaned up in quotation. His hiss - the 
unsettling, extraneous noise - is removed. The context within which the pamphlets were 
written was never one in which intention would be fulfilled by the end product. The end 
product includes interference that disrupts intent. 
In the copy of Bagatelles pour un Massacre which I read, the printed characters 
on the page were often imperfect. 228 The i would sometimes occur solely as a dot, or as a 
line without a dot. It was either a head without a body, or a body without a head. Other 
letters also appeared in varying degrees of degradation. This damage was caused either 
by the incomplete inking of the plates during the printing process, as seems most likely, 
or possibly by damage to the plates themselves. To give a sense of the scale of this partial 
printing, on page 326 (chosen at random) the letter i is damaged in the words `tennis, ' 
`civilization, ' `parfait, ' `animale, ' `Juif, ' and `air'. On page 332 the end of two lines of 
text is missing, I underscore the missing sections: 
Quel theätre pour cyclopes? ... cent 
decors echelonnes, t 
plus grandioses ... vers 
la mer... Mais il se glisse, piaule, piroue 229 
J'accuse. The citing of Bagatelles pour un Massacre in the present purifies the 
pamphlet, excising these imperfections that are omnipresent in the original. To reproduce 
these incomplete passages as complete is to conceal what is a material manifestation of 
the gap that exists between intention and eventuality. There is an incomplete 
correspondence between what Celine wants to say and what is eventually said in 
Bagatelles pour un Massacre. This resistance at the level of the matter of writing itself, 
228 This particular copy is held in the Special Collections section of the Brotherton Library at the University 
of Leeds. 
229 `A theatre fit for Hercules? ... a 
hundred stage-sets spread out, t_ / more imposing ... towardc the 
sea ... gliding, padding, piroue_'. 
Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre, p. 332. 
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the ink that refuses to collaborate with the author, is also lost when parts of the pamphlet 
are reprinted. An ethical reading of the work would be one which drew the readers 
attention to its physical condition (an elaboration of the contextual ethics mentioned 
earlier). 230 The pamphlets exist in the present but not as they did in the past. It is 
important to age them, to acknowledge the changed circumstances in which they are now 
read. It is also equally crucial to draw attention to the way the pamphlets undermine the 
message they are supposed to convey, but not at the level of style, rather through the very 
substance out of which they are made. The damaged i's draw attention to the absence of 
the I in the text, the lack of authority within the writing. The ink refuses to be limited by 
intention. This refusal - in the matter that is print - matters because it highlights the 
possibility of refusal in general. The pamphlets are anti-Semitic, fascist, misogynist, and 
racist, but never perfectly so. The inconsistencies in the ink act as an invitation to a 
further contesting of the content, a rewriting of hate against itself. 'Lesjeux sons faitsi 23I 
230 1 will return to the question of an ethics of reading grounded in materiality through my discussion of the 
aintings of Francis Bacon in the next chapter. 
;ý Louis-Ferdinand Celine, Les Beaux Draps, (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Francaises, 1941), p. 60. 
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Chapter Two 
Listen your way in with your Mouth 
If his is a message, it gets lost in the "background noise ": it is not a communication, it is 
not a language, or at most it is a dark and truncated language precisely like that of a 
person who is about to die and is alone, as we will all be at the point of death. ' 
Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream ; 
hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you can no longer write 
z poems. 
Seen but not Heard 
Painting is the silent art. What does paint sound like? Paint, feint, quaint, taint, 
saint.. . paint rhymes.. . paint 
has rhythm ... paint the word, not paint the thing. 
Paint the 
thing is coated by the word, it is the thing that is at once painted by the word, and painted 
over by it, the thing that lies beneath the ground and pigment of language, the unprimed 
thing underneath. The unprimed thing appears silent, as silent as the dead. John Cage 
once said `until I die there will be sounds'. 3 If he had extended his thoughts to the visual, 
he might have added `until I die there will be images'. When Cage entered an anechoic 
chamber -a place designed to shut out sound - he could still hear his circulation and in 
his nervous system, he could still hear himself. In darkness he would still see entoptic 
lights or phosphenes. Darkness and silence are for the dead. This thing that is paint is part 
of the land of the living, it is not without sound. There is something to be heard. This 
something might be noise. 
Can we catch this noise? Can we ever apprehend those vibrations inside the inner 
ear - the ripples within the cochlea, those waves constantly breaking against the 
stereocilla and then combing up the auditory nerve - those movements that signal noise 
in transit? The ear (the organ we usually associate with hearing) can be described in 
physiological terms, but do these terms describe a process of becoming audible or do they 
instead abbreviate a journey into silence? Is the mind at the end of the auditory nerve 
' Primo Levi, `On Obscure Writing, ' in Primo Levi, Other People's Trades, Trans. Raymond Rosenthal, 
(London: Abacus, 1991), p. 161. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Trans. E. B. Ashton, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 362. 
3 John Cage, Silence, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 
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actually the place where noise ends and sound begins? Do we only ever hear sounds, 
sounds being understood here as the shaping of noise into something other than 
itself... rumble, fart, burp, breath.. .a shaping of even these, our 
bodily functions, into 
something beyond and outside themselves, into sense. Can we hear the noise before the 
sound or are our ears always behind, always already too late? 
All things become in time, in motion, only death - the stilled life - is 
unbecoming. Action sounds, inaction silences. The high-pitched whine of the flatline on 
the encephalograph that indicates cardiac arrest should therefore be thought of as 
somewhere between sound and silence. Sound travels... sound is on the road... the 
speaking-clock, the scrape of the pen writing, the rasp of the paintbrush applying the 
ground (the practice of painting is soniferous)... are sound journeys. This voyaging in and 
as sound... this commotion.. . 
is in time ... or we 
hear time in it... `And at my back I always 
hear time's winged chariot hurrying near'. Time (as a stream or cycle) makes itself 
heard. There is a sound to the times of our lives. The passage of time can be measured 
through the audible and the inaudible. At the sound of the first cuckoo we hear the end of 
winter. We know we grow old when sounds are only seen and felt, or listened to in the 
inner-ear of memory, when we can no longer hear. We also age culturally. 5 This kind of 
ageing becomes audible in the songs we listen to, if we prefer Dead or Alive's You spin 
me right round (like a record) to Danii Minogue's Put the needle on it then we are 
hearing our age. 6 Each generation has its tunes; yet these tunes travel through time and on 
the temporal turntable our 45's spiral from a moment to a memory. 7 Sound is a record. 
Sound keeps time. 
Here I want to attend to the relationship between sound and painting. Can we 
catch sound in painting? Can we perhaps apprehend noise in the paint? There are sounds 
'Andrew Marvell, `To his Coy Mistress, ' in Andrew Marvell, The Complete Poems, Ed. Elizabeth Story 
Donno, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 
5 For a moving description of cultural ageing see the chapter `Not to Undertand the World Anymore' in 
Jean Amery, On Ageing, Trans. John D. Barlow, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 78- 
102. 
6 Dead Or Alive. Danii Minogue, Neon Nights 
Sylviane Agacinski conceives of time as an `infinite spiraling curl' in her book Time Passing, Trans. Jody 
Gladding, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 1 12. Perhaps we should conceive of our death 
as similar to the stylus that becomes stuck whilst beneath the turntable continues its revolutions. The film 
Sea of Love - which revolves around old records and their perceived significance - contains a scene which 
explicitly links music and memory. Sound can be a mnemonic aid. We hear sounds and remember things. 
68 
which take place in the artist's studio that could be memorised, preserved, recorded. We 
could capture sounds of the squeezing of tubes, the mixing of colours, the brush at work 
across the canvas, dabbing, swishing, thumping. These are effects which could be 
digitally edited by the mixing-desk palette, drawn-out, elongated, stretched like the 
canvas itself, or instead, compressed, compacted and condensed. Sound is malleable, 
much like paint. The sound of the making of a painting is not, however, the same as the 
finished picture. A record that was pressed with a recording of the creation of the picture 
would not share the same grooves as the dried brush-strokes upon the finished canvas. If 
a microphone were trained upon a painter painting there would always be something 
which would continue to remain beyond the process of recording, the substance at the 
end of the sound. 
Can this substance sound? Does a painting like Francis Bacon's Study after 
Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953) make a sound? There is certainly a 
ubiquitous sound embodied in the materiality of things - the distension of the canvas 
which takes place because of a subtle change in temperature, perhaps even the fading of 
colours - which we might define as sound at the molecular level. This sound, however, 
currently exists as an unheard heard, as a speculative vibration against the tympanic 
membrane. It would require a currently impossible amplification to render it audible. The 
ear must await an as yet unperfected process of time-lapse recording to aid its hearing. 8 
There are louder, more immediate possibilities though, acoustic interpretations of paint, 
of paintings. Bacons's Study after Velazquez is a painting which has inspired several 
composers, including Gerard Schurmann and Mark Anthony Turnage. 9 But have they 
really sampled the screaming Pope? Have they recorded and reused its sound, or have 
they bought their own sound to it? Do they play the painting? Certainly they have kept 
their distance; they have not touched the paint. It might be possible to persuade a very 
understanding curator at the Des Moines Art Center to allow you to record the sounds 
made by running your fingers across the painted unprimed canvas... across the smooth 
R The possibility of carrying out such a recording in reality draws ever closer. In recent medical research 
crystals have been used as microphones. They are designed to detect viruses as they break off from a 
crystal face whilst it is being electronically vibrated. Scientists at NASA have developed a device known as 
a `nanomicrophone' made from carbon nanotubes which registers even the slightest changes in pressure 
and could potentially detect the sound of a single cell growing. 
Figure 1. Francis Bacon, Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 
Oil on canvas, 1953. Des Moines Art Center, Coffin Fine Arts Trust Fund 
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incorporate motion? Paintings are histories of gestures. They do not appear to be gestural 
in themselves. A painter could perhaps perfect a paint that never dries and apply it to a 
constantly vibrating canvas.. . 
but such a painting would only ever be becoming... it would 
never be painted. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in his essay Laocoon, interpreted the 
moderation he perceived to exist in the artist's treatment of the expression of bodily pain 
in the famous sculpture as resulting from, amongst other things, the time constraints 
faced by the sculptor. He points out that whereas the poet does not have to `concentrate 
his picture upon a single moment, ' the artist does. 12 It is hard to make a single block of 
sculpted marble stand for an entire poem, it is difficult to fold the whole of a moving 
story into a single moment from that story. A sound is also a period of duration and 
would require a similar condensation. A painting of a sound would need to be lasting but 
without length. 
Salvador Dali painted perhaps the most well known attempt to depict time passing 
- to show the temporal motion - through the melting clocks in The Persistence of 
Memory (1931). In the Study after Velazquez, Bacon's timing of the image is of a 
different order. Movement is measured against the immobility of the Pope's gaping maw. 
This black mouth-hole functions to foreground the dissolution of the body around it, a 
body that is losing its outline, a body becoming uncertain. In this sense the mouth does 
act as a witness in the sense Gilles Deleuze understands it in Francis Bacon: Logique de 
la Sensation, it works as an `element-repere ou de constante par rapport ä quoi s'estime 
une variation'. 13 The mouth shows that the image is on the way. This is not an arrested 
outburst like the cry in Nicolas Poussin's The Massacre of the Innocents (1625) so 
admired by Bacon. In Bacon's painting, the motionless source of motion... the 
mouth... the hiatus... allows the rest of the pain to move, pushes the rest of the paint 
around. This is not the same technique as that employed by Edvard Munch in that well 
known cry, The Scream. In this crayon and tempera work from 1893, Munch tries to 
replicate sonorous vibrations through the use of concentric circles. Munch's picture is not 
uncertain enough, it is all sound and no fury. It is not a scream nor is it the representation 
of a scream. Just as, for different reasons, neither are those comic book depictions of 
12 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, Trans. Robert Philmore, (London: Macmillan, 1874), p. 36. 
1' It works as a `gauge or a certification against which change can be judged. Gilles Deleuze, Francis 
Bacon: Logique de la Sensation, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2002), p. 22. 
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screaming soldiers - the recourse to lettering, to a sub-Joycean attempt to write noise - 
the 'Aaaaaaagh' in a cartoonist's speech-bubble. Both these examples are mere 
illustrations whereas I want to argue that Bacon's painting actually is a noise, or at least 
attempts to be so. 
Munch's The Scream is actually a cry. The Norwegian title Skrike can in fact 
mean to shout, scream, or cry out. It is more ambiguous than the simple translation of 
`scream' would suggest. A cry is thoughtful in a way that screaming is not, perhaps it 
could be said that a cry is thought out whereas a scream is outside thought. The cry is 
certainly reasoned. It is intentionally expressive. 14 Munch is afraid, he paints his fear, he 
cries out. Fear need not be rational, but it is always the giving of shape to an experience. 
Experience itself is a shape, an effect of shaping. Feeling is a giving of form to the world. 
It is a question of outline. Munch's painting is bounded. The face of the homunculus - 
head shaped like a light-bulb - is an unbroken form, clearly distinct from the bridge and 
the water that form its backdrop. In contrast, Bacon's style of painting is malerisch, loose 
brush-work, laissez-faire facture. It is a trying not to think in the way of the paint, to 
purify it, to shape it. The Pope's outline is imperfect, punctured. The boundary between 
figure and ground is indistinct. The Pope is not so much misshapen as losing his shape. A 
scream is not a sound. It is not delineated. It is shapeless. It is close to the noise out of 
which outline is extricated. 
Noise works against thinking. Arthur Schopenhauer complains in the section of 
Parerga and Paralipomena entitled `On Din and Noise, ' about `the torture thinkers have 
to endure from noise'. 15 He is particularly irritated by the noise of the cracking of whips 
which he writes of as: 
... this sudden sharp crack which paralyses the 
brain, tears and rends the thread 
of reflection and murders all thought, (which) must be painfully felt by anyone 
who carries anything in his head resembling an idea. All such cracks must, 
therefore, disturb hundreds in their mental activity, however humble its nature, 
14 Martin Heidegger suggests that a cry can be a call, can express a state of being such as distress. What 
differentiates the cry from the call is its transience, `it can offer no lasting abode to either pain or jov'. 
Heidegger, What is called Thinking?, Trans. J. Glenn Gray, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 124. 
15 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paratipomena: Volume 2, Trans. E. F. J. Payne, (Oxford: Clarendon 
University Press, 1974), p. 642. 
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but they shoot through a thinker's meditations as painfully and fatally as the 
executioner's axe cuts the head from the body. 16 
Schopenhauer's own account provides a prime example of shaping, of the transformation 
of sound into sense, whip cracking as disturbance, distraction, diversion, interruption, 
whip-cracking named and described, thought about, thought through, made thought. In a 
similar way, although Bacon's painting may scream and aspire to be noisy art, my 
mobilisation of the painting to perform a narrative function, to narrate the absence of 
narration in the image, to storify it, is to sound its noise, to outline it and destroy it. My 
description demonstrates the violence of meaning making, the losses involved in any 
process of interpretation. 
It is impossible to catch this noise in language or perhaps all too easy to do so, to 
imprison it, to put it behind these bars that are the letters and words, the crotchets and the 
quavers. There is a want within interpretation that could be understood as the ceaseless 
desire to form sound out of noise. Here this desire manifests itself in the effort to forge 
the scream out of the word or the concept, to frame it and intern it, to write it, to travesty 
it. Interpretation is however always incomplete, there is always a hole within it through 
which that which is under interpretation escapes, a `something' which is always 
unaccounted for. Noise is the hole. Michel Serres writes in Genesis about the noise of the 
possible: 
The noise is the opening. The Ancients were right to say of chaos that it gaped. 
The multiple is open, from it is born nature, which is always aborning. We cannot 
predict what will be born from it. We cannot know what is in it, here or there. '? 
Bacon did not even try to predict what would emerge from the opening. His practice was 
one which favoured the unpredictable, the chance elements and occurrences in the 
application of paint. A good example is provided by the `whip of white paint' thrown 
onto the canvas at the last moment which appears on the shoulder of the figure vomiting 
into a basin in Triptych May-June 1973.18 
16 Ibid. p. 643. 
" Michel Serres, Genesis, Trans. Genevieve James & James Nielson, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1995), p. 22. 
18 Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon, p. 94. 
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Bacon's paintings are attempts to shake off meaning, to escape from shape. What 
Ernst van Alphen has described as the loss of self19 that occurs to the spectator whilst 
looking at a painting by Francis Bacon might equally be understood as a loss of meaning 
or shape. The spectator momentarily encounters pre-meaning, encounters an experience 
prior to its shaping as such. The self is not lost in this moment, it is left behind. The self 
is the template that sounds the subject. Bacon's paintings explore the noise and pain 
before the self, beneath the self. 20 Study after Velazquez is a merging of experience, a 
coalescing of sensation, a whorl inward and backward. 2' It is painful to look at and 
painful to listen to. By pain here I mean the experience of losing shape - the experience 
of moving towards a non-experience - of blurring boundaries. Elaine Scarry describes 
intense pain as world destroying. 22 The world is full of sounds and shapes, which make it 
signify. Pain - like intense pleasure - causes the disintegration of signification. You 
cannot know when you are in pain because you as a way of being in the world is paused. 
Pain becomes you, you fade into the background and the background out of which you 
originally emerged becomes foreground. In his essay on torture this is what Jean Amery 
called `self-negation' when the `flesh becomes a total reality'. 23 The person who is being 
tortured `is only a body, and nothing else beside that'. 24 They are perhaps not even a 
body as our bodies are shaped to be. It is the nothing beside, behind and before the body. 
Pain is the burring of mind and materiality, it causes thought, which so often thinks of 
itself as ethereal, to feel the weight of the matter. In Bacon's Study after Velazquez 
figuration (the shape giver) is in the process of giving way to flesh. The painting is not a 
depiction of flesh but a becoming flesh, the paint bleeds. This is what Michel Leiris 
means when he described the possibility for a spectator without preconceived ideas to 
19 Ernst van Alphen, Francis Bacon and the Loss of Self, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1993). 
20 Here I do not mean to suggest that Francis Bacon is trying to communicate his own pain through the 
paint. This noise beneath the subject is not of the subject. I do not think that paint can vehicle an artist's 
feelings, as the critic Clement Greenberg would seem to suggest in his essay `Towards a Newer Laocoon' 
from 1940. See Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Volume 1, Ed. John O'Brian, 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), pp. 23-37. For a good summation of the argument against such 
a notion see Fred Orton, Figuring Jasper Johns, (London: Reaktion, 1994), particularly pp. 200-214., and 
Fred Orton, `(Painting) Out of Time, ' in parallax 1: 3 (September 1996), pp. 99-112. 
21 This whorl is often figured in Bacon's paintings, in the form of smeared faces and smudged bodies. 
22 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 29. 
23 Jean Amery, At the Mind's Limits, Trans. Sidney Rosenfeld, (London: Granta Books, 1999), p. 33. 
24 Ibid. 
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experience `un ordre de realfite chair et sang qui n'est pas san rapport avec ce qu'un acte 
paroxystique tel que V amour physique fait toucher dans la vie ordinaire'25 when they 
look at one of Bacon's canvases. The spectator views Bacon's paintings viscerally. It is 
an unthinking seeing. 
In her chapter on torture in The Body in Pain, Scarry reads the experience of pain 
as a movement towards an unwording. During a forced confession the tormented prisoner 
reaches `aimlessly for the name of a person or place that has barely enough cohesion to 
hold its shape as a word and none to bond it to its wordly referent' . 
26 Sometimes pain 
attains such a level of intensity that words are emptied of their meaning, the prisoner then 
speaks in husks. The confession in these circumstances forms part of a process of 
disintegration of signification, it `is a ha fway point in the disintegration of language, an 
audible objectification of the proximity of silence - the torturer and the regime have 
doubled their voice since the prisoner is now speaking their words. 27 Bacon's art work is 
in this sense a confessional one. He is constantly trying to paint a series of signs that are 
not in his hand, trying to make paint speak in tongues other than his own. He likes chance 
to speak in his stead, and says `if anything works for me, I feel it is nothing I have made 
myself, but something which chance has been able to give to me'. 28 For Scarry it is only a 
particular kind of confession - the confession made under duress - which involves 
speaking as another. The prisoner who is tortured begins to speak for the regime rather 
than for her/himself because pain dissociates the prisoner's voice from their self. It is 
possible however to think of all confessions as produced under some form of compulsion. 
Faith and morality - when they are cited as the incitement for a confession - might be 
construed as the internalised mechanisms of a more subtle and insidious method of 
25 The possibility for a spectator without preconceived ideas experience `an order of flesh and blood 
reality similar to that which an ecstatic act like love-making touches in the everyday'. Michel Leiris, 
Francis Bacon ou la brutalite du fait, (Paris: Editions le Seuil, 1995), p. 77. 
26 Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 35. 
27 Ibid. p. 36. Scarry's notion of language here is one constituted by words. In my reading of Scarry I may 
appear to conflate signification with language. This is because it is my own belief that moments occur in 
torture where not just language but also consciousness disintegrates. Signification is the interpretation of 
experience, for example a paper-cut prompts a response -a signing - from the one cut. It is necessary to try 
and imagine a thousand paper-cuts experienced simultaneously. This would cause the obliteration of the 
One. Intense pain overwhelms the interpretive capacity. Language in the sense I am using it refers to any 
act of interpretation, any sense-making, any recognition of signification. When pain becomes all 
encompassing, becomes one, nothing is signified because signification requires a reader. The reader is 
consciousness as sign producer and dictionary of meanings. 
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torture. No confession is in our own voice, in the sense that all confessions are effects of 
a power that always originates elsewhere. This allows us to read Bacon's pursuit of 
chance - his conscious desire to paint by accident - as an attempt to break out of power. 
The only way for you to confess is to not speak as you. Confession must originate from 
outside shape, from beyond power. Power delimits the contours of the knowable. Bacon's 
paintings are an invitation into an outside of power. 
Scarry separates the body and the self in her analysis of torture. She believes 
torture is an amplification of an always already innate division between the two. Torture 
makes emphatic `the ever present but, except in the extremity of sickness and death, only 
latent distinction between a self and a body'. 29 Speech and writing (which constitute 
language for Scarry) embody - or give shape to - the self, and allow it to break out of its 
corporeal confines. 30 If you destroy the voice or writing you absent the self, but by 
attacking the body you make it present whereas usually it passes unnoticed. In terms of 
our own bodies we are all ordinarily invisible men. The opposition between body and self 
is soundly delineated but artificial. Self and body are two shapes in the geometry that is 
signification, two shapes that produce and reinforce power. They are effects - contours 
with histories - and the division they have formed can be undone. Bacon's blurred and 
besmeared figures and faces form a bringing together of the self and the soma, the mind 
and the body. 
Painting is sometimes read as a form of writing. In Scarry's terms, if it was such, 
it would therefore embody the self. Study after Velazquez is painting as unwriting. In this 
sense it is reminiscent of the signature Guy Fawkes appended to his final confession, a 
chilling example of writing losing its shape.. . moving towards unreadability ... towards the 
dubious freedom of illegibility. Fawkes's final signature (and there are several signed 
confessions so it is possible to track the deterioration in his writing) is writing within 
pain, writing wherein the boundaries between signs are collapsing. Pain disturbs 
contours. It is a violent making of, or taking to, noise. Jacques Attali writes that `to make 
28 Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon, p. 52. 
29 Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 48. 
30 Ibid. p. 49. 
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noise is to interrupt a transmission, to disconnect, to kill'. 31 Intense pain interrupts shape 
and disconnects signs by pushing them into each other. Signs need space. In great pain 
the world becomes too small to accommodate them. Agony is this pain. The agonized 
experiences a pain beyond pain, beyond language. The word `pain' cannot register this 
feeling. It is unwordable. The word `pain' is opaque; it obscures the event it designates. 
Words are above things, they are the destructive lacquer that is necessary to mean. Pain is 
the return of the underwork. It is sensation outside sense. Sense-making is the forging of 
an experience in something other than itself, in its interpretation. Pain cannot be 
interpreted, it is. The word fakes it. 
Great pain cannot be communicated. As Jean Amery explained, `If someone 
wanted to impart his physical pain, he would be forced to inflict it and thereby become a 
torturer himself . 32 The words would need to cut the reader to carry the pain. Even if the 
words are bypassed and the pain is physically induced this might not succeed, to impart is 
to make known, and great pain is not known, it is become. The one in pain - most 
intimate with pain - is known by pain, rather than knows pain. The tortured person - for 
whom the body has become all encompassing - has a body without signification. It is not 
a body as we understand our bodies. It is not a body the experience of which is mediated 
by discourse. It is not a body opposed to, and yet reliant upon, the self. It is a body 
outside. 
The tortured body is not even a body forced to resist in the sense that Foucault 
conceives of resistance in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. It is here that 
Foucault writes the oft cited words, `where there is power, there is resistance, ' and the 
less often sighted `and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power'. 33 For Foucault, power is always located in relations. In a 
Foucaultian sense then, in the context of torture, power does not reside in the person who 
tortures but in their relation to the person tortured. Power exists in connections, it is never 
isolated. It is also connected, it is coupled to resistance. The body in intense pain 
produces a situation in which there is no resistance. The body in agony is not relational. 
31 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, Trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 26. 
32 Amery, At the Mind's Limits, p. 33. 
33 Michel Foucault. The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 95. 
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William Haver has written that `entirely other than a subject, flesh in the plenitude of the 
pain that supplants every possible ontology is utter singularity, nothing but its `ownmost' 
non-relationality'. 34 The flesh is flesh. The scream is scream. The body is all, hence it is 
nothing. The knowable is a realm of relations. It is a place of spaces... spaces open up the 
possibility of connections between things. We know through the space between knowing 
and not knowing. The non-relational is outside knowing and not-knowing. Interpretation 
also requires the relational. The one in intense pain transcends experience because 
experience is always already an interpretation. Intense pain surpasses the interpretative 
capacity. This folding inwards (the collapsing of any and all relations) that occurs in 
instances of extreme torture causes the one in pain to move outside power. Power 
requires space, in the absence of space there can be no power, there can be no master and 
bondsman. 35 
As Jacques Lacan has pointed out, pain has a complex character. It is `an 
intermediary between afferent and efferent'. 36 Pain moves between the inward and the 
outward. Scarry has written of Bacon's pictures of solitary figures that they are `turned 
inside out, revealing the most inward and secret parts'. 37 This is true not just of what is 
depicted but also of the spectator. The spectator sees with their stomach. Their stomach 
sees them. The paintings bring back the body. In Study after Velazquez the inside of the 
body is brought out by the scream. Georges Bataille once wrote of the overwhelmed 
individual who throws back their head, that they appear as if `explosive impulses were 
(going) to spurt directly out of the body through the mouth, in the form of screams'. 38 The 
scream disembodies. It throws the body outside its contours, makes the inside outside. 39 It 
34 William Haver, 'Really Bad Infinities: Queer's Honour and the Pornographic Life, ' in parallax 5: 4 
(October-December 1999), p. 16. 
35 The fact that power requires the existence of relations and that extreme torture causes the cessation of the 
relational (hence removes the victim of torture from power) may explain the changing techniques employed 
in torture in many Western countries. The old-fashioned practices which destroyed the self have been 
abandoned. They have been replaced by methods designed to unsettle rather than undo the self. Physical 
pain is no longer an important component of torture. The aim in contemporary practices is to induce the one 
who is tortured into states of indeterminacy: Is it day or night? Am I here or there? Is this true or false? 
'6 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of P. svchoanalvsis 1959-1960, Trans. Dennis Porter, (London: Routledge, 
1999), p. 59. 
37 Scarry, The Bodv in Pain, p. 53. 
3' Georges Bataille, `Mouth, ' in Visions ofExcess: Selected Writings 1927-1939, (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 59. 
39 Deleuze wrote that `tout le corps s'echappe par la bouche qui crie'. `All of the body escapes through the 
mouth that screams'. Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 33. 
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is a voiding of space. The scream is pain. It is what Volognov called the `animal cry': 
`The animal cry, the pure response to pain in the organism, is bereft of accent; it is a 
purely natural phenomenon. For such a cry, the social atmosphere is irrelevant, and 
therefore it does not contain even the germ of sign formation'. 40 It is something exterior 
to ideology and outside the shape of the sign. It is the outing of the inner. An 
intermediary between the insides and the outside, it also exceeds intermediation. It is 
neither inside nor outside, nor is it both inside and outside, it is beyond inside and 
outside. It is the `beyond-of-the-signified'41 out of which the signified became. Lacan 
calls it the Thing, das Ding. At times I will call it noise. 
Lacan wrote that the Thing is inaccessible to us, that is has always been 
inaccessible. 42 There is no way to approach the Thing even though the Thing is 
everything everywhere, it must of necessity remain nothing and nowhere. The self 
acceded the Thing; abjected the Thing. This accession cannot be repeated without first 
having an abdication. The done has to be undone to be done again. We do not breathe in 
without breathing out. We do not sleep without waking. We do not forget without 
remembering. The self has no memory of the before self. The before is not within the self 
but around and beneath it. The before is the noise from which the self figures itself out. 
Attali understands noise to be a formless form of interruption that initiates change 
through its powers of censorship, through its capacity to annul the existing meanings of a 
given moment and open up a meaningless field out of which to create `a new order on 
another level of organization'. 43 In the beginning however noise interrupts nothing 
because it is not, it is the not out of which the self untangles and extricates itself as self, it 
is the meaninglessness that gives meaning its means, it is the shapeless needed to shape. 
It is that which is before we can say `it' that enables us to say it. Noise lines the outline. It 
is the surround to shapes. It is the paper beneath the type. 
Babies exist in and as noise before they are born, encompassed by and being the 
roar of bodily functions. This roar continues after birth. Didier Anzieu suggests that the 
alimentary and digestive activities `turn the body into a resonant cavern whose noises are 
40 V. N. Volosnov, Philosophy of Language, Trans. Ladislav Matejka & I. R. Titunik. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 22. 
41 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 54. 
42 Ibid. p. 159. 
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all the more disquieting for the baby since they cannot be localized'. 44 Anzieu is correct 
to emphasise the non-localizability of this noise. Noise comes from everywhere and 
nowhere. It does not originate, it is the origin. It is an origin that is no origin, it founds 
origin. Origin arises from noise. Noise and sound as things, as differences; emerge from 
the no Thing that is noise. It is the Thing before the two. It is all and always. Here and 
there, not here or there, the thread of the reel that is noise is ever present. It must however 
silence itself for sound to become possible, for fort and da to be heard. Outside inside and 
outside, beyond closeness and distance, it is extimacy. 45 Noise is the intimate 
unknowable that gives me my edge and puts me on edge. The closest we come to noise is 
through the abject, that which `lies there quite close' but `cannot be assimilated'. 46 Julia 
Kristeva understands the abject to be that which we banish in order to be, that which, 
from its no-place of banishment beseeches `a crying out'. 47 She explains that in the 
writings of Louis-Ferdinand Celine the `narrative yields to a "crying-out theme" that, 
when it tends to coincide with the incandescent states of boundary-subjectivity that I have 
called abjection, is the crying-out theme of suffering-horror. 48 The theme of suffering- 
horror is `the ultimate evidence of (... ) states of abjection within a narrative 
representation'. 49 This crying-out theme of suffering-horror is the scream in Study after 
Velazquez. It is the pain of the desire to touch the untouchable. It is the knowledge of the 
impossibility of fulfilling this desire. It is the wanting. 
Abjection, if not noise, is perhaps on the path back to noise.. . 
it is the experience 
of an unsound self.. . the experience of losing experience... of losing the shape that 
is an 
experience ... of almost attaining the non-experience of unbecoming... 
it is a falling back 
50 to nothingness but a not quite getting there. The abject is not the objet petit a, nor is it 
43 Attali, Noise, p. 33. 
44 Didier Anzieu, The Skin Ego, Trans. Chris Turner, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 163. 
45 It is an intimate exteriority. It is both inside and outside, hence neither inside nor outside. This does not 
make it an undecidable however, it is instead an underneath that is as close as it is far away. Lacan 
mentions `extimacy' in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 139. 
46 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 1. 
a' Ibid. p. 2. 
aR Ibid. p. 141. 
49 Ibid. 
so Roudiez's excellent translation of Powers of Horror does fail to make the differentiation between the 
objet petit a and the abject as clear as is possible. Roudiez translates the key passage on p. 1. of Powers of 
Horror concerning the distinction between the two as `Nor is it (the abject) an ob jest, an otherness 
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an object, it is a border. It is the border between the I and its before, it is the brink of the 
I's history. The abject marks the moment when an I `that is taking shape is constantly 
straying'. 51 The abject is the hinge, it is the process of separation, it is not an after but a 
during. As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, it is the requisite rejection for 
recognition to take place. Abjection is before the time of mirrors, acoustic, visual, or 
otherwise. 52 Abjection is the precondition for any identification with an other. It is a 
tenuous shaping that permits the self to take shape in an outside itself. It is a rejecting of 
noise, a seeking of sound. Mewling and puking in the mother's amts, the infant begins 
the journey towards an outside of this mother Thing. By screaming, the infant expels a 
part of itself from the confines of the maternal embrace. Screaming is a kind of shitting 
out (be that of fear, or of self). Mikhail Bakhtin writes that the gaping mouth is `related 
to the lower stratum; it is the open gate leading downward into the bodily underworld'. 53 
The screaming mouth is a second anus. 
Sigmund Freud believed that the scream was the source of conscious memory. 
The scream is the surface from which speech arises: 
In the first place, there are objects - perceptions - that make one scream, because 
they arouse pain; and it turns out as an immensely important fact that this 
association of sound (which arouses motor images of one's own as well) with a 
perceptual [image], which is composite apart from this, emphasizes the object as 
a hostile one and serves to direct attention to the perceptual [image]. When 
otherwise, owing to pain, one has received no good indication of the quality of the 
object, the information of one's own scream serves to characterize the object. 
Thus this association is a means of making memories that arouse unpleasure 
conscious and objects of attention: the first class of conscious memories has been 
sa created Not much is now needed in order to invent speech. 
ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire'. The original French text reads `II n 'est pas ... cet ob-jeu 
petit <a> fuyant indefiniment daps la quete systematique du desir'. It might possibly be translated as `It is 
not. .. this play-thing petit a ceaselessly 
fleeing in the unconditional quest of desire'. See Julia Kristeva, 
Pouvoirs de I 'horreur: Essai sur V abjection, (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1980), p. 9. 
51 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 11. 
52 For a description of the idea of the acoustic mirror see Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female 
Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 80-81., and 
Anzieu, The Skin Ego, pp. 168-171. 
53 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, Trans. Helene Iswolsky, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984), p. 325. 
`a Sigmund Freud, `Project for a Scientific Psychology, ' in The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of 
Freud: Volume 1 (1886-1899), (London: Hogarth Press, 1966), pp. 366-367. 
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Here Freud is describing the infant's early proto-readings - on the path to interpretation - 
during which the sound of a scream (as shaped experience) is matched to a perceptual 
image. The scream acts to shape the object as unpleasure. Speech is not yet possible but 
there is a reading and writing in process, there is communication, there are signs. Noise is 
further back... 
In the beginning there is the scream out which screams emerge, in the beginning 
there is the pain from which pains arise, in the beginning there is noise. Noise is the 
singularity that is outside the singular and the multiple. Perception and its objects issue 
from the noise, and in their issuance they drown out the noise. Noise is gradually 
abjected, rejected, silenced. In the beginning, we retch and wrench ourselves out of this 
noise. The nausea within noise.. . the gagging and vomiting... starts to pull us out of noise, 
or push noise out of us. Pulling and pushing ... oppositions ... separations... provisional at 
first but then fastening as experiences, becoming sounds. The screaming baby is carrying 
out an exhaustive disgorging of noise. 55 It is propelling noise outside the outside. 
Study after Velazquez is an attempt to paint outside the outside. It is an attempt to 
paint back to the before of before and after, to paint the noise before noise and sound. 
The scream is the first and the final sound, a frontier of the self. 56 The screaming Pope 
tracks sound back to the edge of noise and then seeks to go further, from mis-shaping to 
unshaping. The whips of red paint, streaks which stand out against the white of the papal 
surplice, are interruptions in shape. These blood red spatters appear to have been thrown 
onto the canvas like the `whip of white paint' in Triptych - May-June 1973. They seem to 
be after-thoughts, outside-thoughts, openings. These weals of paint flay the I. The `real 
murderer of ideas is only the crack of a whip. It is meant to crush every good moment for 
meditation which anyone may at times have'. 57 The sting of the lash breaks shape, 
ruptures reason. It opens the eye to the possibility of seeing something which cannot be 
seen, of hearing something which cannot be heard, of thinking something beyond 
ss Within three weeks of a child's birth differentiation begins to occur in its screaming. See Anzieu, The 
Skin Ego, p. 163. 
56 Reinaldo Arenas wrote `I scream, therefore I exist'. The scream is indeed intimately connected to being. 
The scream is the child's first oral assertion of its existence, and can sometimes be a man's last. Arenas, 
Before Night Falls, (London: Serpent's Tail, 2001), p. 301. 
57 Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, p. 643. 
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thought, the possibility of an unthinking. 58 The painting shocks. It is traumatic, it wounds. 
Julia Kristeva asserts that Celine's effect is to call up within the reader, `a nakedness, a 
forlornness, a sense of having had it, discomfort, a downfall, a wound'. 59 Bacon might be 
said to call up a similar wound. Study after Veläsquez breaks the skin - the spectator's 
cutaneous contour - and opens inside to outside, opens an outside to inside and outside. 
It is useful to return to Munch's The Scream here, Fredric Jameson reads the 
drawing as a demonstration of the limits of visual representation, a depiction of the 
impossibility of any artists efforts at self-expression. The inside can never become 
outside. For Munch the picture is the `desperate communication and the outward 
dramatization of inward feeling'. b0 He is seeking to substantiate feelings. Distemper and 
pastel become vehicles through which Munch seeks to exteriorise his inner-pain. This 
effort to carry distress from within to without is an unsuccessful one. The pastel is 
stubborn in its silence. These pigments placed and spaced across the board by Munch 
speak each to each to produce a figuration, but Munch cannot speak to me. Jameson 
believes that the failure of self-expression is underscored by the gestural content, `since 
the realm of the sonorous, the cry, the raw vibrations of the human throat, are 
incompatible with its medium'. 61 It is impossible to hear a picture. An artist should never 
mix the seen and the sounded. The gaze is deaf. Jameson reads Expressionism against 
Pop art. He believes that contemporary artists work in the realisation that the brush is not 
a bridge between artist and canvas, but rather a break. The artist is dead. This is not the 
place to engage with Jameson's cultural logic. I want to focus on his reading of Munch 
however. 
I suggested earlier that The Scream is actually a cry. The picture is too considered 
to be a scream. Munch's picture does prefigure Bacon's Study after Veläsquez in one 
respect however. Hidden behind the twisted torso of the homunculus there is an 
sR This `possibility of seeing' is similar to the `possibility of Saying' that Avital Ronell discusses in her 
essay `Koan Practice or Taking Down the Test'. In the Zen practice of koan - the posing of a problem by a 
master for a pupil - the `largely internal contest ... is intended to secure an experience of extreme 
dispossession'. Thought is encouraged to out-think itself, to open to a thinking beyond thinking. This 
opening is often attained `by the administration of a shock'. `The shock is crucial to the experience of the 
koan: it stages the opening of thought exceeding itself in the jolt'. parallax 10: 1, p. 62. 
59 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 134. 
60 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, (London: Verso, 1991), 
p. 12. 
61 Ibid. p. 14. 
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impossible break in the railings of the bridge, a hidden fracture that unbalances the 
image. The lines of the rails on either side of the figure are not aligned; they are in this 
respect reminiscent of the impossible horizon in Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa. These 
broken lines foretell a future rupture. The Scream seems flawless in its measured 
disturbance but the impossible join of the railings censures the representation's faith in 
itself. The noise is in this interruption behind the figure. The scream is behind the cry. 
The rails should form a coherent narrative - from foreground to background - for the 
reading I but there is a break instead. The gap in the railings introduces an incoherency 
into the image and what it relates. 
Bacon chided narrative interpretations of his own work but they are inescapable. 
The narrative in Study after Veläsquez is interrupted however, making it similar to 
Munch's The Scream. This narrative is challenged, `its linearity is shattered, it proceeds 
by flashes, enigmas, short cuts, incompletion, tangles, and cuts'. 62 The screaming Pope 
becomes incoherent because of the syntax, or lack of it, the disordered brush-strokes. 
This is an abject painting, one in which the `limit between inside and outside' has become 
uncertain. 63 The application of the paint is a violent one. The impasto white of the Papal 
robe and the thick brush-work of the yellow throne (perhaps it should be described as a 
box), manifest the effort expended in the production of the picture. The artist always used 
the rough side of the canvas, which makes the way he pulls broad strokes of paint across 
distance all the more impressive. The canvas must literally have been pummelled to apply 
the pigment in this way. It is not just the form the brush-strokes take though, but the 
sequencing of their application, which brings the abject to be in the portrait. A painting 
like de Kooning's Woman and Bicycle (1952-53) might be regarded as similar in the way 
that broad bands of paint are made to travel across a great expanse of canvas, but the 
American artist's technique is one that only depicts rather than enacts. De Kooning paints 
a figure already in fragments, an already made broken person. Bacon paints his Pope in 
such a way as to make and break him at the same time. It is this difference which 
prevents de Kooning's painting from ever aspiring to the poetic. Here poetry should be 
understood as narrative that is pulverised. It continues to carry its narrative origins as 
62 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 141. 
6' Ibid. 
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traces within it. De Kooning's woman is not broken, because she was always already 
broken. He painted her after the event of breaking. Bacon's Study after Velasquez 
however is an event of breaking and this is what gives it a poetic quality. 
Here poetry is a process of breaking apart narrative even if that breaking apart 
must of necessity create another narrative through its action. This second-order narrative 
bom in its own death forever taunts poetry's claim to independence. Bacon seems to have 
painted a screaming pope and then to have begun to obliterate the image through the use 
of vertical black lines which cut through the existing figure. It is the creation and then 
destruction of a representation, narrative collapsed into poetry. This story of the creation 
of the painting is too simplistic. The effect of a curtain which ostensibly falls across and 
obscures the image is more complex. The curtain which appears to have been painted on 
top of the figure of the pope is in fact at times actually behind him. Some of the curtain 
appears to have been painted before the pope, and some after. Bacon scores his screaming 
pope with black brushstrokes in a process which should reintroduce a form of narrative. 
Any narrative is however made uncertain. The screaming pope is never able to become 
the coherent representation - the consistent narrative - that would constitute the mending 
of a poetic breaking. Those purportedly liberating, destructive downward sweeps of dark 
colour travel sometimes behind and sometimes across the figure of the pontiff and as 
much constitute as deny him. Poetry emerges in this uncertain process of description. The 
poetic is not superseded by narrative at this point. Bacon breaks up the operation of 
breaking up. The recognition of this deceptive technical practice is of course the 
introduction of a narrative once again, but Bacon has pushed story-telling back another 
level and may therefore lay claim to being one of the most poetic of painters. He has 
revolutionised the revolution that is poetry and that happens within poetry. This has 
important implications at the level of subjectivity. 
The consistent inconsistency within the creation of the work unnerves the 
spectator and is one aspect among several in Bacon's practice designed to disturb the I. 
Within the space of Bacon's works - or in the space between Bacon's work and the eye - 
the spectator picks up the spoor of their own origin. The overwhelming sensation is one 
of abjection. It is a feeling of unease in the self which should be distinguished from van 
Alphen's belief that in this instant of looking I lose my self. The brutality of Bacon's 
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Study after Velazquez, its horror, causes the spectator to feel repugnance. Deleuze 
detected a hysterical presence in the artists works and read painting in general as having a 
special relationship with hysteria. For him the hysteric is characterised as someone `pour 
qui les choses et les etres sons presents, trop presents, et qui donne ä route chose et 
communique ä tout titre cet exces de presence'. b4 Deleuze believes that there is a special 
relationship between hysteria and painting, `avec la peinture, I'hysterie devient art'. 65 
Colour and line exist as presence, they are not present to represent something but are in 
themselves. They are not in relation to anything. They are unshaped. 
In psychoanalysis hysteria is usually defined as a particular response to a 
traumatic experience which is primarily somatic but can also manifest itself in and 
through phobia. In their essay `On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: 
Preliminary Communication, ' Breuer and Freud perceive the memory of a traumatic 
experience to behave like an alien within the organism. It is abreacted once a patient `had 
put the affect into words'. 66 This catharsis occurs not through a simple retelling of the 
experience but through the use of a particular language, one invested with affect which 
we might thus call a language of sensation. It is here that Kristeva's conception of 
language as two interwoven registers - the semiotic and the symbolic - is so useful to any 
understanding of this process. Freud conceives of affect as something that must be 
attached to words whereas Kristeva knows that language has a pre-existing affective 
dimension, a drive-invested underside (affect represents the drives). It is not a question of 
binding instinctual energy to language but of turning language on its head. Bacon's 
paintings occasionally twist the symbolic so that the picture plane develops spaces of 
semiotic intensity, places where the facture fractures and the semiotic bleeds through. It 
is a giving of the flesh back to language. The action of language is usually that of 
negation, a repression of this somatic underside. Bacon's paintings are hysterical in that 
they insist on the body in language. This body is not given to the viewer however, it must 
be travelled to. The semiotic is witnessed only after a journey back into the night out of 
which `I' became. It is an instant of impossible witnessing. I see before I. 
64 The hysteric is someone `for whom all things and people are present, overly present, and who gives this 
excess of presence to all things and tells everyone about it'. Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 52. 
65 With painting, hysteria is made art' Ibid. p. 53. 
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The narrative that is the narration of narrative's end, the second-order narrative 
described earlier is also the recounting of a voyage beneath and behind the symbolic. The 
freeing from representation that Deleuze sees to be part of painting's hysteric quality 
constitutes a liberation of the semiotic potential in language. The semiotic is a form of 
noise. Deleuzes's description of painting as hysteria is particularly interesting: 
Liberant les lignes et les couleurs de la representation, eile libere en meme temps 
1'oeil de son appurtenance ä i'organisme, eile le libere de son caractere d'organe 
fixe et qualifie : l'oeil deviant virtuellement I'organe indetermine polyvalent, qui 
voit le corps sans organs, c'est-ä-dire la Figure, comme pure presence. La 
peinture nous met des yeuxSartout : dans 1'oreille, dans la ventre, dans les 
poumous (le tableau respire). 
Painting separates seeing from the organ of sight, or the organ of sight is not contained by 
the eye. Deleuze is describing an abject art practice. We could read the organs of the 
body - as they are named and separated, shaped - to be on the side of the symbolic. This 
corporeal cartography is gifted to the self by the mother who shapes it. The body without 
organs is the body without borders. Bacon's paintings do not signify in the usual sense 
but show instead. 68 The `gagging sensation' and `spasms in the stomach' which Kristeva 
cites as forming part of the experience of abjection should be conceived of as a seeing 
with the stomach and the throat. 69 Before the eye, we see with our body. 
In one of his poems Paul Celan invites the reader to `hör dich ein mit dem 
Mund'. 70 This mouth-ear which shapes speech and produces sound now also receives and 
interprets it. At this moment it is as if Celan is inviting the reader to taste or touch 
language. There seems to be an element of synaesthesia here. Synaesthesia in clinical 
terms is defined as occurring `when stimulation of one sensory modality automatically 
fib Josef Breuer & Sigmund Freud, `On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena : Preliminary 
Communication, ' in Studies on Hysteria, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 57. 
67 `Freeing line and colour from representation, it also liberates the eye from its belonging to the body, it 
frees it from its quality of fixity and function.: the eye becomes, to all intents and purposes, an 
indeterminate and varied organ, which sees the body without organs, meaning the Figure, as pure 
presence. Painting gives us eyes everywhere: in the ear, in the stomach, in the lungs (the picture breathes)'. 
Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 54. 
68 Kristeva differentiates showing and signifying in Powers of Horror. That which is shown is unmediated, 
it should therefore be understood as similar to the kind of pure presence Deleuze describes. See Powers of 
Horror, p. 3. 
69 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
70 `Listen your way in with your mouth'(Trans. Michael Hamburger). Paul Celan, `Die Posaunenstelle, ' in 
Paul Celan, Selected Poems, (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 350. 
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triggers a perception in a second modality, in the absence of any direct stimulation to this 
second modality'. " Celan seems to suggest that the taste of the words in the mouth or the 
feel of their enunciation through the tongue and the teeth can stimulate the ear. What 
Celan has actually recognised however is that the separation of the senses is artificial. He 
may have been influenced by Heidegger here as he was certainly familiar with some of 
the philosopher's writings on Hölderlin. 72 Heidegger had said that `only because the 
bodily organs, mouth and ear, differ in how they look, and are situated in different places 
of the body, do we separate saying and hearing into two separate faculties and thereby 
overlook the original unity of both, which nevertheless first of all sustains the very 
possibility of their interelation'. 73 The senses are shapes that arise out of sense. 
Synaesthesia is experienced by those who have only learnt to achieve a partial shaping of 
sensations. Sensation - before it is made sense of - is noise. Richard E. Cytowic has 
suggested that perception might be `like sculpting from a block of marble, exposing the 
statue within it by removing extraneous bits'. 74 The block of marble is noise. 
Michelangelo's Slaves, unfinished tomb figures, can thus be read as on the path to sound, 
as shapes in process. 75 Celan's late poems seek to fold the senses back into each other, to 
push the statue back into the marble, to forego figuration in favour of presence, the 
presence of noise. 
The Shades: Part One 
I will return to Celan's poetry later but first I would like to consider another factor 
that contributes to the effect Bacon's paintings have on the viewers, his use of colour. 
Colour is, of course, first and foremost a word. Colour is a form of violence, in its 
(de)scription of a perception; it is the destruction of perception. The cruelty of scription 
'1 John E. Harrison & Simon Baron-Cohen, `Synaesthesia: An Introduction, ' in Synaesthesia: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, Eds. Simon Baron-Cohen & John E. Harrison, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 3. 
72 John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 86. 
73 Martin Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin'. c Poetry, Trans. Keith Hoeller, (New York: Humanity 
Books, 2000), p. 146. 
74 Richard E. Cytowic, `Synaesthesia: phenomenology and neuropsychology, ' in Synaesthesia, p. 38. 
75 For a brief history of these sculptures see Anthony Hughes, Michelangelo, (London: Phaidon, 1997), 
pp. 161-162. 
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will be discussed later. For now it is time to concentrate on that which I have named and 
maimed, colour. Colour is born in light: 
And God said, Let there be light, 
and there was light. 
And God saw the light, that 'it was' 
good : and God divided the light 
from the darkness. 
And God called the light Day, 
and the darkness he called Night. 76 
The wavelengths of light that are emitted or reflected from an object produce those 
qualities we term colours. Colour is somewhere between material and light, the 
substantial and the evanescent. The wavelengths are made up of electromagnetic- 
radiation; colour is an energy passing between that which is looked at and the eye. A 
child is born without knowing colours but begins to recognise them as the eye develops 
and the retina evolves. It is not that we never truly know night but that we emerge from it 
and overlay it. Night is the white light at the moment of birth. Night is the noise. Night is 
what impacts against the optic nerve before the rods and cones of the retina, which would 
give it recognition, have come to be. The world of the new born is colourless. There is a 
behind to colour, a history in darkness. This is the veiled time before the beginning that is 
the subject. Colour itself is old. It exists prior to the mirror-phase and accompanies the 
process of abjection as the subject struggles to become. Abjection links colour to that 
colourless time in the earliest stages of life. To encounter the abject is to approach a 
before of colour, a darkness. This journey is one which can be achieved through the 
experience of colours. Of course, the painter has to foresee colour's death whilst he 
works. Colour dies as it dries, it loses its intensity. The painter is a prophet, always fore- 
painting dead-paint. He knows what colours will look like dead, before they live. The 
painter experiences his colours in advance of their application. 
Kristeva's remarkable essay `Giotto's Joy' explores the social historical and 
subjective dimensions of colour as they are demonstrated in Giotto's frescoes at Assisi 
and Padua. Kristeva draws parallels between Giotto's art practice and the role of carnival 
as it is conceived of by Bakhtin in the now famous Rabelais and his World. She reads 
'6 Genesis 1: 3-5 (King James Version) 
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Giotto's use of colour as an expression of governed `anarchy' or a parodic challenge to 
authority. This leads one to ask how and where does this governance manifest itself? 
What polices the frescoes and prevents their achieving an authentic revolutionary 
gesture? Their governance is in the geometry - the parliament of forms - and in the serial 
nature of the images, the narrative. 77 Giotto's colours form blocks - rectangles and other 
shapes - across and within the plaster. The shape controls the colour. In Bacon's art, 
geometry often acts in a similar way, although it can also serve as a foil against which to 
emphasise moments of breakdown in which shape disappears, in which contour gives 
way. His blocks of colour sometimes bear witness to a quantity of unblocked colour that 
appears elsewhere on the canvas. 
Colour is invested with drive. It forms a condensation of the drives. As such, it 
carries a potential threat for the subject, troubling the self-certainty achieved at the 
mirror-phase and through the resolution of the Oedipal complex. Bacon's shapes of 
colour (squares, rectangles etc... ) function in a similar way to the grids and rectangles 
that are also recurring motifs in his work. These motifs ostensibly help Bacon to situate 
his image, but they also act as metonymic markers for the mother's primary mapping of 
the child's body. It is the mother who brings blocks of intensity and borders to being for 
the child. `That order, that glance, that voice, that gesture, which enact the law for my 
frightened body, constitute and bring about an effect and not yet a sign'. 78 The child has 
not entered into active relationship with language but has an awareness of difference. 
This constant surveying of the body by the mother allows the child to gradually cut itself 
free from her, as if the child were a pattern in a magazine, that tore itself out of the page 
along the perforations provided for it, the perforations that give it a potential shape even 
as it is shapeless. The perforations may trace a shape but the shape does not emerge until 
a separation takes place. The explicit grids or implicit squares (such as doorframes and 
bedsteads) within Bacon's work supplement (and are supplemented by) the blocks of 
colour. Slabs of uniform colour such as those in Triptych (May - June 1973) act as 
yardsticks against which to measure the misshaping of colour. If we look at the triptych 
we can see this technique in action. The two white arrows in the left and right paintings 
" Julia Kristeva, 'Giotto's Joy, ' in Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature 
and Art, Trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine & Leon S. Roudiez, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 226. 
71 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 10. 
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as well as the doorframe which unites all three canvasses stand in place of the grid as 
signifiers of maternal mapping. The figure in the right-hand picture is not painted in 
uniform flesh-tones but as a whorl of colours. The brush-work has smeared and smudged 
the pigments into a purl of hues, such as the curve of red which shades into maroon and 
pink and beyond.. . 
into shades that exceed the nuances permitted in words ... shades that 
are distinct but indescribably so. In this head and torso colour has lost its shape and thus 
its containment. When it becomes formless, colour relates and reverberates at another 
level. The negation of geometry liberates its semiotic force. Kristeva has described any 
chromatic experience as acting as `a menace to the self whilst also cradling `the self's 
attempted reconstitution' . 
79At times in Bacon's work, colour works to upset the Self. 
Misshapen colour operates as a force of memory that carries the subject backwards and 
inwards towards the hollow core, the nothingness within. 
It can certainly be argued that Jackson Pollock had pioneered a method (if it can 
be called `method' because it relies on method as anti-method, like Bacon's art it requires 
an astute use of chance) for tapping into the semiotic aspect of colour. His drip-paintings 
do liberate colour and give free-play to the drives, this is what causes them to resonate. 
The spectator sees a shimmer of line and colour. Line as colour, not line as delineation, 
line unlined. Pollock's paintings do not wrench the subject however. This is because they 
fail to include the actual action of this chromatic breaking-free. There is no internal 
witness in Pollock against which to measure what has happened. There is also not the 
blurring of colour that Bacon records in his brush-drunk faces, a blurring that provides 
the history of the liberation of the colours that constitute it. Along with de Kooning, 
Pollock shares the quality of being a painter of after-effects, albeit for different reasons. 
He lacks process. Bacon's colours draw attention to their presence through contrast, this 
is what allows us to call them misshapen, his are works in process. They are not endings 
but openings. There is shape and there is the losing of shape depicted upon the same 
picture-plane. His whirls of colour focus the attention and promote unease because of 
their lack of clarity, their chromatic excess. 80 The words for these colours do not capture 
79 Kristeva, 'Giotto's Joy, ' p. 220. 
"o In an interview the composer Luciano Berio differentiates painting from music because even abstract 
painting is `always linked to a concrete reality, ' whereas the sounds of musical instruments cannot be 
found `in nature nor in everyday life'. For him this is what makes music more difficult to talk about, with 
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the shades. His colours exceed our powers of description. The figure vomiting into the 
basin is neither red nor white nor brown nor grey yet all these and tints in-between. Our 
ability to describe colour becomes uncertain and this uncertainty causes what we might 
describe as a chromatic insult. This insult is caused by the excess of colour that exceeds 
the words with which we seek to shape it. Words are possession and destruction. Arendt 
wrote that `the most radical and the only secure form of possession is destruction, for 
only what we have destroyed is safely and forever ours' . 
8I Language seeks to destroy 
what it describes in a radical (dis)possession. Narration - the speaking of things - is 
absorptive. The colour in Bacon's paintings will not be narrated, will not be destroyed. 82 
It is colour that uncolours itself, colour before it becomes `an idea, an image, (or) a 
representation'. 83 It is noise waiting to be coloured in by these things. Colour in its 
immanence. Colour outside ideology. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote that `in all 
ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon (arising) just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of 
objects on the retina does from their physical life-process'. 84 In the everyday colour is 
seen through the prism of ideology and appears upside-down. Something that Frantz 
Fanon recognises all too well, hence the heartfelt plea for his `brother, whether black or 
white, to tear off with all his strength the shameful livery put together by centuries of 
incomprehension'. 85 It is only when colour exceeds its shape that it can be `torn off, ' that 
it can return to being the right way up, which is to say neither right way up nor upside- 
down. 
`music always puts up a considerable resistance to being "translated" into words'. Bacon's colours might 
be said to have a musical quality because they are also resistant to wording. Luciano Berio, Two Interviews, 
Trans. David Osmond-Smith, (New York: Marion Boyars, 1985), pp. 32-33. 
81 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, 1950), p. 145. 
82 Kristeva suggests that colour is what first enabled Western painting to escape the constraints of narrative. 
See 'Giotto's Joy, ' p. 221. 
83 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, Trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), p. 142. Merleau-Ponty describes this immanent colour as an anonymous visibility 
that undoes the distinction between self and other through the commonality of its experiencing. Two people 
see the same, they see as one. Luce Irigaray suggests that colour also efface the difference between subject 
and object, it is the `ground of the visible where seeing and seen are not yet distinguished, where they 
reflect each other without any position having been established between them'. Irigaray, An Ethics of 
Sexual Difference, Trans. Carolyn Burke & Gillian C. Gill, (London: Athlone, 1993), p. 156. 
84 Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), p. 47. 
85 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, Trans. Charles Lam Markmann, (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 
p. 12. 
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This colour at the edge of ideology, of language, is abject colour. In Triptych 
(May - June 1973), the depiction of the action of being sick reflects the nausea 
experienced by the spectator, an experience prompted in part by Bacon's use of colour. 
Deleuze reads the retching body as a body seeking to escape itself. `Toute la serie des 
spasmes chez Bacon est de ce type, amour, vomissement, excrement, toujours le corps qui 
tente de s'echapper par un de ses organes, pour rejoindre 1'aplat, la structure 
materielle'. 86 In fact this is actually a body seeking to protect its integrity, to preserve 
itself by abjecting that which threatens it: the memory of an archaic unity which would 
cause its dissolution. The origin of the word colour is the Latin word color which is in 
turn derived from `a Sanskrit word meaning the skin on the surface of the milk'. 87 
Kristeva describes `when the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk' as 
an experience liable to bring on food loathing, the most archaic form of abjection. 88 
Abjection and colour are intimately linked. 
When Deleuze identifies the shadow as another instance of a body escaping from 
itself, this is also a misunderstanding. 89 The shadow gives contour or shape to the subject, 
it is usually a form of reassurance. The shadow in the central painting of the triptych does 
not function in this way however. This shadow which is so dissimilar to the seated man is 
charting the effect of an abjection which remains unchecked. The abject must constantly 
be purged. This purgation is usually performed by and in the realm of the sacred. `The 
function of (... ) religious rituals is to ward off the subject's fear of his very own identity 
sinking irretrievably into the mother'. 90 A confrontation with the abject - unmediated by 
the sacred - means psychosis or death for the subject. The shadow which spills out from 
the doorway in Triptych May-June 1973 suggests a subject slipping towards psychosis - 
out of shape -a subject returning to the state of an hommelette. This is a subject in 
transition towards the non-identity and death of unmapped drives. The boundaries that 
contain that liquidity which characterises identity have been broken. The self is flowing 
back into the night of non-being. There is no arrow in this picture, nothing to keep shape. 
86 `The entire series of convulsions in Bacon are of this type, having sex, puking, shitting, always a body 
trying to escape itself through one of its organs, to get back to the flat, the material world'. Deleuze, 
Francis Bacon, p. 24. 
Steven Conner, The Book of Skin, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 151. 
Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2. 
!9 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 24. 
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The presence of the light-bulb which casts this disturbing shadow is of significance. It is 
not present in the other two paintings (although the left-hand canvas contains the light- 
switch), which are without shadow. This light-source in the central picture signifies the 
`flash of lightning' which reveals a forgotten time, a time during which the clean was 
filthy, the pure impure. 91 A time before cleanliness and filth, before separation. It recalls 
the time that which is beyond recall. `The time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion 
and thunder, a veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts forth'. 92 We are at 
the extreme of insight, a death in life which portrays an unravelling but not unravelled 
subject. The central picture represents an impossible time, the moment before self which 
should never be known to self. Bacon has taken us backwards in the forward motion that 
is painting, brushstrokes pulling paint in one direction to push the psyche in another. 
Deleuze remarked on the temporality of Bacon's paintings, describing how 
variations in colour and texture in painted bodies are actually variations in time. The 
body is treated differently to the flat parts of the paintings, the floors and walls. They are 
monochrome, the body is polychrome. The body is in time, is timing. Time is made 
paint. 93 There are two times in the triptychs. Deleuze writes that there is `la force du 
temps changeant, par la variation allotropique des corps, "au dixieme de seconde, " qui 
fait partie de la deformation; puis la force du temps eternel, 1'eternite du temps, par cette 
Reunion-separation qui regne dans les triptyches, pure lumiere'. 94 The use of colour may 
also be said to guide us to a third time, the time before time. The time of noise. The 
eternal and the fleeting are shaped out of this time. 
The abjection that emerges in Triptych May-June 1973 is also dissipated by it. 
Kristeva identified literature as that which has taken the place of the sacred, and serves to 
both elaborate and discharge the abject. 95 It seems that painting is also capable of 
assuming this role. To return briefly to Bacon's Study after Velazquez, the whips of red 
paint that spatter the white of papal robe, the noise in the picture, are example of abject 
9o Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 64. 
91 Ibid. p. 8. 
92 Ibid. pp. 8-9. 
93 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 50. 
94 `The power of changeable time, registered in the physical variations of bodies, "down to a tenth of a 
second, " and the power of eternal time, the eternity of time, the prevalence of their togetherness-separation 
in the triptychs, brings pure light'. Ibid. p. 63. 
95 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 208. 
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colour. It is colour without seeming origin. It is unexplained, outside of any narrative 
except its apparent lack of a place in one, irrational colour. 96 It does not provoke the same 
kind of disturbance as those paintings which distort their chromatic elements through 
blurring and smearing, but like them it does not respect `positions' or 'rules'. 97 
The explicitly religious theme of Study after Velazquez should not be ignored 
despite the painter's indications to the contrary. 98 There seems to be a link between faith 
in God and faith in figuration. Bacon's shift from figuration to what Deleuze calls the 
figural - manifested primarily through the isolation of the figure - parallels a move from 
belief to disbelief. 99 God is inextricably linked to the symbolic. For the believer, the 
Divine acts as a guarantor of meaning in the world. God gives shape to life and to the 
world. In the Catholic church, the Pope is God's representative on Earth. In Study after 
Velazquez this representation of the representative is troubled by the liberation of an 
`excess meaning'. 10° This excess of meaning means the work refuses any easy shaping 
into a narrative. Bacon's techniques (his use of colour, his isolated (non-relational) 
figures, etc... ) release the semiotic and mark him out as a painter to and for the faithless. 
Look Back in Anger 
A musical equivalent to Bacon's pictorial practice may be found in the work of 
the singer and performance artist Diamanda Galas. Her `screaming' albums such as 
SchreiX (1996), The Masque of the Red Death and Plague Mass (1991) were partly 
composed in response to the moral turpitude of the Catholic Church as manifested by 
their response to the AIDS pandemic. 101 Galäs's most recent work Defixiones (2003) has 
examined different subject matter, seeking to draw attention to the Armenian genocide. 
Her vocal methods parallel Bacon's approach to painting in many ways. The singer's use 
of the echo (which usually acts like a shadow - performing a mirroring function and 
96 This irrational, abject colour shares some similarity with Heidegger's notion of colour as that which, 
once it is analyzed `in rational terms, ' disappears. Abject colour is felt, not thought. For Heidegger's 
comments see `The Origins of the Work of Art, ' Trans. Albert Hofstadter in Heidegger, Basic Writings, 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 172. 
97 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
9' Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon, p. 24. 
99 Deleuze explains his notion of the `figural' in Francis Bacon, p. 12. 
100 Kristeva, 'Giotto's Joy, ' p. 221. 
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thereby contributing to the reassurance of the self), which she distorts, acts to catalogue 
the beginnings of a disintegration of self. Galas often uses language as the witness - the 
point of stasis against which to gauge change - within her work. Recognisable words are 
distended and distorted until the phrase disappears into screams or growls, then the 
process is repeated. The word returns to register its own destruction. The destruction of 
words is the only way to undo the losses their very existence has entailed. The exposure 
of the inside of words (the revelation of what they have consumed), their opening out, is 
achieved through a technique of misshaping. This misshaping has unshaping as its 
ultimate aim, the bursting of words back into noise. Galas is acutely aware of the power 
which lies beneath the symbolic, the behind to words. 
The voice is the primary vehicle of expression that transforms thought into 
sounds, thought into message. And beyond the words (with all due respect to 
them), the combinations of vocal and verbal energy can be overwhelming. ' 2 
The voice shapes words, nurtures them and supports them. It is a living writing. It 
carries the inner-voice of thinking to the outside. There is a semiotic lining to this living 
writing, and this is what Galas seeks to expose. The question of transmission arises. 
Galas wants herself and the audience to feel her voice, as she says, `I have to feel it, I fry 
under that sound'. 1 °3 Hers is a voice endeavouring to break boundaries. The audience 
does not hear Galas, so much as feel her. 104 She is inside them. This is a putting into 
practice of the synaesthesia that Celan invites the reader to experience in his poetry. 
Galas makes you hear with your innards. The contours that separate inside and outside 
collapse. Galäs's voice becomes noise. 
This entering of the sound into the body, vibrating the body, voicing the body, 
seems similar to the way the seen is reflected in the eyes of the seer. The eye takes the 
101 SchreiX is a particularly difficult and disturbing listening experience. 
102 Diamanda Galas, `Diamanda Galas, ' in Angry Women, Eds. Andrea Juno & V. Vale, (San Francisco: 
Re/Search Publications, 1991), p. 10. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Galas tries to preserve this effect of feeling her way into her audience in her recordings as well. The 
compact discs for Derxiones each carry the printed instruction `Correct Playback at Maximum Volume 
only'. 
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outside world into itself. 105 The ear and the skin do likewise. The waves of light and 
sound that travel between bodies do so as illation. The voyage is inferred, not known. 
Light and sound are invisible and inaudible whilst in transit, they are not. These waves - 
which form different pitches and intensities, upon arriving - make up part of the 
unthought lining to language, perhaps they are unthinkable. Abjection is borne upon these 
surges of energy. This force - the unseen of sight, the unheard of hearing - is perhaps 
what gives particular people what is called `presence'. The kind of `being there' that once 
made a photographer say of the model Gia Carangi, `she had some kind of a real 
presence, very strong'. 106 Some people seem to revolt against the symbolic in the 
language of their being. Bodies and styles of living have their own syntax. Occasionally 
bodies break with the symbolic and bring that which is usually beneath the surface to the 
fore. Some bodies have a semiotic aura. Those bodies that Celine found so desirable - 
bodies that broke with common contours - might be said to liberate the semiotic through 
disrupting the grammar of the body. A grammar that gets it rules from the dominant 
ideology of a particular historical moment. Each moment has its impossible contour 
(perfect grammar) which many bodies strive to emulate, the disruptive body forges its 
own grammar. 
Galas makes the foregrounding of the semiotic the centre of her vocal practice. 
Like Bacon she is interested in the cage as trope and reality, `a lot of my work has been 
about the concept of a person being caged, treated like an animal, and escaping through 
insanity... '. 107 In her live performances she has constructed an auditory enclosure through 
her use of the quadraphonic sound system which envelops her audience. 108 This mapping 
and positioning of listener by sounds can then be disturbed by the muting of one or more 
of the speakers. Some of the music has a distinct temporality. It is reminiscent of the 
reverberations within Gregorian chant where each verse overlays the still sounding words 
pos Assassins once held the superstition that the eyes of their victims could preserve the last image seen 
before death. This prompted some assassins (in fear of forensic science) to shoot out the eyes of those they 
had killed. 
106 Stephen Fried, Thing of Beauty: The Tragedy of Supermodel Gia, (New York: Pocket Books, 1993), 
p. 167. 
107 Galas, `Diamanda Galas, ' p. 8. 
108 For a brief discussion of the theatrical effects Galas prefers to use in her performance see Diamanda 
Galas, The Shit of God, (New York: High Risk, 1993), pp. 2-3. 
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or the last. 109 There is often an echo in Galas, causing the listener to imagine they are 
hearing something projected into a cavernous space (the work Plague Mass was in fact 
performed in a cathedral). The echo disappears beneath another lament, a piercing 
ululation. The temporality in this vocal technique has the character of a palimpsest. There 
is an interweaving of the before and the present such that the before becomes the present. 
This compression of time denies any simple description of the temporality as linear. Nor 
is this cyclical time, or the monumental time `without cleavage or escapei110 that haunts 
all subjectivity. Like Bacon's paintings, it is an effort to access the time before time, the 
shapeless time out of which times began. Time need space. The time before time is 
without space. 
Writing to Noise 
I have suggested Bacon is a faithless painter. Galas seeks to expose the hypocrisy 
of the Catholic church. Celan is not a writer who immediately appears to be without faith. 
The poet seems to believe in something, even if that something is nothing. The poem 
Psalm, in which the poet writes the line `Gelobst seist du, Niemand, ' displays this 
negative belief. Either the poet believes `no one' can be spoken to, or the poem is an 
admission that there is no one to speak to. In the poem wir (we) and dir (you) are 
differentiated. This means `no one' cannot be taken to mean everyone, there cannot be an 
outside to everyone or everyone would not be `everyone'. Perhaps we should read 
`Niemand' as no more than a name, not a description but a nomination. It identifies `some 
one' under the rubric of `no one'. Celan is saying `dir' are `Niemand'. If we were to take 
this `no one' to signify God, as the title seems to suggest, then either God is but is 
without status, or God is not. After the ashes of Auschwitz, the idea of the Divine has 
become a debased and degraded one. To worship such a God is to mock worship. Celan 
does not mock `no one' however, he writes `Dir zulieb wollen wir bluhn. Dir 
'09 Examples of this technique are provided by the tracks `Confessional (Give me Sodomy or give me 
Death)' from the album Plague Mass and `O. P. M. ' from SchreiX. 
110 Julia Kristeva, `Women's Time, ' in The Kristeva Reader, (London: Blackwell, 1986), p. 191. 
"' `Praised be your name, no one' (Trans. Michael Hamburger). Celan, Selected Poems, p. 178. 
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entgegen'. 12 He speaks to `no one' as the possibility there is `no one, ' perhaps not the 
certainty. Derrida writes of the poem: `To speak to no one, in the risk, each time, 
singularly, that there is no one to bless, no one for blessing is this not the only chance for 
blessing? For an act of faith? '. 13 The only possible faith is an impossible faith. Celan 
writes of flowering, knowing that this flowering may be towards the void. In this 
uncertain time, we are `ein nichts, ' we are a nothing. 
Philippe Sollers has read Bacon's art practice as one which renders the question 
`to be or not to be' redundant, revolving instead around the question of how `to be and 
not to be'. 114 We might read Celan's poetry as unfolding across a similar dichotomy, that 
not of being or nothingness but of being and nothingness. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has 
written of the `dizziness' which we `experience' whilst reading Celan as `an experience 
of nothingness'. ' 15 It is the dizziness of the non-experience, that of Heidegger's anguish 
or of Bataille's laughter. Nothingness is understood in Heidegerrean terms by Lacoue- 
Labarthe, as that which is ever present yet manifests itself only at particular moments, 
such as when the individual experiences angst. 
Nothing is then, at times, itself an experience (and as such something). 
Experience has to be perceived in order to be. Nothingness may `noth' all the time but 
most of the time it does so in obscurity. I live the everyday as an event which is only 
occasionally punctured / punctuated by what I recognise as an experience. It is in these 
rare moments of recognition that I encounter nothingness. If Celan's poetry is 
experienced in the way Lacoue-Labarthe suggests then it is not `read' in the usual sense 
of the word, rather we read ourselves into a space without significance, where `we' are 
not. The self disappears but not in a catastrophic way. Poetry is a clearing of space. It is 
only through this space that presence can come to be. The experience of dizziness is one 
that cannot be experienced, it is not lived. The `non form of pure non-event' 116 that is 
poetry as experience, that is poetry as nothingness, is not. To be able to think ourselves 
112 `For your sake we shall flower. Towards you'. Ibid. John Felstiner suggests that because of the double 
meaning of entgegen (both 'toward' and `against') the second line would best be rendered as 'In thy spite'. 
See Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 168. 
13 Jacques Derrida, `Shibboleth: For Paul Celan, ' Trans. Joshua Wilner, in Word Traces, Ed. Aris Fioretos, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 46. 
114 Philippe Sollers, Les passions de Francis Bacon, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1996), p. 136. 
115 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, Trans. Andrea Tarnowski, (California, Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 19. 
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we need to be able to think of an outside to ourselves. `I am what I am, because I am not 
that' is not enough. Self and other require a `nothing' on which to ground their 
somethingness. The nothing cannot be known, because to know nothing you would need 
to be nothing, to not be. Nothingness necessitates a leap of faith. Lacoue-Labarthe 
describes poems as `pure wanting-to-say nothing, nothingness, that against which and 
through which there is presence, what is'. 117 The poem can only `say' if it says nothing, 
because saying kneads nothing. The poem must not say to say not. Nothing is the silence 
that births speech, which shapes itself out of nothing. Nothing is what we are born out of. 
It is what abjection protects us from. The dizziness, the moment when I am and am not, 
the experience that occurs but as a none-occurrence, is a moment of abjection. Kristeva in 
fact describes abjection as a `sight-clouding dizziness, ' a seeing nothing. 118 Abjection is 
the impossible instant when the subject faces the void out of which it became, the all that 
is the Nothing. It `seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond 
the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable'. 119 When Kristeva writes that the 
abject is not an object (except in opposition to I) this is because the abject is not. The 
abject is however `not nothing, either'. 120 It is `a something that I do not recognise as a 
thing'. 121 This could either mean that abjection is not nothing, or that nothing is not 
nothing, it is instead no thing. It is useful to look to Merleau-Ponty to clarify what 
nothing is/is not. Merleau-Ponty writes: 
It is precisely because Being and Nothingness, the yes and the no, cannot be 
blended together like two ingredients that, when we see being, nothingness is 
immediately there, and not in the margin like the zone of non-vision around our 
field of vision, but over the whole expanse of what we see, as what installs it and 
disposes it before us as spectacle. 122 
The something is braided to the nothing like the symbolic is braided to the 
semiotic. They are exclusive and inseparable. Kristeva writes of the abject as that which 
is not `recognised' as thing. She shares the belief with Merleau-Ponty that Being exists in 
116 Ibid. p. 18. 
117 Ibid. p. 20. 
1" Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3. 
119 Ibid. p. 1. 
120 Ibid. p. 2. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 66. 
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and as perception. Perception itself is something, and is able to perceive other 
something's, because all something's front the void. If I look at a coffee cup I am seeing 
something and I am seeing a void, but I avoid the void. 123 I am blind to it because to see it 
would be to see myself, to see my self as what self is; which is, precisely, this void, the 
nothing. The before-child that is plenitude - child as part of the Mother, not apart from 
the Mother - is this not, is not. The Mother must be rejected; a space must be created, for 
the child to be. The Mother must become the nothing, must unbecome. It is, however, not 
so simple. It would be a mistake to believe that the child makes the Mother `something' 
whilst it, it's self, is not. The child is a force of memory that reminds the Mother of 
nothing, of the nothingness underlying both, and also of the nothing of the Mother's 
(M)Other. The birth of the child into the world and into language is only felt as a loss to 
protect the Mother from the knowledge that the child was, in a certain sense, never there. 
The sense of loss replaces a worse feeling, that of melancholia. It is also an illusion which 
is necessary for the child to believe that it has become something, that it is. Abjection is a 
protective mechanism that preserves this mis-recognition, yet also acts as an unwelcome 
memory of the nothing. It is the impossible that gifts us the possible. Merleau-Ponty 
writes that: `The negative becomes a sort of quality precisely because one fixes it in its 
power of refusal and evasion'. 124 There is a trap inherent in the thinking of the negative. 
If we say what the negative `is' not, if we `say' the negative, we destroy its negativity. If 
we maintain that the negative is not, we cannot avoid elevating it to a sort of positivity, 
we confer upon it a sort of being, since through and through and absolutely it is nothing. 
It has this non-quality which is nothingness. 
Nothing is something because we think and talk about it. It is a part of language, 
and as scription it is made material. Even thought is inscription, it is a simultaneous 
writing and reading across the text of the mind. The question we need to ask at this 
juncture is whether language requires nothing, a non-language, in order to be. Derrida's 
most frequently cited statement is that `il n'y a pas de hors-texte'. 1 25 There is not an 
outside (to) text. Nothing is text-free. As John Mowitt points out, with characteristic 
123 The coffee cup is shape defined against the shapeless. It is sound within the noise. Underneath the coffee 
cup - beneath the recognition - there is nothing. 124 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 67. 
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clarity, Derrida's statement means that `there is no inside' to the text as well . 
126 In 
addition to the destruction of distance between a `disciplinaryframework' and the `space 
it governs', between a student and their object of study, between a reader and writing, 
that such a statement implies, for me there is also `no inside' because no is inside. '27 
Derrida would, perhaps, suggest that the something (in this instance, text) must carry the 
trace of the nothing within it to exist as it does. The trace is that which must be present as 
an absence. It appears similar to the nothing, if we think of the nothing as what is needed 
for things to mean, but needed as a not. The trace is the relation that exists as non- 
relation. It ostensibly shares the quality of being `is' and `is not' with the nothing. Are the 
two different and the same? Il n'y a pas de trace, le pas n'est qu'un trace. It is time to 
tread carefully. Is nothing text? If nothing is not text, then what is it? If text is not...? Is 
text a product of perception? Merleau-Ponty has pointed out that once we talk or think 
about something, even nothing, it becomes substantial. Nothing is text because I am 
reading it and writing it, but what about the `pas de deux', the `pas' of `pas', the `pas' 
beneath `pas', the nothing once it is removed from itself, from word, from shape. What 
about the nothing that I am not reading and writing about, the nothing that is not this text? 
Is a nothing which I cannot write? And if it is not...? 
The play of the trace ensures that absence can never be absolute, each time I think 
something that is absent from absence, a nothing behind and/or beyond the text, I present 
and textify it. I textify that there is no outside of text, no(text)no. I give textimony to the 
fact that nothing is not text-free. What if I could not read? I write illiteracy. But what if I 
could not read because there was nothing to read? If I experienced a non-experience. 
Non-experience is the word I give to this `nothing'. I make nothing into something. But 
can I give this `nothing' I have made to nothing? Nothing is not there to receive this gift 
of language. I cannot know nothing the no-thing, only nothing the word-thing. I can only 
know language, language is knowing. Lacoue-Labarthe's `nothing' is a caesura (a 
'25 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), p. 158. 
126 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinarv Object, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1992), p. 97. 
127 Ibid. 
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wording, an annihilation of nothing by some word-thing), `a pure suspension of 
occurrence, ' 128 it is not nothing. 
We might ask if `nothing' exists (although of course it cannot exist, in the normal 
sense we ascribe to existence) if we do not recognise or perceive it. I understand 
`recognition' to be the translation of a signified into a signified. I perceive the signified 
something, that something is then translated into another signified selected from the mind 
dictionary. `Something' is transformed into `coffee', `cold' or `incomprehension', for 
example. Something can even become `something'. Recognition is the after-event of 
perception. Perception is the prime-reader. It is the sensing of signifieds. It should not be 
confused with knowing, knowing occurs at the level of recognition. Signification is, 
above all, a sensation and sensation is, above all, a signification. Is not `not' before I 
sense it? Do I coat `not' in reading/writing, sense it, shape it, sound it, text it? Or is it 
always already as text? What about text? Is text before I perceive it? I could rephrase this 
as `is perception before I perceive it'? Or, perhaps, am Ui before I perceive? When does 
the subject begin to read and write itself? Is it `not' before it is subject? It is possible that 
I perceive before I know I do, such that we should really speak in terms of passive and 
active perceptions. Until I am able to recognise, I perceive passively. There are thus 
passive and active signifieds. The active signified is the self-reflexive act of perception, 
the `I am perceiving that I am perceiving'. I perceive problems with such an 
interpretation, of the kind `I am perceiving that I am perceiving that I am perceiving'. 
Third order signification and fourth and fifth and on and on... although can the infinite be 
perceived? Even if passive signification is (and certainly Kristeva seems to conceive of a 
passive symbolic129) it is not nothing. The question as to whether nothing `is' or is `not' 
outside the text is perhaps unanswerable. Nothing might be thought of as framing the 
text. The 'n 'y a pas' is what gives shape to the text, what allows it to possess an inside 
and an outside. This frame - nothingness - abuts the text and abuts a nothing that is 
beyond the scription that is `n'y a pas'. A frame that `is essentially constructed and 
128 Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, p. 19. 
129 `... a being-there of the symbolic that a father might or might not embody'. Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 
p. 10. The symbolic appears to precede the I, which upon arrival will activate it. 
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therefore fragile: such would be the essence or truth of the frame'. ' 30 The frame is 
permeated by text such that it is and is not text. The frame cannot contain the text, it is 
simultaneously contained by text and containing text. The frame is something, the 
nothing text. Text cannot be believed in without the belief in an(other) text, the nothing. 
It imagines a space outside of itself in order to posit itself as text. This speculative outside 
is required in order for text to perceive itself as such. This imaginary exterior - the `n'y a 
pas' - opens up a position from which to look inside, a position from which text can 
`read' itself, can come to be. Text cannot know itself unless it can first unknow itself. I 
am reminded here of an observation that Kelly Osborne, Ozzy Osborne's daughter, once 
made: `People ask me what it's like being Ozzy's daughter - well, I don't know what it's 
not like'. 13' The not-knowing is necessary for all self-knowledge. At the level of 
subjectivity this is what abjection accomplishes. Abjection at once protects us from the 
`nothing' out of which we begin, yet at the same time reminds us of it and thus allow us 
to be. The abject is our frame. 
The Silence 
Paul Celan is the poet of this silence, of the nothing, the n'y a pas. He understands 
that there is something that he cannot know, something that he cannot know because it is 
no longer, because it is not. All his poetry is written in the knowledge of this not- 
knowing. For that reason it is necessary to consider the relationship between nothing and 
language, to consider the fact that there should be no relationship. Celan writes in the 
shadow of traumatic events. Severe psychic trauma can take two forms, forms which I 
might be called `traumatic plenitude' and `traumatic nihilism'. Traumatic plenitude 
describes the condition wherein a traumatic experience has filled a person completely. 
That person is entirely the traumatic experience, the person is therefore not, the mind has 
no outside from which to think this experience. To borrow from the language of my 
analysis of Francis Bacon's paintings, it could be said that in a case of traumatic 
plenitude the mind has no internal witness. The mind is the problem, hence it cannot see 
130 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, Trans. Geoff Bennington & Ian McLeod, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987), p. 73. 
131 Kelly Osborne, `Born to be Wild, ' in Observer Magazine, 26th January 2003, p. 20. 
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beyond the problem and think through it. The person lives the trauma rather than 
remembers it. Traumatic nihilism is a condition within which the mind rejects the 
existence of the traumatic experience completely. The traumatic experience only 
manifests itself by not doing so. The experience takes on the mantle of the textual- 
nothing. It is present as an absence. In this situation trauma does not overwhelm the 
mind, it hides in the mind. The mind thinks around a void. It avoids thinking certain 
thoughts. Traumatic plenitude is the experience of trauma that causes flash-backs and 
nightmares, hyper-sensitivity, and many of the symptoms that fall under the heading 
PTSD. 132 Traumatic nihilism is trauma experienced as the horror of the nothing, of what 
appears to be an empty space in the mind. 
Celan's poetry shares an affinity with the second condition. It may be read as an 
attempt to write his way into the hole within. This attempt is made in the knowledge that 
the writing can never reach the non-experience. Celan concluded the poem 
`Aschenglorie' with the famous line: `No one bears witness for the witness'. 133 This no 
one includes language. Celan's trauma is the product as much of what he has not 
experienced (here meant in terms of the historical context of Celan's Holocaust 
experience, for instance he was at a labour camp, not a concentration camp or an 
extermination camp) as what he has. In his poetry efforts are made to write away the 
insensitivity of perception, to write beyond the belief that all that is is that which is 
perceived. Celan writes against perception, against writing. The mind writes the traumatic 
experience as nothing because it does not wish to confront it. Celan over-writes this 
nothing writing of the traumatised mind. He insists that the mind read all its thoughts, 
read into the nothing. This endeavour to reveal these invisible ink experiences is 
complicated by a simultaneous desire to communicate the futility of writing. Celan wants 
to write out of writing, to write nothing. To write that he believes in nothing would be a 
misnomer. He has no belief. Celan's poetry is rich with religious imagery but he is not a 
religious poet. His late poems resonate with the language and imagery of a faith. They are 
echoes of a old belief, growing gradually fainter, fading away. There is no spiritual 
132 For a brief summation of the origin of the term PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and the 
problems inherent in using it as a catch-all clinical description of trauma, see Ruth Leys, Trauma: A 
Genealogy, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000), pp. 5-8. 
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awakening in the last, most elliptical, verses. The poems grow closer and closer to the 
nothing that is `left'. More compact. The posthumously published collections of 
Schneepart (1971) and Zeitgehöft (1976) may be what prompted Primo Levi's comments 
about Celan in his essay `On Obscure Writing". Levi writes of the poetry of Celan and 
Trakl (both of whom committed suicide) as a kind of `pre-killing, a not-wanting-to-be, a 
flight from the world of which the intentional death was the crown'. 134 Celan's poetry 
forms part of a gradual death by his own hand. He is writing himself to death, writing 
himself to nothing. Words insult by their tangibility. They give too much matter to the 
dead, offering an afterlife where there should be nothing. Celan wants to write for the 
dead but the only appropriate writing would be a wordless one. The pared poetry Celan 
wrote towards the end is close to an unwording. The words are carefully chosen, kept 
tight together, holding multiple meanings. This produces an excess of sense. A too much. 
Teetering close to nonsense. The words have no space. No room to breath: 
Die Posaunstelle 
tief im glühenden 
Leertext 
in Fackelhöhe, 
im Zeitloch: 
hör dich ein 
mit dem Mund. ' 35 
The words gesture towards the void.. . the 
hole.. 
. the lacuna.. . empty words. 
'36 Levi calls 
Celan's late compositions an `atrocious chaos without a glimmer of light'. 137 This is 
twilight writing. Night is falling. The hole within is becoming the hole without. The black 
cracks, the lettering... fissures within the page. These letters have no meaning, they are 
not. They cleave the paper. The glow is the noise that beckons from the bottom of the 
word-voids. The warmth of reunion with nothingness. Of union. These words are not to 
133 Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 223. The original German is `Niemand zeugt für den Zeugen'. Paul Celan, 
`Aschenglorie, ' in Gedichte 2, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), p. 72. 
134 Levi, `On Obscure Writing, ' p. 161. 
135 'The Trumpet Part / deep in the glowing / lacuna / at lamp height / in the time hole: / listen your way in 
with your mouth' (Trans. Michael Hamburger). Celan, Selected Poems, p. 351. 
136 Felstiner recommends translating `Leertext' as `text-void'. Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 271. `Empty-text' is 
another possibility. 
137 Levi, `On Obscure Writing, ' p. 161. 
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be read, they are to be climbed into. The reader must step through the page. Into the 
word-mouth. Step into the outside of inside and outside. This is a kind of death. Levi is 
right to see this shadow, `this darkness (which) grows from page to page until the last 
inarticulate babble consternates like the rattle of a dying man, and in fact that is just 
what it is'. 138 The babble is the noise. The death of all things. The no thing. It is a writing 
back to the before of becoming. A kind of suicide. A `language of the lifeless'. 139 It is a 
writing inwards not outwards. As Adorno suggests, it is a hermetic writing. One not 
meant to mean but to shock. 140 There is no sound in Celan. His `poems want to speak of 
the most extreme horror through silence'. 141 
Heard but not Seen 
Levi's remarks on Celan also emphasise the absence of light in the poetry and 
also its coldness, he describes the reader as gripped `as in an ice-cold vice'. 142 It is 
specular and tactile reading. The darkness Levi perceived had importance for Celan from 
the beginning. `Todesfuge' begins black: 
Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends 
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinchen sie nachts 
wir trinken und trinken143 
The black milk.. . the life-giver in mourning ... the food of childhood... made malignant. 
Black.. . the colour that absorbs all colours... the 
hole. Bruno Bettelheim reads this black 
milk as a poison masquerading as nourishment, as a metaphor for a mother murdering her 
child, `when one is forced to drink black milk from dawn to dusk, whether in the death 
camps of Nazi Germany, or while lying in a possibly luxurious crib, but there subjected 
to the unconscious death wishes of what overtly may be a conscientious mother - in either 
situation, a living soul has death for a master'. ' 44 The black milk may be a reference 
13" Ibid. 
19 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (London: Athlone, 1999), p. 322. 
140 Ibid. p. 321. 
'a' Ibid. p. 320. 
142 Levi, `On Obscure Writing, ' p161. 
143 `Black milk of daybreak we drink it at sundown / we drink it at noon in the morning we drink it at night / 
we drink and we drink it' (Trans. Michael Hamburger), Celan, Selected Poems, p. 63. 
144 Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving and Other Essays, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), p. 11 I. 
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Celan had read to what was literally drunk in the camps. 145 The black milk may be 
language. The ears drink language from dawn until dusk. It is difficult to close the ear, to 
cease to drink the sounds of the world. ' 46 `The ear is the organ of space and time, and it's 
always listening to and locating something'. 147 The ear swallows sound, digests it, 
thereby situating the self in the world of things. In the camps the ear absorbs the sounds 
of starvation, the sounds of destruction, the mocking sound of music, the sounds of the 
dying, the death rattle. The many languages, `des jurons en russe, en allemand, en 
polonais, en francais'. 148 A veritable Babel. 149 The sounds of Auschwitz or Treblinka. 
Sounds that have ceased. Replaced by the violence of a forgetful silence. Celan is not 
silent. 
There is at least one recording of Celan reciting `Todesfuge'. 150 Felstiner 
describes it as giving the listener `quickenings, emphases, retards, pauses, caustic 
articulation, and even a phrase misspoken'. 15' The recording is and is not Celan. In the 
process of making this recording something happened to Celan's voice (a voice which is 
only a part of Celan the man). In a tape-recording a magnetic `image' of a sound is stored 
onto a tape. The `image' is made up of magnetized iron oxide or chromium dioxide 
granules in a magnetic emulsion. Given the date of the recording, Celan's voice's `image' 
would be made up of iron (otherwise known as ferrous) oxide. The voice is given form, is 
transformed, in this act. Magnetic tapes are extremely sensitive and their previous 
magnetic history threatens the quality of the recording. This sensitivity is given the 
technical name `hysterisis'. As the tape played it would have been subjected to a biasing 
signal which accompanied the signal of Celan's voice. The biasing signal `stirs' the 
145 Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 33. 
146 As John Mowitt states, `hearing is omnidirectional and automatically receptive'. Mowitt, percussion: 
drumming, beating, striking, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 47. 
147 Berio, Two Interviews, p. 33. 
149 'Cursing in Russian, German, Polish, French'. David Rousset, L'Univers concentrationnaire, (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1965), p. 31. 
149 Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, Trans. William Templer, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 156. 
1-o It was made in 1958 for the publishing firm Günther Neske. See the sleeve-notes to Paul Celan, Ich 
hörte sagen: Gedichte und Prosa, der hörverlag, 2 cassettes. Diamanda Galas provides her own notable 
reading of the poem on the album Defixiones. 
"1 Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 32. The line Celan misspeaks is `Er ruft stecht tiefer ins Erdreich ihr einen 
andern singet und spielt'. 'He calls out jab deeper in the earth you lot you other sing now and play'. He 
says instead "... ihr andern . spielt weiter zum 
Tanz auf. `... you other play on for the dance'. This is actually 
the end of a later line. See Celan, Selected Poems, pp. 62-63. 
108 
magnetization of the tape to make sure each part of the signal (the voice) has the same 
magnetic starting conditions for recording. A recording is a process of stirring and 
storing. We might compare it to the way we stir paint to make sure it has the same 
consistency before we apply it. The application of the paint is like the fixing of the aural 
image against the tape. When we listen to the recording, we do not hear Celan's voice but 
a representation of it. The voice vanishes in the act that seeks to preserve it. I hear an 
electronic likeness of that voice, an figuring generated by the reading of the magnetic 
image. The technology of preservation protects through destruction. I do hear something 
however, something I would like to think of as the echo of Celan's voice. The 
intercession of technology cannot separate me entirely from this voice. 
What is this voice though? It is the voice of a dead man. A voice from beyond the 
grave. It is a memento mori. What Roland Barthes said about photography is equally 
applicable to the tape-recording. To listen to such a recording is to enter into contact with 
death. In an interview about photography Barthes declared: 
If photography is to be discussed on a serious level, it must be discussed in 
relation to death. It's true that a photograph is a witness, but a witness of 
something that is no more. Even if the person in the picture is still alive, it's a 
moment of this subject's existence that was photographed, and this moment is 
gone. This is an enormous trauma for humanity, a trauma endlessly renewed. 
Each reading of a photo, and there are billions worldwide in a day, each 
perception and reading of a photo is implicitly, in a repressed manner, a contact 
with what has ceased to exist, a contact with death. ' 52 
The photograph and the tape-recording are both forms of witnessing, but what they testify 
to is not. They witness `nothing'. The technologies record their failure to fulfil the task of 
preservation for which they were founded. They are always too late. For Barthes, the 
photograph provides a contact with that which has `ceased to exist', that which is no 
longer, which is not, which has returned to nothing. There is something, the contact, the 
photograph, the recording, but it is not the thing, this thing has been left behind, has cased 
to be, is dead. Death is outside the text. It is outside the cultural shaping of life and death. 
The death after death, the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns. 
Celan's voice returns from this country. He is dead but persists. The recording of Celan 
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reading `Todesfuge' is a speaking from this nothing. It is a voice without obvious origin. 
We see the tape-recorder but not the magnetic image of the voice. We hear a voice 
without a body. The voice of a dead man. An acousmatic voice. Michel Chion describes 
the acousmatic as being those sounds which are heard but whose cause or source cannot 
be seen. ' 53 He goes on to say: 
... this voice without a place that 
belongs to the acousmetre takes us back to an 
archaic, original stage: of the first months of life or even of before birth, during 
which the voice was everything and it was everywhere (but bear in mind that this 
"everywhere " quality is nameable only retrospectively - the concept can arise for 
the subject who no longer occupies the undifferentiated everywhere'. 154 
Celan's exilic voice -a voice without a place - carries the listener back to a time before 
listening. The reading brings back the timeless time of the voice. Voice as all. Noise. The 
words have shape but the voice in the recording has no immediately recognisable contour 
(the contour which is given in any origin). It is not from anywhere. 
Barthes thoughts about photography also raise the question of the relationship 
between time and nothingness. It seems that for Barthes, `nothing' is the passage of time. 
It is a sentiment Paul Celan seems to have shared. He recognised that reading is also a 
repressed contact with death. Writing is reading. I read the mind and write. The mind 
reads and writes in an impossible simultaneity. The poet became conscious that he was 
always leaving something behind. Writing is always a leaving, a process of separation, 
even though it is also ostensibly a technology of preservation. Feeling falls away in the 
act of writing it. The writer tries to catch up with an experience that they have already 
passed by, that is past. Translation (and time is the ultimate-translator) is destruction 
(time is not outside writing, time is a form of writing). To call something into words is 
not to make it available for recall but to efface it. Something is not when it is called 
`something', it becomes something else, letters, ink, typeface. It changes shape. 
Something is outside the text. Something, everything, is nothing. Language is not a 
T52 Roland Barthes, `On Photography, ' in Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 356. 
153 Michel Chion, The Voice of Cinema, Trans. Claudia Gorbman, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), p. 18. 
154 Ibid. p. 27. 
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prison-house but a charnel-house. The inscription of the word, inscription in any form or 
thought, is an epitaph. Writing is erasure. Celan did not write poetry. 
It is only once we have this in mind that we should read `Todesfuge', the poem 
that it was rumoured prompted Adorno to state that it would be barbaric to write poetry 
after Auschwitz. 155 `Todesfuge', written in German but first published in Romanian as 
`Tangoul Mortii' or `Tango of Death', is a poem about writing. To write in German was a 
problem, the language was implicated in the horrors it was seeking to describe. ' 56 Celan 
is writing in German to Germany. The mann in the house in `Todesfuge' also writes in 
German to Germany, `der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland'. 157 Celan and the 
Nazi share a language. The serpents that the man plays with are words, the same curls 
and coils that Celan now describes him with. The language has a history. Celan takes 
language out of time to escape the contagion of etymology. He makes `the German 
language take flight on a line of escape'. 158 What Deleuze and Guattari say of Kafka's 
use of the German language might, at times, equally be said of Celan: `He will push it 
toward a deterritorialization that will no longer be saved by culture or by myth, that will 
be an absolute deterritorialization, even if it is slow, sticky, coagulated. To bring 
language slowly and progressively to the desert. To use syntax in order to cry, to give a 
syntax to the cry'. 159 In their book Towards a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari 
compare Kafka to Celine in that the two write `with a kind of minor music'. 160 This music 
is the music I discussed in the last chapter, the music that opens writing to the semiotic, 
that frees the drives. Celan does not write into this music but out of it. His syntax 
screams. It screams to have shape. He writes in noise, as noise. He writing is as an after 
effect of the impulses which Celine discharged in his writing but which the Third Reich 
iss Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation, (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 47. 
156 Language cannot be owned however. lt can resist as much as aid an oppressor. In her report of his trial, 
Hannah Arendt wrote of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann's `heroic fight with the German language. which 
invariably defeats him'. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: 
Penguin, 1994), p. 48. 
157 `he writes when dusk falls to Germany... ' (trans. Michael Hamburger), Celan, Selected Poems, p. 63. 
158 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 26. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
discharged as physical violence, as torture, as suffering, as mass murder. He is concerned 
with the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis. 
Celan is concerned with the problem of this horror appearing at all. Horror is not 
when it is translated, when it is written. Horror is not a word, the horror is not in `horror'. 
Horror is unwording. It is unshaping. It is men, women and children made 
ashes... vanishing. Horror is nothing. The power of horror is its nothingness. It is 
abjection which protects us from nothing, which causes us to turn away from the dead. 
Writing (in the limited sense of ink on a page) can be likened to abjection for the simple 
reason that it gives the suggestion of something. It rejects nothing. Inscription requires 
surface and point, it needs things. The means however that the more Celan wrote, the 
further he sensed he was moving away from the horrors he was trying to write about. The 
black milk is writing, the balm of the pen. Unstoppable writing. `Schwarze Milch der 
Frühe wir trinken sie abends wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts 
wir trinken und trinken'. The absence of punctuation in `Todesfuge' emphasises the 
endlessness of writing. Writing, and writing, and writing, creeps in this petty pace from 
day to day, to the last syllable of recorded time. Time is writing. The camps must, at least 
partly, be outside time or it is too late. Celan knew that to write something about horror 
he must not write, we must not read, there can be no text. His answer to the violence that 
is writing was the idea of the breath-turn. The breath-turn is the nothing. Celan described 
the breath-turn during a speech he gave on the occasion of receiving the Georg Buchner 
prize in 1960. The speech is usually referred to as The Meridien. It is perhaps the most 
important piece of writing about writing from the Twentieth Century, because it is not 
about writing. The speech is about how not to write. `I am talking about a poem that does 
not exist! '. 16' 
The Meridien teaches us that art is velocity. Art, of which poetry is (a)part. `Art 
makes for a certain distance from the I. Art requires that we travel a certain space in a 
certain direction, on a certain road. 162 Celan believes that poetry only exists in moments 
where the momentum of `art' is resisted. It exists in the invitation to turn against its own 
momentum. Poetry exists only when it allows the poem to overtake it. Poetry is a pause. 
16) Paul Celan, Collected Prose, Trans. Rosmarie Waldrop (Manchester: Carcanet, 1986), p. 5 1. 
162 Ibid. p. 44. Celan is engaged in a commentary on Büchner's Lenz at this point. 
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It is an Atemwende, `a turning of our breath'. ' 63 A point of suspension. `Nobody can tell 
how long the pause for breath - hope and thought - will last. 'Speed', which has always 
been 'outside', has gained yet more speed'. 1b4 Hope and thought exist in an instant that is 
no instant, in death. Breathing is living. The breath-turn, the moment that is not inhalation 
or exhalation, is outside life. It is outside the narrative that is each breath - an in and an 
out -a beginning and an end to an action. Poetry is an attack upon narrative. The breath- 
turn is one form of this offensive. The breath-turn is the nothing. The noise. 165 The 
`farthest limit of the I-voice, ' it doesn't even involve a voice, it is a pre-vocal expression, 
even before the air in the airway rattles the larynx' . 
166 Perhaps it is even further than this 
limit. The I-voice fallen silent. The end of the I. Hope and thought exist in the nothing, in 
the unwritten. The breath-turn is not a pause whilst speaking, or a space between words 
on a page. The breath-turn is the space between the words on the page and the page, it is 
the pause between the pause and speech. It is not spoken. It cannot be written. It cannot 
be thought. It is `not'. Celan explains that the `poem holds its ground, if you will permit 
me yet another extreme formulation, the poem holds its ground on its own margin. In 
order to endure, it constantly calls and pulls itself back from an 'already-no-more' into a 
'still-here'. 1 6' The breath-turn is the already-no-more. A death between breaths. Abject. 
The `Wirk Nicht Voraus' from Lichtzwang (1970) illustrates this. It is useful to 
quote the poem in its entirety: 
Wirk nicht voraus, 
sende nicht aus, 
steh 
herein: 
durchgründet vom Nichts, 
ledig allen 
163 Ibid. p. 47. 
1" Ibid. p. 48. 
165 The breath-turn is perhaps the aleph, which in Hebrew 'represents nothing more than the position taken 
by the larynx when a word begins with a vowel'. It is the moment in which a shape is chosen. The aleph 
can also `be said to denote the source of all articulate sound, and indeed the Kabbalists always regarded it 
as the . spiritual root of all other 
letters, encompassing in its essence the whole alphabet'. It is that out of 
which voice (shaped sound) originates. 'To hear the aleph is to hear next to nothing; it is the preparation 
for all audible language, but in itself convetýs no determinate specific meaning'. See Gershom Scholem, On 
the Kabbalah and its, Symbolism, Trans. Ralph Mannheim, (New York: Schocken Books, 1996), p. 30. 
166 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, p. 53. 
167 Celan, Selected Prose, p. 49. 
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gebets, 
feinfügig, nach 
der Vor-Schrift, 
unüberholbar, 
nehm ich dich auf, 
statt aller 
Ruhe. ' 68 
The poems opening entreaty should be understood as asking the reader to slow the 
forward movement of the mind. Merleau-Ponty suggests in The Visible and the Invisible 
that reality is in a sense always deferred: `... "reality" does not belong definitively to any 
particular perception... in this sense it lies always further on'. 169 Celan wants to avoid the 
breaking up of perceptual appearances, those continual replacements that constitute 
everyday existence. He wants a static perception - perhaps we could conceive of it 
through the act of writing, a writing that stops mid-sentence to allow the ink to catch up - 
a perception that allows a particular experience to engulf words rather than to be engulfed 
by them. It might be read as a call for perceptual suicide. Perception is a process but 
Celan wants it to become an end-point. He requires perception to bear witness to a stilled 
reality, a reality which is really nothing. He wants `a terrifying silence'. 170 We move to 
Be. Something is only as a form of momentum because it is momentum which gives it 
form. You move these words to be by your reading them. You shape them. The sentence 
only is through the wanderings of the eye. Celan wants quiescence: the end of motion and 
the silence which that brings, the noise. This is not tranquility, it is `statt aller Ruhe', 
because it opens up a space within which the instant must be confronted. It demands 
another temporality of us, a timeless one. Normally we travel on the hands of the clock, 
here we must watch them pass us by. Faith is a forward and upward looking. The `breath- 
turn' is a turn away from faith. It is in the turn that experience is found(ed). Experience as 
non-experience. 
The `Vor-Schrift' of the poem - the pre-script - is the nothing out of which 
writing exploded. It is the noise before the sound. The pre-script is that which is always 
61` `Do not work ahead, / do not send forth, / stand / into it, enter: / transfounded by nothingness, / 
unburdened of all /prayer, / microstructured in heeding / the pre-script / unovertakable, /I make you at 
home, / instead of all / rest (Trans. Michael Hamburger). Celan, Selected Poems, p. 323. 
169 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 41. 
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already overwritten. It is what Celan wants to write. It is a hard task. If something is in 
our wake we cannot overtake it, it can only catch us up. Celan wants to travel backwards 
whilst going forwards. He wants to write us to the underneath of writing, to what hides 
beneath the scroll of a pen yet resides above the page that it travels across. It is difficult 
to think because thinking is writing. To think the nothing is to nihilate it. It requires 
poetic thinking. Poetry is when it is not. Language needs to exceed itself, like the colour 
that exceeds meaning in Bacon's paintings. It needs to be thought through and out of 
itself. The black milk may be such a thinking. The black of the black milk. The print on 
the page. The lines of the letters. And also the milk which makes it possible, the white of 
the paper which is also writing. "' Writing has colour. Colour has writing. Colour is a part 
of writing and apart from it. `Todesfuge' was initially to be a tango of death, a dance. The 
dance is like colour. The dancer is like writing. How do we separate the dancer from the 
dance? How do we separate the colour from the writing, from that which it colours? 
The Shades: Part Two 
Colour is untouchable. It is perceived as surface, as a coating of the world, but 
there is no beneath to colour. Smash a brick and colour remains within and across the 
fragments. Break a word. BI a ck. The letters keep their colouring. Colour surrounds and 
is nowhere. It is upon and within things. It is upon the within of things. It is within the 
upon of things. It is everywhere and nowhere, it is everything and nothing. It is always 
and all, yet I cannot say that I am touching colour. I touch the object, I feel its texture. An 
object that has and does not have colour. I see colour without thinking it. Words do not 
possess colour. Colour is not the ink, nor the surface upon which the ink is inscribed. It is 
both and neither. Colour is not possessed by things. If possession is destruction, then 
colour is that which cannot be destroyed. Colour is not of language although all language 
has colour. Colour is the flesh of writing and it is its skin. Jean-Luc Nancy explains that 
the origin of the word `chromatic, ' of `chröma vient de chrös, surface de corps, peau, 
170 Celan, Collected Prose, p. 47. 
171 Scholem writes of Kabbalists who believed that the white spaces on the scroll of the Torah also 
consisted of letters, but ones that had not yet revealed themselves. Scholem, On the Kaballah, p. 82. Even 
now, we can say that once we recognise that there is a white page we have begun to read that whiteness. 
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chair'. 172 Colour holds the corpus together but cannot be held by it. In writing schwarze 
milch Celan writes what writing cannot take away. He writes its colour. He writes 
nothing. Colour is `already-no-more' yet `still-here'. It is always already absent from 
writing yet also the very stuff of writing. Levi suggested that Celan's message gets lost in 
the `background noise'. This `background noise... is the ground of the world, the 
backdrop of the universe, the background of being, maybe'. 173 The background noise is 
the horror. National Socialism was `characterised by widespread useless violence, as an 
end in itself, with the sole purpose of creating pain, occasionally having a purpose, yet 
always redundant, always disproportionate to the purpose itself. ] 74 Purpose gives shape 
to an act. The act that exceeds purpose loses shape, it spills. The infliction of pain 
destroys the contours of the self. Pain kills. It returns the one in pain to the noise. The 
camps were the epicentre of pain, of the horror. `Under the word and language, this 
wave, and beneath the wave, the black noise' . 
175 Celan must write in pain, not of it, he 
must carry it in the cadence of his words. And in their colour. He must write the horror. 
In the last chapter I described Celine's writing as a form of catharsis for the writer, a 
writing away of the horror. The violence is carried into language rather than carried out. 
Celan's writing however is from the horror. It is writing from out of the after-effects of 
fascism. His poetry the desolate words of a survivor. William Haver described the 
hibakusha (the survivors of atomic bombing) as being in a disjunct simultaneity, `in an 
essential abjection... neither alive nor deadd, neither present nor absent, neither inside nor 
outside the human, but the surplus of every binary'. 176 The survivors of the Holocaust 
live as a similar surplus. An outside to the binary-relation. On the edge of noise. Of 
nothing. From the very beginning Celan writes across this terrain. 
The schwarze milch is between the black and the white. It is the grey. Grey is ash- 
coloured, lead-coloured. "? `Todesfuge' is a grey area, a grey zone, an uncertain place. 
Grey is difficult to place, to keep in place, to hold. It is a colour between colours, a shade. 
172 `Chroma comes from chros, meaning the surface of the body, the skin, flesh'. Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Technique du present: essai sur On Kawara, (Villeurbanne: Gachet, 1997), p. 26. For a further discussion 
of the etymology of the word, see Conner, The Book of Skin, p. 151. 
173 Serres, Genesis, p. 62. 
174 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, Trans. Raymond Rosenthal, (London: Abacus, 1989), p. 83. 
175 Serres, Genesis, p. 139. 
176 William Haver, The Body of this Death: Historicity and Sociality in the Time of AIDS, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 86. 
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The impossible black and white both shade to grey. All Celan's writings are penned in 
the ink of the schwarze milch. He writes with(in) the `in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite'. '78 His is an abject poetry. A poetry that reaches its abjection from a different 
direction than Celine. Celine writes from a language that privileges the symbolic towards 
a privileging of the semiotic. Celan writes from within a semiotic universe, a universe 
that occasionally shows itself in the symbolic. Celine shades his writing into grey and 
Celan shades his out of it. The grey is the collapsing inwards of distinctions, the losing of 
shape. It is a noisy colour. In a fragment of writing from 1914 or 1915 Walter Benjamin 
states that `la couleur est de ce fait originelle pour eile-meme, c'est-ä-dire quelle ne se 
rapporte pas ä des choses, ni non plus ä leur apoparition dans les taches colorees; eile se 
rapporte au contraire ä la plus haute concentration de voir'. 19 Colour is not possessed 
by things, nor does colour represent things. Colour is. Benjamin adds: `La travail consiste 
ä montrer que la couleur et la forme sont distinctes'. 180 Celan writes into colour to move 
beyond representation. '8' The words are and are not this colour, the schwarze milch, the 
black milk, is ink upon paper, the contrast that requires difference and shape, the 
darkness emerging from the light that is writing upon a page. Colour is also, however, 
within this contrast, undoing it. The black milk is the impossible non-edge of the black 
and the white, the grey beneath the black and the white that brings them together and 
undermines them. Celan writes towards the edges of his words, edges that always recede, 
that shade off. He writes in the shade of the ink towards the outside of writing, towards 
nothing. In his reply to a questionnaire sent out in 1958 by the Flinker bookstore in Paris, 
Celan suggested that because of the legacy of the horrors of war German poetry now 
distrusted `beauty'. In the reply he describes German as having become `a "greyer" 
language, a language which wants to locate even its "musicality" in such a way that it 
177 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Ed. C. T. Onions, (London: Book Club Associates, 1983), p. 889. 
17 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
179 `Colour, for this reason, existed originally in itself, by which I mean that it was not related to things, nor 
to their appearance as coloured marks; colour is linked to the most intense seeing' (translation mine). `La 
reflexion dans l'art et dans la colueur, ' in Walter Benjamin, Fragments, Trans. Christophe Jouanlanne et 
Jean-Francois Poirier, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), p. 135. For an insightful reading of 
Benjamin's work on colour see Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), especially pp. ] 0-13 and pp. 82-89. 
ixo 'The work that is required is to demonstrate that colour and form are distinct' (translation mine). Ibid. 
This is not to say that colour does not act metonymically at times in his verse. See for example, Peter 
Szondi's discussion of Celan's use of the word `red' in the poem `Eden, ' in Celan Studies, Trans. Susan 
Bemofsky and Harvey Mendelsohn, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 92. 
117 
has nothing in common with the "euphony" which more or less blithely continued to 
sound alongside the greatest horrors'. 182 Celan does not seek out pleasant sounds but 
instead opens his readers to the horrors of the noise. His is the greyest of languages. 
192 Celan, Collected Prose, pp. 15-16. 
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Chapter Three 
Under the Skin 
At the first blow... this trust in the world breaks down. The other person, 
`opposite' whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can exist only as 
long as he does not touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality 
on me with the first blow. He is on me and thereby destroys me. It is like a rape, a 
sexual act without the consent of one of the two partners. 
31661 
31661... a sequence of figures ... five numbers.. .a single number.. .a place assigned 
in a 
series... 31658,31659,31660,31661,31662,31663... a position in time... 31661.31661 
is an indelible number, it is a tattoo. A tattoo is a design upon the skin. In tattooing the 
cuticle is punctured with a needle and then impregnated with pigment, marked with 
figures. It is a kind of writing that introduces an unfamiliar intimacy within the body. The 
tattoo breaks the border between inside and outside, beneath the skin yet upon the skin, 
ambiguous, in-between, a part of one yet apart from one. 31661 was a violent inking, a 
rendering nameless and a naming. `You no longer have a name; this is your new name'. 2 
The number pinpoints a moment of arrival and indicates a period of survival. Those who 
were sent straight to the gas chambers were unmarked. The number is political. In his 
book on skin Steven Conner writes about `the power that accrues to the mark' in actions 
like penal branding. 3 Here the mark is power, the crude hypostatization of a bureaucratic 
process. Power is most manifest in times of crisis and periods of certitude. The number is 
a sign of surety. A post-mark. A number that we see and that someone 
felt... 31661... probably not the first blow but perhaps the most enduring. The blow 
manifestly differs from the touch. We are always already touched. 
' Jean Amery, At the Mind's Limits, Trans. Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella P. Rosenfeld, (London: Granta 
Books, 1999), p. 28. 
2 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, Trans. Raymond Rosenthal, (London: Abacus, 1989), p. 95. See 
also Elie Wiesel, Night, Trans. Stella Rodway, (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 54.: `The three "veterans, " 
with needles in their hands, engraved a number on our left arms. I became A- 7713. After that / had no 
other name'. 
Steven Conner, The Book of Skin, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 74. 
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Our body bears the imprint of others from its beginning, the pressure of another 
starts the self. 4 We are shaped before we become. The mother - as fact or figure - creates 
our contours for us through a continuous process of cleaning and cradling. She draws us 
out, acts as our cartographer. We originate in her compass, touched to become. Kristeva 
describes this process of primal mapping in Powers of Horror: 
Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into a 
territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the 
archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and 
improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. 5 
The mother gifts us our borders through her allowances and interdictions. Yet we are also 
delineated in another way prior to this delineation or in conjunction with it. Our path is 
prepared before us. In advance of the body that becomes me there is signification. `This 
signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless 
and simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action. '6 The body 
is an effect of signification rather than effecting signification. This means that language is 
productive rather than mimetic. As Judith Butler writes, it is also, by extension, 
`performative, inasmuch as this signing act delimits and contours the body that it then 
claims to find prior to any and all significations'. 7 
Kristeva's understanding of signification differs considerably from Butler's in 
that for her language is always composed of both a semiotic and a symbolic aspect. 
Butler is indeed critical of Kristeva's semiotic, identifying it as a `prediscursive libidinal 
economy which occasionally makes itself known in language, but which maintains an 
ontological status prior to language itse f .8 This would seem to contradict Kristeva's 
own understanding of the semiotic chora. The chora is articulated by the drives as they 
are arranged by the various constraints imposed upon the body. The theory of language 
Kristeva advances in Revolution in Poetic Language is more nuanced than Butler's 
reading implies. Drucilla Cornell recognizes this when she writes that `it would be 
4 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, (London: Verso, 2004), p. 26. 
5 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 72. 
6 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex ", (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 30. 
7 Ibid. 
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incorrect to argue that Kristeva's account of the maternal is either simplistically 
naturalistic or ontological, because the sign (fiance of the maternal is given within the 
gender structures of the Lacanian framework, and not by the very "being" of woman'. 9 
Psychic structures should not be conflated with physical bodies. 10 Kristeva also makes 
the cultural nature of the semiotic explicit in Revolution in Poetic Language, stating that 
the semiotic is `put in place by a biological set up and is always already social and 
therefore historical'. ' 1 Through the guidance of the mother the drives come together, 
become discursive, socially conditioned. The drive is usually conceived of as hereditary, 
inherited pressures within the body that require satisfaction. The baby begins wholly 
impulsive. Yet this beginning is always within culture. The womb is not acultural. The 
pulse of the mother is culturally contingent. The stresses of the everyday - the changing 
cadences of the heartbeat, the different soundings of breathing - are measured and 
reflected by the mother's body. The social lives through the unborn child. There is 
however the matter of the child, the bones, the flesh and blood, the excitations and 
energies, the substances and surfaces that are played upon by the world outside as it 
composes the baby. The heart beats the rhythm of its age, an age that does not make the 
heartbeat but borrows it. This matter of the child is kneaded for the world outside to 
become inside. For me, this matter is what Kristeva means by the biological. 
In this sense Kristeva's understanding of language is more similar to Butler's than 
one might initially be led to believe. Butler concedes in Bodies that Matter that the 
`materiality of language, indeed, of the very sign that attempts to denote "materiality, " 
suggests that it is not the case that everything, including materiality, is always already 
language'. 12 Language is material. The material though `never fully escapes from the 
process by which it is signified. 13 Kristeva's conception of the semiotic might be read as 
8 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (London: Routledge, 1990), 
80. 
Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law, (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 49. 
10 Although Kristeva herself does at times seem to do precisely this, such as in Stabat Mater. See Julia 
Kristeva, `Stabat Mater' in Tales of Love, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987), pp. 234-263. 
1' Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 68. 
12 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 68. 
13 Ibid. 
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a reversal of this award of custody, signification `never fully escapes from the matter 
through which it signifies'. The drives are a constant reminder of the materiality of 
language; they provided the ink for primary inscriptions. 
Primary inscriptions occur before the articulation of the chora. The drives are 
described by Kristeva as `energy charges as well as psychical marks'. 14 The mark must 
be made before it can come to articulate. Energy has to be produced. The way the drives 
themselves emerge is not explained in Revolution in Poetic Language. The drives arise 
through the process I call primary inscription here. Primary inscriptions simultaneously 
produce the paper and ink - the skin and drives - out of which they are written. The 
inscription writes the surface upon which it will appear; the surface writes the inscription 
that will mark it. This invites the question as to what it is that is before or beneath this 
surface. The before is what I called `noise' in my previous chapter. It is aimless and 
nameless. It is not. It is the potential of nothingness or the nothingness that is potential. 
The drive is not until it is guided to where it is supposed to arrive. Drives become in their 
congregation. They are gathered by the mother as she zones the body of the child. The 
mother pressures areas of sensation into becoming, the drives find themselves here. An 
area of sensation is distinguished in relation to an area without sensation; it acts as what 
could be named a double-naming. Sensation - the concentration of excitation - produces 
both itself and a surrounding absence through its emergence. The surrounding absence 
should not be confused with nothing. Nothing has no relation to anything, has no relation. 
Sensations - which are aboriginal namings - start out as temporary. The first names are 
presence and absence, not known as such, but felt. The first names around the orifices of 
the body are sensational and fleeting. These are names that are immediately forgotten, 
names that are not accorded the permanence of remembrance. The mother acts as a 
magnet attracting the drives to areas of the body through her touch, giving them a place 
to aim towards, somewhere to arrive and actualize themselves. 15 For example, as the 
child suckles, the breast focuses the drives around what will be the mouth; this orifice 
14 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 25. 
15 Touch here is of course not to be understood as something that is recognized as such by the child. The 
child has not separated from the mother yet. At this stage the child is therefore touched all the time and 
hence untouched and untouchable. The conjoined must separate for touch to take place. 
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briefly becomes an area of sensation. When the breast is withdrawn the area of sensation 
evanesces into the nothingness. 
The first thought of the child will be one of loss as the constant appearance and 
disappearance of sensation (and with it, its absence) enters into memory. Memory is an 
experience that the mind will not permit to return to the nothingness. Memory precedes 
thinking. The first thought is modeled on this memory, the experience of presence and 
absence which is any sensation. This experience is translated into loss. This translation, 
the first thought, is a response to the absence of touch, the absence of the breast. When 
the child ceases to be enbosomed the thought arises that something is missing and is 
being missed. This thought replaces the lost touch. As Wilfred R. Bion realized this 
thought serves to keep the infant company. 16 Words also later act to fill the emptiness that 
is the mouth bereft of the breast. 
Words which are part of thought - and the usual cite of the performative - 
emerge later, out of the mother's work of mapping. The mother sensationalizes the child 
through touch and sound. This sensory world is what Didier Anzieu terms the echotactile 
backcloth to communication. " This backcloth provides the means by which 
communication at a distance becomes possible. Voiced sound as a source of comforting - 
the cooing of a mother for instance - is condensed into (and superseded by) words. The 
language of touch - of presence and absence - is supplemented by one of gesture. Anzieu 
describes this supersession in terms of an Aufhebung. It is a somatic dialectic within 
which the initial maternal caresses and murmurs are `at once denied, surpassed and 
preserved'. 18 Inarticulate sounds and frequent touching appear to be transcended by 
talking. Speech, however, is never entirely able to suppress its tactility, nor this early 
voicing that continues to carry. 
The `Skin Ego' as it is elaborated by Didier Anzieu should be understood as the 
resultant relief of the mother's mapping. It is a representation of the interplay between 
bodies, a means of making sense of those early interactions. The mother in caring for the 
16 Didier Anzieu, The Skin Ego, Trans. Chris Turner, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 37-38. 
Bion develops these ideas in his essay `A Theory of Thinking. ' I came across this essay too late to integrate 
the arguments developed there into this thesis. See W. R. Bion, Second Thoughts, (London: Karnac, 1984), 
110-119. 11Anzieu, 
The Skin Ego, p. 153. 
18 Ibid. 
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child must sacrifice proximity for the overview necessary to provide for the varying 
needs of the infant. Different needs are satisfied at different times causing shifts in the 
attention given to parts of the child's body, nourishing variations. The gestures of the 
mother tending to the baby - the maternal environment - form the matter out of which the 
fragile integument that is the Skin Ego emerges. Once the Skin Ego has been sketched 
out, it holds the nascent psyche together, shielding it, fulfilling a function of `maintaining 
the psyche'. 19 The parchment of primal writing, it is emblazoned with `an original pre- 
verbal writing made up of traces upon the skin'. 20 This is not primary inscription, which 
produces only a fleeting skin. This is skin that has concretized through the repetition of 
primary inscription; it is the secondary permanent skin that has superseded its transient 
precursor. The pre-verbal writing Anzieu writes of is actually secondary inscription. The 
Skin Ego figures this secondary inscription which was written by the mother upon the 
skin that supports it. 
The skin has three functions which are central to Anzieu's elaboration of the Skin 
Ego: 
The primary function of the skin is as the sac which contains and retains inside it 
the goodness and fullness accumulating there through feeding, care, the bathing 
in words. Its second function is as the interface which marks the boundary with 
the outside and keeps that outside out, it is the barrier which protects against 
penetration by the aggression and greed emanating from others, whether people 
or objects. Finally, the third function - which the skin shares with the mouth and 
which it performs at least as often - is as a site and a primary means of 
communicating with others, of establishing signifying relations; it is moreover, an 
`inscribing surface' for the marks left by those others. 21 
It is a container, it keeps things in. It is a border, it separates inside/outside. It is a 
kind of paper. These three functions are all interrelated. The container is also a border, as 
is paper. The container contains something and prevents it from escaping to an elsewhere, 
an outside. Paper that is written upon carries the memory of the moment when it was a 
border between two pressures, the pen and what the paper rested upon. A paper without 
19 Ibid., p-98- 
20 Ibid., p. 105. 
21 Ibid., p. 40. 
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support could not be written upon. 22 It would move with the pen rather than meeting it. 
The skin as an inscribing surface must have an inside (the flesh) as well as an outside. 
The skin however is punctured by orifices that undo any simple notion of an inside and 
an outside, these are loci of undecidability. The skin folds beneath itself, beneath the 
outside of the body that it is supposed to be: the anus, the ears, the lips, the nostrils, 
neither inside nor outside, thresholds that unsettle the image of the skin as border. In 
places the skin trespasses the border that it is meant to be. Whilst he does acknowledge 
that the skin is paradoxical, Anzieu does not explain how the presence of uncertain holes 
- such as the mouth and the posterior opening - (with)in the skin fail to trouble the Skin 
Ego. 23 He details how knowledge of the imperfect formation of the Skin Ego can have 
implications for the study and treatment of masochism and narcissism, but does not 
explain how the Skin Ego is ever formed such that it appears whole. Given the 
undecidable areas of the skin that form part of the template upon which it rests, the Skin 
Ego must always be holed, there must always be a danger of psychic seepage. The Skin 
Ego which has partially failed in its containing function is in fact described by Anzieu as 
a colander. Such an Ego, with its continuity `broken into by holes, ' is one in which 
`thoughts, and memories are only with difficulty retained, they leak away'. 24 For Anzieu 
however, this is an abnormal Skin Ego. 
Given the presence of holes within the skin out of which the Skin Ego arises, why 
is every Skin Ego not a colander? The psychic process of abjection may provide the 
answer to this question. The abject, as Kristeva explains in an often quoted passage, is 
that which does not `respect borders, positions, rules'. 25 The skin, as a border with 
disrespects itself, would seem to have an abject aspect. As I referred to in the previous 
chapter, the skin on the surface of milk is cited by Kristeva as an example of food 
loathing. When `the eyes see or the lips touch' this skin, a `gagging sensation' is 
22 Water as liquid is such a paper. The story of the Persian king Xerxes seeking to punish the Hellespont - 
for destroying a bridge he had recently constructed - by having it tattooed, rests upon this knowledge for its 
effect. For a brief summation of Herodotus's account of this event see pp. 6-7 of C. P. Jones's `Stigma and 
Tattoo' in Written on the Body, Ed. Jane Caplan, (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), pp. 1-16. 
23 Anzieu lists several paradoxes, amongst them that the skin is 'both permeable and impermeable, 
superficial and profound, truthful and misleading'. See The Skin Ego, p. 17. 
24 Ibid., p. 102. 
25 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
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experienced. 26 Is this nausea solely because of the skin of the milk, or is it also because 
that skin reminds the I that the rims and lids of the eyes, and the lips, as skin are liminal 
(in-between outside and inside)? Waste and dung - mucus, piss, shit, spit - are also abject 
and function as metonyms for orifices that hole the skin. The corpse, the `utmost of 
abjection, ' shows death as a `wound with blood and pus, or the sickly acrid smell of 
sweat, of decay'. 27 The corpse as it is described here is a skin losing its integrity. The 
body is seeping out through the skin as sweat or viscid matter. Abjection - the throwing 
up and out of filth and refuse - is therefore, at least partially, the expulsion of things 
connected to the skin's holes. The bodily functions that expel (shitting and vomiting, for 
example) provide the model for the psychic process which finds these same processes 
repugnant. At the same time that the Skin Ego surrounds the psyche, abjection as a 
psychic process also emerges to support that which contains it. An imperfect Skin Ego 
might therefore be partly attributable to a breakdown in the process of abjection. 
The tattooing of 31661 was an abject act for many reasons, one reason of which is 
shared by all tattoos. The tattoo crosses (out) borders. The tattooist's needle breaks into 
the skin, suffusing the skin with pigment. The prick of the needle - like the cut or the 
blow - can act to reassert the self. If you are hit you are recognized as being there to 
be 
hit, the hit provides an unwelcome and painful, but tangible, reassertion of self. The feel 
of the needle similarly suggests an act of recognition; `you' are here being tattooed. 
Unlike a bruise or a graze however the tattoo does not physically disappear over time, it 
remains. Although gradually fading, the tattoo never entirely vanishes. 
28 The tattoo 
therefore - whilst it may continue to remind the person tattooed that they were once 
recognized as tattooable - represents a permanent challenge to corporeal integrity. The 
tattoo is after all an undecidable: 
The tattoo substitutes a surface for the actual surface of the skin: but it does so in 
a way that plays with the knowledge that the skin has been penetrated, since the 
technique of tattooing in fact requires pigment to be injected beneath the surface 
of the skin. Thus what appears to lie on top of the skin in fact lies below it. 
29 
26 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
27 Ibid. pp-3-4- 
21 Incidentally, even the use of laser treatment to remove tattoos is often only partially successful. The 
tattoo sometimes remains beneath the surface of the now superficially clean skin. 
29 Connor, The Book of Skin, p. 63. 
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The tattoo is above and below the skin ... in the skin and on the skin... 31661 is abyssal. 
The numerals are holes within the skin. To look at the tattoo is to look through the body. 
The tattoo is writing within the skin and as such seems like a scar but a scar is not foreign 
to the body. A scar may be a response to an action which has impacted upon the body 
from the outside, but it arises from within the body. A scar may be ugly but it is not 
untouchable. The scar gestures towards the abject; it shows the skin as border to be 
permeable. It does not disrespect the skin however, rather it affirms it. A scar is the 
writing of a wound. It is a form of narration. It tells a story of the body, for the body, 
through the body. The hardened skin tissue of the scar can then later be translated into 
more traditional narrative structures. A good example of this kind of translation is 
provided in a scene that forms part of the film Jaws (Steven Spielberg, 1975). Three men, 
Brody, Hooper and Quint, have set out on a boat to hunt down and kill the great white 
shark that has been carrying out attacking along the local shoreline. One night, whilst 
sitting around the cabin table, Hooper and Quint set about comparing their scars and 
relating what caused them, a moray eel, a bull shark, a thresher shark etc... Eventually 
Brody intervenes and points to a scar on the arm of Quint asking for an explanation. It 
proves to be a tattoo of the U. S. S. Missouri which the sailor has had removed. The U. S. S. 
Missouri was a ship torpedoed by a Japanese submarine in the final days of the war; 
because no rescue was immediately forthcoming, many sailors were subsequently killed 
by sharks whilst waiting to be picked up. Although Quint has endeavoured to have the 
visible reminder of his past removed, a trace remains (and, of course, the memory also 
remains tattooed in his mind, the flesh may forget but the mind does not). 
Scars are sculpture; a deep cut memorialized in tissue. The scar may cause 
revulsion; it reminds us of the wound that it was, but it can also arouse affection, be 
touched and touching: 
... when the top of 
her dress was around her hips and he saw the sculpture her 
back had become, like the decorative work of an ironsmith too passionate for 
display, he could think but not say, "Aw, Lord, girl. " And he would tolerate no 
peace until he had touched every ridge and leaf of it with his mouth, none of 
which Sethe could feel because her back skin had been dead for years. 30 
30 Toni Morrison, Beloved, (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 17-18. 
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Touching the scar, kissing it (even if that kiss is not felt and as such is not, is only known, 
only kisses the mind), is denying or overcoming the abject. I should loathe you but I do 
not, I love you. There are many examples of this love over loathing portrayed in 
contemporary film and literature. 3 1 The physical contact of two people through the 
connective tissue of the scar seems an attempt by the one without scarring to share the 
wound. 32 The texture of this trace of injury acts as Braille for another's body, for 
another's lips. Lips that read the embossed body and learn its past, the skin provides a 
chronicle of experience. But also lips that hide the history of a hole - conceal the cicatrix, 
the trace of a wound - and conceal themselves. This kind of kiss (like the French kiss) is 
the (con)sealing of two holes. The buss comforts because it brings memories of the 
maternal envelope, of the body cradled and protected, of secure borders. I have never 
read of someone kissing an Auschwitz tattoo although such kissing must occur (if not 
deliberately, then by chance, during the embrace of by now aging lovers) and have 
occurred. Any such kiss would however miss the tattoo. The lips would only kiss the 
surface of the skin, not the marks that lie beneath. The tattoo is untouchable. It cannot be 
shared. It is too deep. 
31661 is a permanent reminder of a moment -a visual record of an event that was 
also acoustic and tactile - that is inaccessible. Tattooed numbers... numbers in a row 
(sometimes prefixed by a letter, here not) within an arm or a chest... are in part 
metonyms. A metonym is a name change. With the tattoo a name becomes a number. The 
number is the name that replaces. Now the number names other names, 31661 names 
Auschwitz and Ravensbrück. The number belongs to the numbered (although it was 
designed to dispossess) and accrues a history. There are sometimes efforts to recount this 
31 Two examples that immediately occur to me are the scene in the film Thirteen (2003) when Melanie 
(played by the actress Holly Hunter) kisses the scars left by her daughter Tracy's (played by Evan Rachel 
Wood) self-mutilation, and the instant in Barbara Bell's autobiography when a woman with AIDS whom 
she is `buddying' called Ann-Marie kisses the scarring that marks Bell's recent mastectomy. `I told her 
about my mastectomy and how 1 'd felt so bad about myself. She said, "I want to see it. " I'd never shown 
anybody. I. said, "Oh, it 's just a pucker of a scar. You don 't want to see anything as ugly as that. " She said, 
"I want to see it, " in her very quiet, determined voice - she never spoke loud So she saw it and she just 
bent down and started kissing it, saying how beautiful it was, to make me feel better about it. She was such 
a wise little creature and so courageous'. Barbara Bell, Just Take Your Frock Off: A Lesbian Life, 
(Brighton: Ourstory Books, 1999), p. 161. 
32 For a discussion of this within the context of Morrison's Beloved see Laurie Vickroy, Trauma and 
Survival in Contemporary Fiction, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), pp. 182-183. 
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history, to cut through the skin and allow the memories to bleed out. The writings of 
31661 are an example of such an attempt. 
Writing Skin 
31661 survived the camps. 31661 unnumbered herself... renamed herself 
Charlotte Delbo... but the number remained in her skin. 33 The tattoo, a moment of 
communication; spoken and bodied. `Dipping her stiletto into a little bottle, a Jewish 
woman tattooed me, saying : "Don't be afraid. It doesn't hurt, " and in a scarcely audible 
voice: "Where did you come from? Paris? Will the war be over soon? "- "Yes, we won 
Stalingrad. "934 The Jewish woman is nameless, a nameless voice that greets the convoy, 
those about to be unnamed. In Convoy to Auschwitz she persists in her whispered 
resistance, barely audible. She spoke louder in Delbo's skin, where possibly the only 
extant writing in her own hand remained. A fragile remembrance, now long since gone. 
Delbo explicitly links skin and memory in the opening pages of her final book La 
memoire et les fours. The skin is memory. It registers the blows that impact upon it from 
the outside and the motions of the body beneath it. Delbo wore her skin out at Auschwitz: 
Explaining the inexplicable. There comes to mind the image of a snake shedding 
its old skin, emerging from beneath it in afresh, glistening one. I left a worn-out 
skin behind at Auschwitz - it smelt bad, that skin - branded by all the blows it had 
received, and rediscovered myself wearing another, beautiful and clean, although 
with me the molting was not as fast as that of the snake's. The visible traces came 
away with the old skin: the fixed stare of sunken eyes, the tottering gait, the 
frightened gestures. With the new skin the gestures belonging to a former life 
returned: the using of a toothbrush, of toilet paper, of a handkerchief, of a laufe 
and fork, eating calmly, saying hello to people when entering a room, closing the 
door, standing up straight, speaking, later on smiling with my lips and, still later, 
smiling with my lips and my eyes at the same time. Rediscovering odors, flavors, 
the smell of rain. In Birkenau, rain brought out the smell of diarrhea. It is the 
foulest smell I know. In Birkenau, the rain beat down upon the camp, upon us, 
carrying soot from the crematoriums, and the smell of burning flesh. We were 
steeped in it. 
It took a few years for the new skin to fully form, to consolidate. 
33 Charlotte Delbo was a French political prisoner. She was arrested in France in March 1942 and sent to 
Auschwitz in January 1943. In January 1944 she was transferred to Ravensbrück. 
34 Charlotte Delbo, Convoy to Auschwitz, Trans. Carol Cosman, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 
1997, p. 6. 
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Rid of its old skin, the snake is unchanged. It appears that I am as well. 
Nonetheless... 35 
The skin is between two camps; the concentration camp and its aftermath. It is also 
between the effect of the camp upon the exterior of the body and upon its interior. The 
skin recalls motions. When our bodies move our skin moves. The skin creases and 
smoothes as the muscles flex. There was a particular economy of gesture at Auschwitz. 
The skin displays the gestures that the body has learned. We are taught the appropriate 
movements. The way muscles operate is partly governed by the impact of social 
technologies. The use of the knife and fork - using the muscles in the arms and hands - is 
an everyday occurrence. It is also the end-product of a particular education. Muscles are 
ideological, indeed Althusser's examples of interpellation are as much gestural as they 
are acoustic and/or visual events. In the moment of hailing a posture is assumed. This is 
something John Mowitt recognizes during his discussion of interpellation in percussion. 
Mowitt writes that in the moment of recognition that one is being hailed, the `ears prick 
up, the head cranes, the body turns'. 36 He does not develop his thinking about this 
gestural dimension to interpellation any further as he is more interested in the acoustic 
aspect. For him `interpellation is clearly a conspicuously sonoric event'. 37 It is also 
evidently a muscular one. The `one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion' that 
occurs in Althusser's first example of interpellation requires a motional response. 38 You 
need muscles to become you. The subject is not free from subjection beneath the skin. 39 
Delbo in describing her movements in Auschwitz - the unsteady walk and the anxious 
demeanour - is also describing a politics of deprivation and cruelty, one that has 
impacted upon and within the body. This impact is made visible through the skin. The 
35 Charlotte Delbo, Days and Memory, Trans. Rosette Lamont, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2001), P. I. (translation emended). 
36 John Mowitt, percussion, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 48. 
37 Ibid., p. 45. 
38 Louis Althusser, `Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses, ' in Louis Althusser, Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essaus, Trans. Ben Brewster, (London: NLB, 1971), p. 163. 
39 An example of this is provided by the research of Iris Marion Young, in an essay she describes how 
women athletes suffer from an arrested potential as a result of their education. In a footnote she details the 
results of a survey of textbooks for young children which `revealed that children are thirteen times more 
likely to see a vigorously active man than a vigorously active woman and three times more likely to see a 
relatively active man than a relatively active woman'. See `Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of 
Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality' in Iris Marion Young, Throwing like a Girl and 
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wavering walker is a walking skin. We only usually see the skin of someone. The totter 
Delbo describes is the result of tiredness or starvation, yet we do not see the exhausted 
muscles or the empty stomach except as they are mediated through the skin. The skin 
writes its inside. It is the skin which sways or, when threatened, cowers. These 
movements are only visible on the surface of body, even if motivated from within it. This 
is not to say that we are only skin deep, but that we are only ever seen to be so. The pen 
that I write with or the keyboard that I type upon (examples of co-operation and dictation, 
respectively) touch my skin rather than my muscles or my mind. The skin mediates 
gesture. We encounter the world through the death that gives us shape. `Skin is both dead 
and alive. The thin outer layer, the epidermis, consists of strata of cells that migrate 
40 towards the surface, where they compact into a layer of dead material'. 
In the Muscle 
Delbo writes that the totalitarian gestures which she experienced were gradually 
forgotten, replaced by the old ways of moving from before her internment. This was a 
forgetting which would be made visible by the skin. The skin handles the hanky, the 
toothbrush and the toilet paper. The muscles that grasp do so through the skin. The new 
beginning is only visibly skin-deep. That there is flesh beneath the skin usually requires a 
leap of faith. The x-ray only shows that inside we are shadow-lands. The autopsy, the 
bloody wound, the open-mouth, are all exceptional windows within. Yet perhaps gestures 
are never forgotten, merely foregone. In his book Parables of the Virtual, Brian Massumi 
discusses the different modes of perception that exist in the body. These include tactile 
sensibility (which is `exteroceptive'), visceral sensibility (which is `interoceptive'), and 
the sensibility of muscles and ligaments, which is proprioception. 41 Proprioception is a 
folding of touch into the body, `enveloping the skin's contact with the external world in a 
dimension of medium depth: between epidermis and viscera'. 42 It translates encounters 
Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 
158. 
40 Ellen Lupton, `Skin: New Design Organics, ' in Ellen Lupton, Skin, (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2002), p. 31. The child in the film The Sixth Sense who says `I see dead people! ' is therefore simply 
relating a normal occurrence. We are all dead on the outside. 
41 Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 58. 
42 Ibid. 
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with objects into `a muscular memory of relationality'. 43 Muscle is a `tissue of 
quotations' formed from encounters with the external world. If Amery flinched at the first 
blow, this flinch as painful motion is not forgotten by the muscles that enabled it. 
Similarly the muscle that is part of a situation in which it should move but cannot, 
remembers that inaction. Muscle remembers when it was not, hence, as I will explain, 
when it was: 
You who are passing by 
Well dressed in all your muscles 
How can we forgive you 
That are all dead44 
This quotation forms part of Delbo's poem `Prayer to the Living to Forgive them for 
being Alive, ' the first two lines are repeated three times in the course of the poem. The 
speaker of the poem resents these bodies clothed in muscle precisely because these 
muscles are clothing. They are upon yet apart from those who pass by, not experienced as 
such and therefore extraneous if not non-existent. Usually muscle is the background to an 
everyday action - part of a process - such as carrying, kneeling, standing, sitting, walking 
or writing. It is familiar and therefore invisible; it is the `excess of life which keeps you 
from feeling'. 45 Muscle is a luxury that goes unnoticed. It is only in unusual exertion that 
muscle surfaces. It is when muscles fail that they become: 46 
She was clinging to the other side of the slope, her hands and feet grasping the 
snow-covered embankment. Her whole body was taut, her jaws tight, her neck 
with its dislocated cartilage straining, as were her muscles - what was left of 
them on her bones. 
Yet she strained in vain - the exertion of one pulling on an imaginary rope. 47 
This effort to climb a snow-covered bank whilst in an extremely weakened condition is 
an effort unknown and unknowable in the everyday. To watch people passing by without 
43 Ibid. p. 59. 
44 Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After, Trans. Rosette C. Lamont, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), p. 229. 
45 Ibid. 
46 This is an idea 1 develop further in my article `Towards a Radical Politics of Muscle, ' Limina, Vol. 10, 
2004, pp. 52-69. See particularly the section on Kathy Acker's essay `Against Ordinary Language: The 
Language of the Body, ' pp. 62-65. 
47 Ibid. p. 24. 
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effort - to watch effortless motion - after seeing this, is to be reminded of the 
impossibility of communicating life in a particular body to another body. The level of 
atrophy that Delbo describes was an end that befell many in the camps. The most extreme 
examples of this wasting away of the body were to be encountered in the figures of the 
Muselmanner, human beings `in the process of dissolution'. 8 `In a final stage of 
emaciation, their skeletons were enveloped by flaccid, parchment like sheaths of skin, 
edema had formed on their feet and thighs, their posterior muscles had collapsed. 
49 
They were in such a state of profound malnutrition, that `their limbs moved slowly, 
hesitantly, almost mechanically' . 
50 The prisoners were deliberately weakened through 
poor and inadequate rations; a state of asthenia was encouraged. The resultant wreck of a 
body, the Musebnann, acted as the polar opposite to the Nazi ideal, the muscle man. 
Fascism `places the body at the center of its ideological aesthetics, fusing athleticism, 
hypermasculinity, and politics to fashion its sense of a perfect body'. 51 The perfect body 
is solid, in shape. It has firm contours. It is a physique similar to the one that so excited 
Louis-Ferdinand Celine, the central difference being that in National Socialism it is 
primarily the male body which is to be celebrated as a source of strength. The 
psychological underpinning is the same however, a need for circumscription. The ideal 
body is a bounded body. It is a body with well-defined limits, one which keeps the 
outside out and the inside in. The Muselmann is a body turned inside out. It is the anti- 
body. The body against which a healthy body can define itself, the constitutive outside. In 
the camps the skin of the inmates - the contour of their bodies - was placed under 
sustained attack. 
52 The first break into the body was the tattoo. It became a permanent 
insult to bodily integrity. The body was then subjected to gradual degradation, grew 
scabrous, became marked by edemas, eruptions, effusions and lesions. As Filip Müller 
describes, in the case of the Muselmanner, often `their bones had rubbed through their 
ax Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, Trans. William Templer, (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 25. 
49 Ibid. p. 199. 
so Ibid. 
51 Alan M. Klein, Little Big Men: Bodybuilding Subculture and Gender Construction, (Albany: SUNY, 
1993), p. 255. 
52 `I idealize and maintain my ideology by attacking the surfaces of those who threaten its cohering content 
- in the case of the Third 
Reich, the Jew-Body'. James M. Glass, `Skin Ego and Purification Ritual: 
Psychodynamics behind the Nazi Final Solution, ' in Journal for the Ps choanalvsis of Culture and Society, 
2: 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 50-51. 
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thin parchment-like skin, resulting in inflamed and festering wounds' . 
53 This assault on 
the skin was certain to have effects on the psyche, `the psychotic fragmentation of the 
subject suggests a damaged skin as well as a mirror without silvering'. 54 The psychotic is 
one who has a holed skin or an imperfect identification with the image in the mirror. The 
skin was continuously pierced and punctured in the camps. Their skin was made abject. 
In Powers of Horror, Kristeva discusses the chapters in Leviticus which link skin and 
impurity. These chapters `locate impurity in leprosy: skin tumor, impairment of the cover 
that guarantees corporeal integrity, sore on the visible presentable surface'. 55 Leprosy 
`visibly affects the skin, the essential if not initial boundary of biological and psychic 
individuation'. 56 Kristeva concedes that legislating against leprosy through purity laws 
would also make sense because of the detrimental effects it can have on a community. 
This admission is, however, an unnecessary one. As mentioned in the opening chapter, as 
Hyam Maccoby explains in his significant assessment of the purity laws, Ritual and 
Morality, the Greek word lepra used in the Septuagint should not be translated as leprosy 
(which in Greek is elephas or elephantiasis). 57 Lepra refers to skin diseases of various 
kinds - such as eczema and psoriasis - which are not usually contagious or life 
threatening. Maccoby's insight emphasizes the symbolic function of these laws. Anything 
which threatens the integrity of the skin places the self in jeopardy. This is one of the 
reasons why the inmates endured a crisis of subjectivity. Their borders became unstable, 
their shape uncertain. The consequent loss of a sense of identity is encapsulated in the 
closing lines of Elie Wiesel's Night. Several weeks after his liberation from Buchenwald, 
time spent in hospital recovering, he is finally able to summon the strength to look at 
himself in the mirror: `From the depths of the mirror, a corpse gazed back at me. The 
look in his eyes, as they stared into mine, has never left me'. 58 In the camps, the inmate - 
even when not reduced to the physical and mental state of the Muselmann - crosses over 
to the side of death, the side before and after all identity. The corpse is `the most 
53 Filip Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers, Trans. Susanne Flatauer, 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), p. 45. 
54 Julia Kristeva, The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanahwis, Trans. 
Jeanine Herman, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 53. 
55 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 101. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity Svstem and its Place in Judaism, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. ] 18-119. 
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sickening of wastes... a border that has encroached upon everything'. 
59 The inmate who 
has become a corpse no longer has a border. Death is the end to all shape. Delbo writes 
back from this death. Her writing might be read as a reshaping. The Muselmanner do not 
feature by name in her work but from the account she gives, the woman who strains on 
the imaginary rope is one step away from their state of torpor. What distinguishes her 
from the Muselmann is that she has a sense of purpose. Delbo wants to communicate to 
bodies that are in shape what it is like to become misshapen. There is nothing in the 
everyday however which can act as an adequate point of comparison. 
Comparing Memories 
In Freud's earliest conception of it, memory itself operates through comparison. 
As part of the `Project for a Scientific Psychology' Freud advances a cellular explanation 
of mnemonics in which memory is a shuffling of cells. Nervous tissue changes with each 
contact it encounters. This is not memory in the sense we are used to. Memory is simply 
the enduring modification of tissue from one state to another. The tissue has `a capacity 
for being permanently altered by single occurrences - which offers such a striking 
contrast to the behaviour of a material that permits the passage of a wave-movement and 
thereafter returns to its former condition'. 
60 Once cells are agitated they change their 
alignment, this variation in what Freud calls the `impermeable neurones' becomes the 
registration of an event. 
61 For variation to take place there must, however, be a constant. 
Not all the neurones can alter; some must remain as they are to act as the gauge, the 
internal witness. Yet where does this measure of all memories come from? Is there an 
initial set up of tissue, an originary form awaiting disruption and the advent of memory? 
We become in excitation, arising out of a chaos of stimuli. There is no cellular structure 
that can be said to be from the beginning. There are, however, ever increasing 
representations of the passage of excitations, which persist and accumulate. Each 
representation is unique. Memory is, therefore, not composed from excitation but is the 
sR Wiesel, Night, p. 126. 
59 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3. 
'0 Sigmund Freud, `Project for a Scientific Psychology, ' in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume 1, Trans. James Strachey, (London: Vintage, 2001), p. 299. 
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figuration of its effects (effects which are the material for the figuration that represents 
them). What Freud has described here through the materiality of the body is memory as it 
operates in the mind in the everyday. It is memory as it exists within what Kristeva calls 
the symbolic. Memory in the symbolic disavows the excitations that are part of it. Freud 
is wrong in this early work to separate perception and memory entirely. Perception is 
sensation and memory (at least on one level) is figuration. Sensation lines all figuration. 
Sensation - as affect - is allied to the drives. 
62 It is part of the semiotic underside to 
language (and to memory as an aspect of that language) within the symbolic. Memory is 
therefore sinewous, connecting thought and sensation, symbolic and semiotic. Pinch me 
and do I not think pain as much as feel it. Memory is thought and touch preserved. 
Memory as thought - the first I remember - is an instance of cognition (the recognition of 
loss) that adopts the infant in the mother's absence. The memory stands in for the 
sensation, is a surrogate. The warmth of the mother is replaced by the warmth of words. 
Memory is also a form of sensation however, in a way that the word as replacement is 
not. Memory goes deeper than words. Memory is not a representation, there is no 
separation, there is no back to a before. It is like an echo, a sound that returns less distinct 
but which is the same sound only dulled by an impact. Memory is a downward curve, a 
decline. It is bottomless. The end of the decline is the end of memory. There is never an 
occurrence and then a memory of it. There can be no opening between occurrence and 
remembrance... there can be no gap. Memory is fastened to the sensation that occasioned 
it. It is that sensation. Memory is dwindling sensation. Amery's first blow still resonates 
within him. It is not remembered. It is not called to mind, but continually calls. The blow 
is sometimes in the background and sometimes in the foreground but it is never not 
present. Experience - as memory - has no past. It is now. We do not have a memory if 
memory is conceived as the remembrance of things past. The past is beyond memory; it 
61 Freud identifies two types of neurones, the permeable (which are associated with perception, and offer no 
resistance to excitation) and the impermeable (which form the stuff of memory, and resist excitation). In 
this schema memory and perception are distinct. Ibid. pp. 299-300. 
62 The drives express themselves as affect and idea. The idea is thought, a drive transformed into an image. 
The affect is a quota of excitation which can exist autonomously from the idea. Affect is drive manifesting 
itself as sensation rather than as representation. See Andre Green, The Fabric of Affect in Psvchoanahvtic 
Discourse, Trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 234-238. 
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is history. All experiences have no past. They are continuous, unbroken. 63 We are an 
increase of experiences. Some begin before others but none end, or if they do end they do 
so forever. What is forgotten can never be known. What is forgotten cannot trouble us, 
what troubles us is still present in some form. What we know we cannot call to mind is 
still in mind. 
Auschwitz et apres, the title of Delbo's famous trilogy, is translated as Auschwitz 
and after yet the words `et apres' also carry the connotation `what next', Auschwitz and 
what next? There is an after but there is no what next. What continues to happen is 
Auschwitz, although it does not happen all the time. The mind fences off the memory of 
Auschwitz. This is a process Delbo describes in La memoire et les jours: 
The skin enfolding the memory of Auschwitz is tough. Even so it gives ways at 
times, restoring all it contains. The will has no power over dreams. And in those 
dreams I see myself again, me, yes, me, as I know I was: hardly able to stand up, 
my throat harsh, my heart pounding my chest, frozen to the marrow, filthy, skin 
and bones; the suffering I feel is so unbearable, so identical to the pain endured 
there, that I physically feel it again, I feel it throughout my whole body which 
becomes a mass of suffering; and I feel death fasten on me, I feel myself dying. 
Luckily, in my agony I scream. My scream wakes me and I emerge from the 
nightmare, exhausted. It takes days for everything to get back to normal, for 
everything to be forced back into memory, and for the skin of memory to mend 
again. I become myself again, the person you are familiar with, who can talk to 
you about Auschwitz without exhibiting or registering any anxiety or emotion. 64 
For the survivor, Auschwitz is an ever-present background. Occasionally this present 
achieves full presence, becomes foreground. This is what occurs when the skin that 
surrounds memory is broken. It is the cut of remembrance. Auschwitz persists in the 
present as a semiotic excess. It as an excess that is continuously abjected by 
consciousness. The survivor does not voluntarily remember Auschwitz, the sensation that 
is Auschwitz in the now. This is because it constitutes a dangerous memory, a threat to 
63 The opening to each new episode of the popular police drama NYPD Blue recapitulates what has 
occurred in previous episodes (always beginning with the catch phrase 'Previously on NYPD Blue'). This 
provides a good illustration of the fact that the previous is present, hence strictly speaking the previous is 
not. What is `previous' (a criminal's history, for example, the search for `priors') comes before but travels 
with. `Presently on NYPD Blue' would make no sense without this previously. Memory is never simply 
what was, it is as much what is. The montage of shots from previous episodes - scenes seen, heard, felt by 
the characters - are part of the current episode, integral to its sense. 
137 
the self. It is a form of recollection which involves a death in life, a form in which the I is 
no longer. The I becomes Auschwitz. It is, therefore, not really remembrance, an activity 
which suggests an I casting a backward glance at past events. The memory of Auschwitz 
overwhelms the I. In this state it is no longer the I that expels, the 'I is expelled' . 
65The 
border that keeps the semiotic excess in check has been breached and the self is 
threatened with psychosis. This is why Delbo screams. The scream is a discharge of 
affect, a driving out of drive. It is the expulsion of the unthinkable from the thinking 
being, the action that enables a return to thought. It is the nothing necessary for 
something to be again. Michel Chion states that the scream is `to do with limitlessness'. 66 
This is indeed the case. The I that is in danger of disintegration, the I that is losing its 
shape, its borders, screams into the boundlessness that threatens to undo it. 
Abjection `is a composite of judgement and affect, of condemnation and yearning, 
of signs and drives'. 67 It is our edge. Auschwitz was a world without edges. In the 
everyday we abject `what disturbs identity, system, order'. 68 In the camps what disturbed 
identity became all pervasive. Shit and death were everywhere. The skin of the prisoner 
was covered in lesions, inside becoming outside: 
There's blood on my shirt, there's blood on my chest, which is red from scratched 
bites; scabs are starting to form, I pull them off, and they bleed. I can't stand it 
any longer; I'm going to scream. I'm nothing but shit. It's true: I'm just apiece of 
shit. 
69 
In this description of his experience at Gandersheim, Robert Antelme describes himself 
as shit. The I is not like shit, but is shit. In this state the `defilement, sewage and muck'7° 
that the I should find repugnant have actually become that I. The mechanisms of retching 
and revulsion that would normally protect the self from filth have ceased to function. In 
fact `prisoners were systematically subjected to filth', such that defilement turned into `a 
64 (Translation emended). In particular I have chosen to translate `cri' as `scream' rather than retaining 
Lamont's choice of `cry'. Given that Delbo describes herself to be in agony, screaming seems a more 
suitable alternative. Delbo, Days and Memory, p. 3. 
65 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
66 Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 79. 
67 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 10. 
68 Ibid. p. 4. 
69 Robert Antelme, The Human Race, Trans. Jeffrey Haight & Annie Mahler, (Marlboro: The Marlboro 
Press, 1992), p. 114. 
70 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2. 
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condition of life from day to day'. 7' In his book The Survivor, Terrence Des Pres reports 
on the response of men who were forced to lower their heads into bowls of their own 
excreta. This `defilement caused a desperation bordering on madness'. 72 The men's 
`demented screams issued from the rending of subliminal structures, in response to 
violation of those "cleanliness habits" which are "enforced by any culture at an early 
stage of training,,. 73 In this abject world the inmates lived on the border of psychosis. 
During Man's Search for Meaning, which includes an account of his time as a prisoner in 
Auschwitz, Viktor Frankl explains how `disgust, horror and pity' were emotions that he 
`could not really feel anymore' in the camp. 74 At Auschwitz and elsewhere, horror was 
not a threatening outside to the self. Horror became mundane. It stopped having power 
over the self because the self became a part of it in order to survive. The self became an 
aspect of horror, a piece of shit, a suppurating skin, a marasmic body, a death-in-life, a 
self unravelling. The symbolic - the realm of thought - which is usually ascendant, was 
no longer dominant in the camps. L 'univers concentrationnaire was a semiotic universe. 
It was drive-orientated, a universe of sensation not cognition, a universe of pain, a pain 
not known but become. 
Shrunken Prose 
The drives could be said to be the musculature of language. In this sense Delbo's 
prose is scraggy, deliberately so. Its leanness forms part of its sophistication. It is thin, 
emaciated, minimal writing. It is not orchidaceous, instead it is deceptively simple. It is 
repetitive. Mary Jacobus describes Delbo's words as having `become colourless and 
wooden, leached of pleasure and affect'. 
75 The writing is not calculated to excite the 
senses. This is because Delbo wants the least possible semiotic interference in her prose. 
She is seeking to mend a break in the symbolic function. She writes back from semiotic 
excess, not into it. Celine wrote towards the semiotic, Celan sought to make his way 
within it, Delbo seeks to return from it. This modest writing - writing that endeavours to 
71 Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), p. 57. 
72 Ibid. p. 67. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapv, (New York: Touchstone, 
1984) p. 34. 
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be as unwriterly as possible - whilst guiding Delbo back from the camps also carries the 
reader into them. The reduced vocabulary and the frequent use of repetition reflect the 
shrunken world of Auschwitz. The camps were characterized by compression. On one 
level this constriction was caused by the sheer number of inmates in the camps. 
Wolfgang Sofsky explains the effects of this forced reduction of space: 
Crowding... shifts the sensual foundations of social contact. The senses of eye and 
ear, those main organs of social interaction, forfeit significance to the more 
proximal senses of touch, heat and smell. One prisoner pushed aside the next, 
shoved and jostled; he pressed his sharp knees into his bedmate's body when 
sleeping, and irritated him with foul odors and excretions. The territories of the 
self - even the exterior wrappings of clothing and skin, which otherwise serve to 
protect the body - were constantly under threat. There were constant 
infringements, intrusions, and encroachments, not only because of noise, 
obtrusiveness, or theft, but as a result of the sheer shortage of space. 
76 
In the crowd, hearing and seeing assumed less importance than the intimate sensations of 
touch and smell (the latter senses take on great importance in early infancy but are 
gradually superseded). The inmates found themselves assailed by the stink of others, 
jostled by the bodies of others. The other was incessantly disturbing the contours of the 
self. Such a suffocating proximity also occurred within the confines of the self. The world 
became as basic as possible. It was not thought but sensed, something I will return to 
later. Actions lessened in intensity - `we were taking shrunken steps' - as exhaustion 
overtook the body. " Movement was reduced to a minimum. Motion is life, from the 
faintest breath to the most furious exertion. Celan's breath-turn is a death-in-life, a 
moment between movements. Auschwitz was designed to curtail movement. To 
encourage the pseudo-death of stasis. Delbo's prose does not move. It repeats as if it is a 
record that has become stuck beneath the stylus: 
Sentries begin to pace around the squares. We become conscious of ourselves, we 
are still breathing. We are breathing in the cold. Beyond us lies the plain. 
The snow sparkles in refracted light. There are no beams, only light, hard and 
glacial, where everything is etched in sharp outline. The sky is blue, hard and 
glacial. One thinks of plants caught in ice. It must happen in the Arctic region, 
when the ice freezes even underwater vegetation. We are frozen in a block of 
75 Mary Jacobus, `Jane Austen in the Ghetto, ' in Women: a cultural review, 14: 1 (2003), p. 77. 
76 Sofsky, The Order of Terror, pp. 70-71. 
77 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 35. 
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hard, cutting ice, transparent like a block of pure crystal. And this crystal is 
pierced by light, as if this light were frozen within the ice, as though ice were 
light. It takes a long time to realize that we are able to move within this block of 
ice which encloses us. We wiggle our toes within our shoes, stamp our feet. 
Fifteen thousand women stamp their feet yet no noise is heard. The silence is 
solidified into cold. We are in a place where time is abolished. We do not know 
whether we exist, only ice, light, dazzling snow, and us, in this ice, this light, this 
silence. 78 
In this account of a roll call, the description is disrupted by the repetitive use of particular 
words, most noticeably `light' and `ice'. The prose moves forward and stays still. The 
repetition returns us to a constant, there is no development, the words open the reader to a 
plain of sameness. The prose is frozen in time. It is communication through non- 
communication. For Kristeva all literary texts comprise of a phenotext and a genotext. 
The two can `be separated only for the purposes of exposition'. 79 The phenotext is allied 
to the symbolic and is on the side of communication. The genotext is associated with the 
semiotic and manifests itself as rhythm. Here despite my contention that Delbo is a writer 
who privileges the symbolic (e. g. the phenotext), the constant repetition of words gives 
the writing a rhythm that sometimes brings the genotext to the fore. 8° It is the repetition, 
the rhythm, which communicates something about l 'univers concentrationnaire, 
something about the `temporal law of terror, ' its combining of `cyclical recurrence with 
endless duration and suddenness or abruptness'. 8' Delbo provides us here with a cyclical 
prose, words that return, that go nowhere, sentences that are continuous yet without 
continuation. The prose says nothing because there is nothing to say. Time is sensed 
rather than said. This is prose that means without meaning. Meaning was a luxury at 
Auschwitz. 
There are similarities here with Celan's poetry. The writing is sparing. There is a 
synaesthesic quality to the description. The lack of sound is felt rather than heard. The 
78 Ibid. p. 32. 
79 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1992), p. 114. 
"0 The genotext consists of the drive elements in a text and can display itself through repetition. 
`Designating the genotext in a text requires pointing out the transfers of drive energy that can be detected 
in phonematic devices (such as the accumulation and repetition of phonemes or rhyme) and melodic 
devices (such as intonation or rhythm), in the way semantic and categorial fields are set out in . syntactic 
and logical features, or in the economy of mimesis (fantasy, the deferment of denotation, narrative, etc. )'. 
Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 86. 
SI Sofsky, The Order of Terror, p. 74. 
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writing is not elliptical but the use of repetition causes Delbo's words to move towards 
unmeaning. The repetition detaches the words from sense and opens them to sensation 
instead. It is necessary to catch something of the semiotic as part of the return to the 
symbolic. 82 This is where the writing differs from Celan's, Delbo is trying to 
reappropriate the symbolic. She writes a reconciliation between the semiotic and the 
symbolic. The consequent return of the symbolic permits the experience of Auschwitz to 
be spoken in the Symbolic. 83 Auschwitz was an ordered chaos. The inmates were 
subjected to practices designed to terrorize them, to horrify them. They were forced to 
live inside horror, at the edge of the Symbolic. It was a life of sensation. Thinking was an 
extravagance. Thinking is on the side of the symbolic, a part of the world of `meaning 
and signification'. 
84 Auschwitz did not signify to the prisoner, it showed itself. 
Signification is a kind of interpretation. An encounter with an object is translated into 
meaning. That which shows itself does not mean, but is. Kristeva writes in Powers of 
Horror: 
The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a 
cropper, is cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who 
confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance. A wound with blood and pus, or the 
sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not sign i death. In the presence of 
signified death -af at encephalograph, for instance -I would understandd, react, 
or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses 
show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. 85 
Interpretation is a form of understanding. Auschwitz was beyond understanding. Events 
were not known or knowable, they were instead shown to the inmate. They had an 
immediacy that is absent in the everyday. The experience of thirst provides a good 
82 Those moments when the drives are most in evidence (those passages with include an extensive use of 
repetition, for example) in Delbo's writing might be understood as a kind of linguistic muscularity designed 
to compensate for a disturbance in the skin-function. It is an aggressive prose forming 'a muscular tti pe of 
self-containment - "second skin " in place of a proper skin container'. See Esther Bick, 'The Experience of 
the Skin in Early Object-Relations, ' in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis 49 (1968), p. 485. 
Writing can give the writer a contour. Delbo stitches the semiotic into the skin of language as part of a 
reappropriation of the symbolic. She reshapes herself through her prose. 
83 The semiotic and the symbolic co-exist as signification within the Symbolic Order. For a brief outline of 
the distinction between the symbolic and the Symbolic, see Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the 
Double-bind, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 9-10. 
94 Julia Kristeva, `From One Identity to Another, ' in Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic 
Approach to Literature and Art, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 136. 
i5 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3. 
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example of this kind of unmediated encounter. In the everyday we drink before we know 
what thirst is, drinking is therefore evacuated of urgency. It takes the form of a social 
event, it is an irritation between activities, it is everything but the necessity that it is. It is 
taste and delectation. You never really drink until drinking becomes you, until there is 
nothing else but swilling and gulping, water, lips, tongue, throat, stomach. This is 
drinking. This was drinking at Auschwitz. Not the words, but the acts. The feel of the 
liquid. Thirst is the dream of this feeling. Thirst is nothing but the want of water. It is all. 
`They... thought I had gone blind. It took me a long time later on to explain that, without 
being blind, I saw nothing. All my senses had been abolished by thirst'. 86 The only sense 
that still remains is that of thirst. After her fellow prisoners have arranged (not without 
some risk) for her to be able to have a drink she is asked if the water tasted good. She 
does not respond. `I hadn't felt the water's taste. I drank, that's all. '87 Taste is a kind of 
interpretation. It is a value judgement. It is on the side of the symbolic. 
Thirst is a need. 88 It is first and foremost somatic. Thirst dries the tongue. It 
prevents speech, reduces the capacity for communication. After feeling thirst saying `I 
am thirsty' no longer means thirst. Thirst has no meaning. It is felt, felt not at a distance 
(I feel thirst) but intimately (I thirst). For the one who has thirsted, the word `thirst' has 
itself become parched, lacking. The survivor of Auschwitz sees through words, 
recognises their `banality, conventionality, emptiness'. 89 Meaning is skin-deep. A 
language that privileges the symbolic is superficial. It simply scrapes the surface of an 
experience. Auschwitz can only be reached unknowingly - it is beyond meaning - in the 
flesh of language. Flesh alone though is too much, too violent, unreasonable and 
unreadable. Delbo writes a cut, an incision. The symbolic is ascendant, it shores against 
the violence of the semiotic. Delbo's reader will not fall into Auschwitz but does not rest 
easy above it. 
Words are empty because they are too familiar. `There are people who say, "I'm 
thirsty. " They step into a cafe and order a beer'. 90 For Delbo, after Auschwitz the word 
86 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 142. 
87 Ibid. p. 145. 
8' A need differs from a desire in that a need can be sated. 
" Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 239. 
90 Ibid. p. 145. 
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`thirst' has been `split in two' 91 There is an Auschwitz `thirst' and an ordinary `thirst'. 
After Auschwitz, `thirst has turned back into a word for commonplace use'. 92 Delbo 
wants to retrieve the sensations that were attached to words at Auschwitz. She uses 
repetition as a way of making words strange to themselves. Through the iteration of 
particular words, she bodies these words. There is a compulsion not to repeat in writing. 
A belief that using the same words again and again and again displays a lack of linguistic 
ingenuity. In certain circumstances this may be true, in Delbo's writing though, the 
ingenuity is in the repetition. The reoccurrence of particular words is an integral part of 
what she is trying to accomplish. Words return over and over in order to return to 
themselves, in order to matter: 
The whistle blows in the camp, a voice shouts: "Zell Appell " and we hear, "It's 
the roll call, " and another, "Aufstehen, " but it is not the end of the night. 
it is not the end of the night for those who are delirious in the charnel house 
it is not the end of the night for the rats feeding on still living lips 
it is not the end of the night for the stars frozen in a frozen sky 
it is not the end of the night 
it is the hour when some shadows slip back into the walls, when other shadows go 
out into the night 
it is not the end of the night 
93 it is the end of a thousand nights and a thousand nightmares. 
The repetition of `it is not the end of the night' graphically reinforces the night without 
end, this prose refuses progress. It also focuses the reader's attention on the `not, ' the 
`end, ' and the `night'. The `repetition of words and word parts' calls attention `to the 
absurd and unmotivated echoes among them at the level of syllable and letter'. 
94 In his 
essay `Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant, ' Paul de Man writes that in the works of 
that philosopher `the play of the letter and of the syllable, the way of saying (Art des 
Sagen) as opposed to what is being said (das Gesagte), 'is what is of decisive 
importance. 95 In a sense this is also true of Delbo's prose. De Man is writing of the 
91 Delbo, Days and Memory, p. 4. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 57. (translation emended). 
94 J. Hillis-Miller, `Paul de Man as Allergen, ' in Eds. Tom Cohen, Barbara Cohen, J. Hillis-Miller & 
Andrzej Warminski, Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theon', (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 194. 
95 Paul de Man, `Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant, ' in Paul dc Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 89. 
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materiality of the letter, something which emerges in similarities of sound, in alliteration, 
assonance, shared sibilance, in puns and rhymes. In these instances it is not the meaning 
of the word which is of importance but its form, its shape, its sound. In these instances it 
is the matter of language that matters, not the meaning. Language is made to remember 
the stuff it is made of. 96 The word is before it means. Auschwitz is before meaning. 
Delbo knows the mockery of language, words misshape things. She also knows that 
beneath their meaning, words are in themselves things. It is the thingness within words 
which she brings out through her use of repetition. The flesh of language which lies 
beneath the skin of meaning. The word is a name for a thing. Friedrich Nietzsche saw the 
name to be a skin: `I have unlearned with you beliefs in words and values and great 
names. When the Devil casts his skin does his name not also fall away? For that too is a 
skin. The Devil himself is perhaps -a skin'. 
97 Delbo wants to slough off the name so the 
word can show itself. She wants to reveal the word as thing, to find the colour of the word 
again. `Words lost their color long ago'. 98 
Outside Narration 
The emergence of any meaning has required a sacrifice, an arrested potential, the 
death of what might have been for what is. When I feel, I feel a facet of what was felt. In 
his essay `The Autonomy of Affect, ' Brian Massumi describes how research has 
suggested that `sensation is organized recursively before being linearized, before it is 
redirected outwardly to take its part in a conscious chain of actions and reactions. i99 We 
always think in retrospect when we are incited. The brief time that elapses between the 
application of stimulation and its registration - the `I feel that' - is not an empty moment 
but an overfull one. Meaning - here meaning the ascription of sense to a sensation, or 
96 Lea Fridman Hamaoui, in one of the most thoughtful readings of Delbo's work that I have encountered, 
cites a specific instance where she feels repetition is used to matter that which is being described. Hamaoui 
focuses on a passage which repeatedly uses the word `brick'. `The word is repeated again and again as 
though its repetition would aid us in grasping the brick in the ultimacv of its realized and materialized 
form'. Hamaoui, 'Art and Testimony: The Representation of Historical Horror in Literary Works by Piotr 
Rawicz and Charlotte Delbo, ' in Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, 3: 2 (1991), p. 250. 
97 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), 
285. 
" Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 112. 
99 Brian Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect, ' in The Deleuze Reader, Ed. Paul Patton, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), p. 222. 
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perhaps more properly the creation of that sensation - is reductive. Massumi proposes the 
time before thought as recognition, to be a time of bodily thinking. Here sensation is not 
experienced because it is not known (in this context knowledge should be understood as 
the actualization of sensation). The moment between stimulation and mentation, the 
moment `which happens too quickly to have happened actually, is virtual. 
"00 This 
domain of the virtual that cannot be is `a realm of potential. "°' From this mess of 
possibilities `an individual action or expression will emerge and be registered 
consciously'. 102 The expression is willed into becoming. The will bequeaths a sign. 
Without the signing will, sensation would remains virtual. Auschwitz exists as bodily 
thought for Delbo. It is an intensity that underlies her. `Intensity is qualifiable as an 
emotional state, and that state is static - temporal and narrative noise'. 
103 This intensity 
that exceeds narration; that is not on the side of communication, is drive energy. 
The drives, arranged as they are by the various constraints imposed on the body, 
articulate what Kristeva calls the `chora'. It is `an essentially mobile and extremely 
provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases'. 
104 The 
chora can be posited in language, shaped by words -I write of it here - but it will never 
fit in these words, it is uncertain. The chora is out of time and space, out of narrative, 
unlike. It is noise becoming sound, it is already differentiation, it has cadence. The chora 
is analogous to vocal or kinetic rhythm. Resonance, vibrations, reverberations... the chora 
shudders.. . judders.. . oscillates... 
demonstrates an ordered disorder.. .a driving 
force ... a 
motivation. The subject ferments in the semiotic chora, agitated then arrested, `generated 
and negated'. 
105 The semiotic continuum aligns the fragmented body of the infant, 
articulating `the connections between the (glottal and anal) sphincters in (rhythmic and 
intonational) vocal modulations, or those between the sphincters and family 
protagonists'. 
106 It is a positioning prior to positions, a preparation. There are spacings 
(modulations) but there is no space. Space needs an exterior, a substance to give it form. 
Think of a table, there is space on it, above it, below it, but there is no space within it. 
100 Ibid. p. 224. 
10' Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. p. 220. 
104 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 25. 
'05 Ibid. p. 28. 
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The chora is within no space. There is no severance yet, no subject and object. There is 
no attribution of alterity to self the child, to assign it. The semiotic precedes the thetic 
phase. It is during this phase that identity or difference are asserted through the child's 
gestures or mouthing. The child proposes something... points at, talks to or about 
something... and gives to that thing a fragment of the semiotic which becomes a signifier. 
Kristeva locates the thetic phase of the signifying process at two points in the 
development of the subject, `the mirror phase and the "discovery" of castration'. 107 The 
moment the child invests in the mirror-image it shapes itself and the mirror-image, the 
two are cut out of the continuous. The discovery of castration - the perception of lack - 
makes the phallic function the `symbolic function'. `This is a decisive moment fraught 
with consequences: the subject, finding his identity in the symbolic, "separates "from his 
fusion with the mother, "confines " his jouissance to the genital, and transfers semiotic 
motility onto the symbolic order'. 
108 The gap is now in mind, signif ier and signified have 
become. The symbolic including fragments of the semiotic. The entry into the symbolic 
is an act of distancing, the mother is placed at a remove, replaced, but this distance 
requires the original proximity to be. The trace of the mother - the semiotic - persists in 
the symbolic but as its underside. In the camps however this separation collapses. Delbo 
describes the inmates as existing in a state of `delirium'. The separation that is required in 
order to witness is always retrospective. The inmate is not in the camp, the inmate is the 
camp. The camp shrinks around those imprisoned within it until no distance exists 
between the two. The inmate is not a person who experiences events, but is the events. In 
her article `Charlotte Delbo's Auschwitz et Apres: The Struggle for Signification, ' Renee 
A. Kingcaid draws attention to the self-reflexive nature of Delbo's prose. Delbo considers 
where what she writes has come from. This would seem self-evident, the experiences she 
relates originate in the camps. It is not so simple. For Kingcaid the prose Delbo uses in 
the section of Auschwitz et Apres titled `Le Ruisseau, ' `points out its own embellishments 
the better to represent, paradoxically the absolute inability to represent that defined the 
106 Ibid. pp. 28-29. 
107 Ibid. p. 46. 
10' Ibid. p. 47. 
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camps'. ' 09 Delbo's prose foregrounds its failure. In her description of washing herself for 
the first time since the shower she had on arrival two months previously, Delbo writes: 
So on that day, at the stream, I must have thought of the last shower, and also of 
the pleasure of immersing one's body in gentle, warm water. Or perhaps I 
thought of all the ones who had died since our arrival without having been able to 
splash some water on their faces. All of this is but reported remembrances. 
Actually, I thought of nothing except the stream, and all my thoughts were focused 
on what I had to do to wash myself, to remove dirt as fast and thoroughly as 
possible. I was rubbing myself quickly and strongly, fortunately unable to check 
on the results. It would have discouraged me. ' 10 
Her thought is reduced to a minimum. She thinks of `nothing except the stream' and how 
to `remove the dirt as fast and thoroughly as possible'. This limited think still appears 
complex; it requires a process of calculation. Delbo needs to choose the quickest and 
most efficient gestures as she washes. She then goes on to describe these gestures, 
washing her pubic hair and the skin of her thighs, one of her knees. Before she can start 
on her other knee the whistle blows to signal the end of the break, she gets dressed and 
rejoins the other inmates. However then she adds: `It must have happened like this, but I 
have no memory of it. I only recall the stream'. ' 11 The entire description of her washing is 
a deduction, it is an addition. The only certainty is the stream. In one sense this mirrors 
all history in that it requires the use of inferences. As Hayden White explains, `the 
historian must "interpret" his materials by filling in the gaps in his information on 
inferential or speculative grounds'. ' 12 Delbo knows that she was at a stream, the rest of 
the narrative has been deduced from that fact. I was at a stream, I must have washed. 
Inference fills archival gaps in the mind and the museum. Delbo's account of the stream 
is an example of surface memory, a willing of sensation into sense. Surface memory is 
meta-memory. 1' An after-effect of memory. Meta-memory is narrated memory. Memory 
taking the form of a particular narrative selected from amongst a number of possibilities. 
109 Renee A. Kincaid, `Charlotte Delbo's Auschwitz et Apres: The Struggle for Signification, ' French 
Forum, 9: 1,1984, p. 105. 
110 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p. 152. 
"' Ibid. p. 153. 
112 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), p. 51. 
13 I first advance the idea of meta-memory in my chapter `Testimony' in The Years Work in Critical and 
Cultural Theory, Ed. Martin McQuillan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), In press. 
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Deep memory is the stream not as it is worded, not as it is willed into words, but as it was 
sensed. `Deep memory preserves sensations, physical imprints'. 11 4 This is the stream 
Delbo remembers. Washing - the action of cleaning oneself - is narration. Calculation is 
narration. The camp was beyond narrative. Narrative is belated. The stream happened 
then, the story of the stream came much later. The sensation of the stream is unwilled, 
unshaped. 
For the survivor Auschwitz exists as a constant hum beneath the sound of the 
everyday. It is isolated from the present by the muffle that is the skin of memory, `an 
impermeable skin that isolates it from my present self. 115 This skin sometimes thins. 
Everyday language is also a skin. A symbolic skin above a semiotic flesh. Jennifer L. 
Geddes has written that Jean Amery and Delbo `experienced in their bodies the results of 
the decisions people such as Eichmann made'. ' 16 The tattoo is one instance of the 
bodying of a bureaucratic process, of a calculated hatred. Delbo wants to lift what is 
beneath the skin above it. She wants to bring deep memory to the surface, to bring the 
body into language. To do this she scars the symbolic. Earlier I wrote that Delbo writes a 
cut. The cut is repetition. It is an invitation through rhythm, an opening of the prose to the 
force of the semiotic. White has written of Holocaust testimony as `confirmed as an index 
of the events about which it speaks' in the same way as `a scar or a bruise' index an 
event. 117 Here sensation scars the skin of language. The tattoo - the deep memory 
beneath the skin - becomes a scar on the surface of language. Delbo's words are 
cicatrices pushed up from the inside of the body into her writing. To read this scarring is 
to try to share the wound. 
29236 
Delbo's prose, whilst using plain language, involves rhythms and repetitions that 
lend her writing a poetic aspect. Her writing is knowingly simple; complexly 
114 Delbo, Days and Memory, p. 3. 
115 Ibid. p. 2. 
116 Jennifer L. Geddes, `Banal Evil and Useless Knowledge: Hannah Arendt and Charlotte Delbo on Evil 
after the Holocaust, ' in Hipatia 18: 1 (Winter 2003), p. 110. 
"' Hayden White, `Figural Realism in Witness Literature, ' in parallax 30,10: 1, (January - March 2004), 
p. 114. 
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uncomplicated. ' 18 I would therefore like to contrast it very briefly with the testimony of 
Filip Müller, which by contrast, would seem to be devoid of literary pretensions. ' 19 It is a 
writing without style. The prose just describes. Müller was one of the few members of 
the Sonderkommando to survive Auschwitz. 120 He recounts the horrors he has seen in a 
language which is devoid of ornamentation. The deep memory - the sensation - does not 
appear to break through. Müller description of a gassing is terrible in its effectiveness 
because there is no recourse to images of hell, there is no fragmentation of language; 
there is only what happened: 
Finally there were about 600 desperate people crammed into the crematorium. A 
few SS men were leaving the building and the last one locked the entrance door 
from the outside. Before long the increasing sound of coughing, screaming and 
shouting for help could be heard from behind the door. I was unable to make out 
individual words, for the shouts were drowned by the knocking and banging 
against the door, intermingled with sobbing and crying. After some time the noise 
grew weaker, the screams stopped. Only now and then there was a moan, a rattle, 
a sound of muffled knocking against the door. But soon even that ceased and in 
the sudden silence each one of us felt the horror of this terrible mass death. '2' 
Müller's testimony is without noise. It is the absence of affect in the writing, the absence 
of horror, which paradoxically conveys the horror. This writing does it best to shut out 
the semiotic. It is dead language, these are lifeless words. Although Müller's writing 
seems far removed from Celan's elusive verses there is a common element to both their 
works. Celan empties his poetry of meaning and Müller empties his prose of feeling. 
There two writers commune in this emptiness. They write next to nothing. 
"" Nicole Thatcher discusses Delbo's literary technique at length (including her various stylistic 
innovations) in her book A Literary Analysis of Charlotte Delbo's Concentration Camp Re-Presentation, 
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). 
19 I am unable to read Müller's testimony in the original Czech. The book was actually also first published 
as a German translation. 
120 I will discuss the Sonderkommando or `Special Squad' in more detail in my next chapter. 
121 Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz, pp. 33-34. 
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Conclusion 
The Remains of a Day 
To have "really seen with his own eyes "a gas chamber would be the condition 
which gives one the authority to say that it exists and to persuade the unbeliever. 
Yet it is still necessary to prove that the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it 
was seen. The only acceptable proof that it was used to kill is that one died from 
it. But if one is dead, one cannot testy that it is on account of the gas chamber. ' 
If the survivor bears witness not to the gas chambers or to Auschwitz but to the 
Muselmann, if he speaks only on the basis of the impossibility of speaking, then 
his testimony cannot be denied. Auschwitz - that to which it is not possible to bear 
witness - is absolutely and irrefutably proven. 
2 
Bare Life 
Giorgio Agamben's Remnants of Auschwitz provides perhaps the most important 
philosophical reflection on testimony to be published in recent years. In his book, the 
Muselmänner become the locus for a sustained meditation on ethics and witnessing. 
Although the arguments put forward in Remnants of Auschwitz are now familiar to many, 
I want to briefly situate them in relation to ideas that Agamben advances in the earlier 
work Homo Sacer and also in the later work Le temps qui reste. In Homo Sacer Agamben 
analyses the relationship that has come to exist in modernity between zoe (bare, simple, 
natural life) and bios (the May of life of an individual or group). 3 Agamben tracks the 
developing relation between bare life and styled life or political life through to the 
emergence of National Socialism. In Ancient Greece the introduction of political society 
prompted the disappearance of simple, animal living. Bare life was removed from sight, 
relegated to the domestic, but still sited within the polis. That which is excluded (Zoe) is 
therefore also included, it is an inclusive exclusion. Agamben finds a link in Aristotle's 
Politics between this situation and that of the acquisition of logos by the subject, an 
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The D fierend: Phrases in Dispute, Trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 3. 
2 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999), p. 164. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 1. 
4 Ibid. p. 7. 
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acquisition in which phone (the voice) disappears yet is also preserved. 
5 Language 
permits judgement and as such separates man from animal, bios from zoe. The animal 
feels but does not judge. 6 This description of the entry into language is echoed in 
Remnants of Auschwitz where Agamben describes how `the living individual 
appropriates language in a full expropriation alone, becoming a speaking being only on 
condition of falling into silence'. 
7 He adds that `there is no moment in which language is 
inscribed in the living voice, no place in which the living being is able to render itself 
linguistic, transforming itself into speech'. S The voice is an inclusive exclusion in speech. 
It falls silent for speech to become. Homo Sacer focuses on the inclusive exclusion of 
bare life as a condition and identifies it as essential to sovereign power. 9 In the 
concluding part of the book Agamben seeks to build upon Foucault's conception of 
biopolitics by relating it to National Socialism. Biopolitics is politics concerned with 
man's everyday natural life, with issues such as health, leisure, and working practices. 
Agamben is interested in biopolitics because its emergence causes the sovereign 
imperative `to make die and let live' (asserting the right to kill) to be replaced by the 
aspiration `to make live and to let die' (privileging the care of life). 
10 As Foucault had 
explained, `the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully 
supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life'. 
" This 
administration of bodies marks the incorporation of zoe into the political. Bare life is now 
the stuff of politics. Agamben suspects that `the exemplary place of modern biopolitics' is 
`the politics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century, ' a politics which he 
believes Foucault did not consider. 12 In the final chapter of Homo Sacer he analyses the 
5 Ibid. p. 8. 
6 Ibid. pp. 7-8. 
Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 129. 
K Ibid. Agamben lists two exceptions to this formulation: in the realm of theology and in the incarnation of 
the verb. 
9 Agamben develops this argument in Homo Sacer within the section of that name, pp. 71-115. 
10 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 155. 
" Michel Foucault, The History ofSexualiry 1: The Will to Knowledge, Trans. Robert Hurley, (London: 
Penguin, 1990), pp. 139-140. 
12 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 119. Agamben does Foucault a disservice here as the outlines of such a 
consideration do exist in his unpublished works, particularly the lecture notes for the 1975-76 course 'II 
faut defendre la societe'. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg draw upon this material for their own 
Foucauldian re-thinking of the Holocaust, an essay the published of which was almost contemporaneous 
with that of the Italian edition of Remnants ofAuschwitz. See Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, 'Michel 
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role of the concentration camp within the politics of National Socialism. The camps 
function as a state of exception. 13 As Agamben explains, the state of exception `allows 
for the foundation and definition of the normal legal order'. 14 The essence of the camp 
`consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the subsequent creation of 
a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction'. 15 
The state of exception becomes the norm. In this space the Muselmann - the unthinking 
and automatic body, an abject lesson in bare life - becomes `the final biopolitical 
substance to be isolated in the biological continuum, ' after which there is only the 
beyond of politics, death. 16 The Muselmann is `the absolutely unwitnessable, invisible ark 
of bio power'. " It does not speak or think. 18 It is no longer human, yet it is not outside 
the human. It is the inhuman within the human. 
The inhuman is the inclusive exclusion that constitutes our humanity. It is a part 
of us yet apart from us. Here in the Muselmann the inhuman has replaced the human 
come close to conjoining. The Muselmann is `the threshold between the human and the 
inhuman'. 19 Whilst the human is still present, the inhuman is not; or to put it another way, 
the human is, so long as we can say, `This is the inhuman'. If we recognise that which we 
call inhuman then we must recognise a part of ourselves in that inhumanity. We are not 
truly seeing that inhuman part of us which allows us to be, the inhuman that grounds our 
humanity, the impossible that makes us possible. The Muselmann is in some senses 
unknowable but crucially not in terms of recognition, it is not unrecognisable. That we 
recognise the Muselmann as something that used to be someone means that the someone 
that once was still is. This was a man, rather than this was... Agamben describes the 
Foucault, Auschwitz, and the Destruction of the Body, ' in Postmodernism and the Holocaust, Eds. 
Milchman and Rosenberg, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 205-237. 
13 The epistemological paradigm for the state of exception originates in the political writings of Carl 
Schmitt. There is insufficient space here to consider the ethical questions posed by Agamben's engagement 
with Schmitt's thinking. 
14 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 48. 
15 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 174. 
16 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 85. 
" Ibid. p. 156. 
18 In Remnants ofAuschwitz the Muselmanner are gendered as masculine and the testimonies that conclude 
the book are all from men. It is certain that many women also reached this state of attenuation. I have here 
chosen the designation `it' for the Muselmann not because of its lack of gender specificity (although the 
Muselmann might be said to be beyond the performance of gender) though, but rather because of its lack of 
familiarity. `He' or `she' seem too ordinary. The term is used advisedly however as 'it' is usually used to 
describe the non-human. 
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Muselmann, as the `non-human who obstinately appears as human' and `the human that 
cannot be told apart from the inhuman'. 
20 The ethics he advances is one founded on the 
principal of recognition. To truly become inhuman (hence not inhuman but perhaps non- 
human) would -be to become unrecognisable. The earth that Gitta Sereny describes 
walking upon at Sobibor approaches this beyond of the human. 21 Only gradually is it 
recognised as ash. Ash is perhaps the remnant that Agamben should confront - should 
attest to - but he cannot. 
22 
Agamben warns us that to deny the humanity of the Muselmänner `would be to 
accept the verdict of the SS and to repeat their gesture'. 
23 For Agamben the Muselmann 
is beyond the reach of ethology in its current form. He believes that an ethics which 
formulates the human in terms of an obligatory communication or in terms of dignity is 
an ethics that is unable to recognise and account for the Muselmann. Agamben's call for a 
means of accountability equal to the task of attesting to the Muselmann here resonates 
strongly with Judith Butler's recent work on ethics. In Giving an Account of Oneself, 
Butler writes that `when we come up against the limits of any epistemological horizon, 
and realize that the question is not simply whether I can or will know you, but whether 
"you" qualms within the scheme of the human within which I operate' then ethics 
requires that `we risk ourselves precisely there, at the moments of our unknowingness, 
when what conditions us and what lies before us diverge from one another, when our 
willingness to become undone constitutes our chance of becoming human, a becoming 
whose necessity knows no end'. 
24 What Butler seems to be suggesting here is that at times 
it is ethically necessary to embrace the inhuman, a sentiment which resonates with 
Agamben's own thinking: to bear witness to the Muselmann, to break with the violence 
of ethical silence, requires that the inhuman in the human be spoken. Testimony 
19 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 55. 
20 Ibid. pp. 81-82. 
21 Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder, (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 116. 
22 If, as Agamben contends, `biopower's supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body, the absolute 
separation of the living being and the speaking being, zoe and bios, human and inhuman - survival, ' 
(Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 156. ) then his witnessing has to be situated in a concentration camp. 
There is no place in his arguments about biopower for those camps like Sobibor which operated only as 
extermination camps and where one was usually dead within a few hours of arriving. This is a point I will 
return to later. 
23 Ibid. p. 63. 
24 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself Against Ethical Violence, (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 
2003), p. 80. 
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necessitates an impossible convergence, such that `the subject of testimony is the one who 
25 bears witness to a desubject fication'. This means that there is no subject of testimony, 
rather `every testimony is a field of forces incessantly traversed by currents of 
subjectification and desubjectification'. 26 Witnessing is here perhaps what John Paul 
Ricco describes as a becoming that is unbecoming, one which does not produce `a 
reduction or a suicidal renunciation of self, but rather an intense desubjectiflcation' "27 
This desubjectification is a loss of language within language, a speaking of the 
unspoken; a recognition of the inhuman in the human. I would agree with Jay Bernstein 
that for Agamben the inhuman should be thought of as having `something like the role of 
differance in Derrida: a necessary condition for the possibility of meaning that is equally 
its impossibility'. 28 The human can never be fully present to its self, self-presence or self- 
sameness is an illusion. When I say I am in this I, I can never mean what I say. 
Testimony thus becomes a bearing witness to the `impossibility of conjoining the living 
being and language, phone and logos, the inhuman and the human, ' to the impossibility 
that makes any and all testimony possible. 29 The gap - the space that produces a relation 
between, albeit in the form of a non-relation - is where testimony takes place. This gap - 
the impossible conjunction, the disjunction - is bodied by the Muselmann, a figure 
manifesting both the inhuman capacity to survive the human and the human capacity to 
survive the inhuman. The Muselmann is seemingly the impossible made possible, the 
complete witness. For Agamben the `paradox here is that if the only one bearing witness 
to the human is the one whose humanity has been wholly destroyed, this means that the 
identity between human and inhuman is never perfect and that it is not truly possible to 
destroy the human, that something always remains'. 30 The notion of the remnant requires 
a particular conception of the inhuman in order to function; one which a principle of 
humanity based on recognition might significantly trouble. 
25 Agamben, Remnants ofAu. schwitz, pp. 120-121. 
26 Ibid. p. 12I . 27 John Paul Ricco, The Logic of the Lure, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 21. 
28 J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
p388 (n15). 
Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 130 
30 Ibid. pp. 133-134. 
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The Remnant I 
To move beyond the category of relation - to abandon our abandonment to the 
law, to sovereignty - requires `nothing less than an attempt to think the political-social 
factum no longer in the form of a relation'. 31 The path to the relationless (the unrelated is, 
of course, relational in its very unrelatedness to the relation) lies in the remnant. The 
remnant is relational, in the Muselmann the human continues to relate to the inhuman as 
a part of a figure that has ceased to be human whilst not having become inhuman. The 
Muselmann does not relate to something (e. g. human to inhuman) but is that very relation 
(the `to' between the human and the inhuman). As Düttmann explains, `in order not to 
relate, and to break with the "logic of sovereignty " as well as with the bad infinity of 
iterability, of a perpetual, always renewed and always frustrated relating, one must 
retain oneself in the relating of the relation'. 
32 Agamben echoes this in Remnants of 
Auschwitz when he writes firstly of the remnant of Israel as `neither the whole people nor 
a part of the people but, rather the non-coincidence of the whole and the part, ' and then 
of the remnants of Auschwitz as `neither the dead nor the survivors, neither the drowned 
nor the saved' but `what remains between them'. 
33 The ethical subject is therefore a 
witness who relates to this relation. Such a witness resists the efforts of bio-power to 
separate the human and the inhuman, their witnessing does not relate to either of those 
terms but rather to the very fact that they are in relation. Ethics in Remnants of Auschwitz 
centres upon testifying to this connection, the production of such a testimony ensures the 
preservation of this relation. In Trauma and the Memory of Politics, Jenny Edkins 
emphasises that the ultimate aim of biopower is to sever all connection between the 
human and the inhuman. The Muselmänner would be proof of the successful 
accomplishment of this aim if they survived intestable. Testimony however demonstrates 
the failure of this endeavour to divide, hence `in its very form, testimony contests 
sovereign power'. 34 For Agamben the ultimate achievement of National Socialism would 
be the (of necessity violent) separation of the human and the inhuman, however the 
31 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 60. 
32 Mittmann, `Never Before, Always Already, ' p. 5. 
33 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, pp. ] 63-164. 
34 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2003), 
p. 189. 
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witness who acknowledges the Muselmann refuses such a separation by attesting to a 
persisting relation. The only true separation is the destruction of any sense of relation; it 
would mean the Muselmann becoming a non-human, neither inhuman nor human. The 
relation is of course, in a sense, just this. 
It could be argued that by privileging the relation Agamben enacts the very 
violence he seeks to prevent. The relation is, after all, not to be confused with an 
undecidable, it is not an aporia. The neither/nor of the undecidable in deconstruction is 
relational but it is not the relation. The relation cannot be equated with the undecidable 
but rather exists within it. The zone of indistinction that Agamben is proposing - the 
remnant - separates from separation by becoming that separation. 
35 Agamben is 
proposing a witness who testifies to the relating that enables a situation of neither/norism 
to arise. In the undecidable neither relates to nor, neither/nor relates to either/or, the 
undecidable is decisively multiple (prior to the decision which causes it to obsolesce) 
whereas the relation is what it is, it is its that-it-relatedness and nothing more. It is 
singular. The idea of a relating to relation - of the importance of the idea of the remnant - 
is developed in far greater depth in Agamben's remarkable book Le temps qui reste 
which was published subsequent to Remnants of Auschwitz. The two books are deeply 
imbricated. Le temps qui reste is an extended exegesis of the first line of Paul's Epistle to 
the Romans. A quotation from Romans (coupled with one from Isaiah) opens Remnants 
of Auschwitz. In Le temps qui reste, Agamben explores the idea of messianic temporality 
as it is articulated in Romans, messianic time is radically contracted time, it is time as 
remnant. The remnant is the time that remains between time and its end. It is a time 
between times. 36 Agamben describes it briefly in Remnants of Auschwitz as `neither 
historical time nor eternity but, rather, the disjunction that divides them'. 3' Eternity is 
time's end. 
In the between times that is messianic time the quality of becoming what remains 
is one that is shared by the newly emergent messianic law. Paul notes that biblical law 
acts primarily through the institution of division, the creation of separation, `i/ semble 
35 Agamben explicitly equates the idea of the remnant with the zone of indistinction in Le temps qui reste 
(Agamben 2000,123-124). 
36 Giorgio Agamben, Le temps qui reste, Trans. Judith Revel, (Paris: Rivages, 2000), p. 105. 
37 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 164. 
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donc prendre au serieux le sens etymologique du mot grec `nomos '- don 't il se serf pour 
designer non seulement la Torah mais la loi en general -, qui derive du verbe 'nemein', 
diviser, attribuer des parties'. 38 The fundamental separation of Jewish law is that 
between the Gentile and the Jew, the Jew's circumcision marks this division. Paul 
overcomes this pivotal division through instituting another division, that between flesh 
and spirit. He separates separation: `For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither 
is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: / But he is a Jew, which is one 
inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose 
praise is not of men, but of God' (Romans 2: 28-29). The introduction of this new 
division within the divided causes the separation of the faithful founded in the flesh to 
become uncertain. The circumcised may not be Jews. The uncircumcised may not be not- 
Jews. The body is not the guarantor of faith, the spirit is. 39 For Agamben this gesture 
represents the creation of a remnant, the Jews and the non-Jews do not include everyone, 
people remain outside of either category. This remnant - the not not-Jew - falls under 
messianic law. This is not a universal category, the not not-Jew does not encompass all 
the Jews nor all the Gentiles. Nor does the not-not Jew identify a particular part of the 
Jews or Gentiles; rather it describes the impossibility of self-coincidence for either 
identity: `... cela ne signifie pas que les non non-Juifs soient seulement une partie des 
Juifs ou des non-Juifs. Its representent plutöt 1'impossibilite pour les Juifs et les goyims 
de coIncider avec eux-memes, ils soot comme une Sorte de reste entre chaque peuple et 
lui-meme, ou entre chaque identite et elle-meme'. 40 Pauline thought is not concerned with 
identifying an underlying unity between divided peoples but rather with dividing division 
itself and thereby rendering the original division inoperative. The remnant is the result of 
this dividing division. In its prevention of coincidence the remnant appears similar to 
Derrida's concept of the trace, that which names the impossibility of the sign achieving 
total presence and presentness. The separating of separations is a form of preparation for 
38 `He seems to take the etymological sense of the Greek word nomos seriously - he uses it not just to 
signify the Torah but law in general - which derives from the word nemein, divide, apportion'. Agamben, 
Le temps qui reste, p. 79. 
39 For a useful discussion of the Pauline notion of circumcision see James Shapiro, Shakespeare and the 
Jews, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 117-121. 
40 'This does not mean that the not not-Jews only form a part of the Jews or the not-Jews. They represent 
rather the impossibility of the Jews and the Gentiles to coincide with themselves, they are like a kind of 
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the telos that is the end of time. The aim of dividing division is to open the way to an 
eventual fulfillment of the messianic promise. The time will arrive at which time ends. 
The Pornography of Horror 
What should now be becoming apparent is that Remnants of Auschwitz says very 
little about Auschwitz. Auschwitz provides the backdrop for the elaboration of a 
philosophical argument, an argument centring upon the remnant. This argument does not 
require Auschwitz, in fact ultimately it might said to be indifferent to it. 41 Jay Bernstein is 
therefore fully justified in decrying the losses necessary for Agamben's argument to be 
made, the frames of reference that disappear through this almost exclusive focus on the 
Muselmann, and the inhuman. Bernstein writes of his repugnance and revulsion at 
Agamben's inability to `veer off from the space of impossible sight to the wider terrain: 
from the victims to the executioners, to the nature of the camps, to the ethical dispositions 
of those set upon reducing the human to the inhuman'. 2 He goes on to equate Agamben's 
philosophic practice with photography in that it removes from consideration one by one 
`the historical, the political and above all the moral frames through reference to which 
some understanding of the meaning of the Muselmann might be achieved'. 43 For 
Bernstein photography is oriented towards `abstraction, isolation and de- 
contextualization' 44 This is precisely what he believes Agamben does to the figure of the 
Muselmann. 
Bernstein also suggests that Agamben introduces an element of pornography into 
his account of the Muselmann because bearing witness to this near death-in-life requires 
bearing witness to an ignoble body, `what is looked upon is a body without dignity ' as 
Agamben's portrayal of the Muselmann is pornographic because `pornography contains 
remnant between each people and themselves, or between each identity and itself'. Agamben, Le temps qui 
reste, p. 87. 
41 See Düttmann's comments in this regard in `Never Before, Always Already, ' p. 5. 
42 J. M. Bernstein, `Bare Life, Bearing Witness: Auschwitz and the Pornography of Horror, ' in parallax 30 
10: 1 (January-March 2004), p. 7. 
43 Ibid. p. 12. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. p. 8. I am less convinced than Bernstein that a body without dignity is necessarily always a 
pornographic body. I am also uncertain whether all bodies that appear within pornography are de facto 
undignified, although the majority may well be unfitting. 
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within itself both ethical blindness and ethical insight'. 46 The Muselmann shares this 
quality of ethical ambiguity. The pornography of sex involves `the objectification and 
degradation of women' and the `aestheticisation of the sexual in which reverberates, 
through that very aestheticisation, the claim of the sweetness of life which is but the 
reverse side of suffering and the fragmented body'. 47 The sexual act (in its doing and 
depiction) is the means through which human beings have `experienced nature as 
condition and limit, as animating and violating, ' and in that doubleness as a `condition 
for culture in general'. 48 Sex fucks with bios. Making love (which unlike Bernstein, I 
believe to be an almost entirely cultural affair) occasionally shifts into what I have chosen 
here to call fucking. 49 The fuck is the moment when decorum (which does play a part in 
sex) gives way to dismemberment. The whole body (the illusion of completeness that is 
the cultural physique) breaks into pleasurable parts. The fuck is the moment when our 
`animal bodies... routinely receive an emphatic moment of independence from cultural 
norms'. 50 It is only through this escape from our acculturation - through a kind of 
disembodiment - that we enter a position from which we are able to understand our own 
embodiment. The body we live with only becomes known to us through the little death 
that is the orgasm. Sex undoes culture; it brings us to the brink of bare life from which we 
then come back to culture again. The fuck allows us to touch the outside that grounds 
culture, the nothing. Nathalie Gassel writes of `le rien qui se passe dans le sexe. 
L'excitation que le plus souvent nous evitons mais qui resurgit toujours. Ce rien est une 
preoccupation constante. Il reprend place des qu'on ne le pourchasse plus, des les 
premiers relächements'. 
51 This nothing that occurs during the fuck (the fuck to nothing, 
or nothing-fuck) opens us to the sweetness of life, whilst also reminding of our vital 
bodies, the flesh that suffers to let us live. Fucking involves pleasure and pain. 
°6 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. p. 10. 
48 Ibid. p. 11. 
49 Terms like `having sex' and `making love' seem too much on the side of culture to catch the 
transgressive dimension of the sexual encounter that Bernstein is trying to describe here, it could indeed be 
said that the prose he uses is far too 'dignified'. Fucking - because of its impropriety - seems a more 
appropriate description. 
56 Bernstein, `Bare Life, Bearing Witness, ' p. 9. 
51 `The nothing that happens in sex. The excitement that we usually try to avoid but that always reappears. 
This nothing is a continual preoccupation. It takes it place again the moment we cease to pursue it, the 
moment we begin to let ourselves go'. Nathalie Gassel, 
Eros androgyne, (Paris: L'Acanthe, 2000), p. 70. 
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Pornography contains the trace of the fuck. Bernstein believes that the Muselmann forms 
part of a pornography of horror to which atrocity photographs also belong. 52 The 
negatively pornographic quality of some atrocity photographs `involves the framing of 
devastation for the sake of the moral satisfaction of the liberal gaze'. 53 As pornography is 
the aestheticization of sex so atrocity photography is the aestheticization of horror. For 
Bernstein the violent immediacy of the atrocity photograph `constitutes the 
aestheticization of representation that is the fulfillment of witnessing'. 54 He believes that 
the Muselmann in Remnants of Auschwitz is comparable to the photograph in that it is 
similarly shorn of context. What Agamben craves is an `absoluteness of witnessing, ' an 
absolute untroubled by the impurity of any context. 55 
Men Without Context 
Bernstein's contention that the absence of context in Agamben's figuring of the 
Muselmänner makes them equatable with atrocity photographs is not without its 
problems. Are atrocity photographs truly as abstract as Bernstein appears to believe, even 
in the absence of any textual accompaniment? That the photograph cannot coincide with 
the photographed - even photographing a photograph institutes a gap between original 
and copy - is not in doubt. The photograph however is its own reality, and as such (as 
John Tagg explains) `a material product of a material apparatus set to work in specific 
contexts, by specific forces, for more or less defined purposes'. 56 The context does not 
admittedly inhere within the photograph, rather the photograph is gifted a context. In 
writing of photographs as oriented towards `de-contextualization' however, what 
Bernstein does not ask is in what context `context' emerges. Context is not inherent in 
anything. In this sense all the world's a photograph, or rather all the world's a negative 
52 Whilst Bernstein's arguments are persuasive here, I find his choice of the term 'pornography' difficult to 
reconcile with the subject matter. The word pornography was originally used to describe writings about the 
activities of prostitutes. I do not feel it can successfully be separated from those origins in sex. It is quite 
clear however that what Bernstein labels the `pornography of horror' is to be understood as a source of 
moral and not sexual titillation. 
53 Bernstein, `Bare Life, Bearing Witness, ' p. 11. 
54 Ibid. p. 12. 
ss Ibid. p. 14. 
56 John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 3. 
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awaiting its contextual exposure. Our every encounter with the world is with what is 
initially, necessarily an abstract world. We are therefore in constant danger of falling into 
a form of narcissism (although what form this narcissism might take depends upon the 
context), a point I will develop later. Context is the after-effect of all encounters. The 
abstraction that Bernstein and others discover in particular photographs is belated. It is 
itself a context. Context is the meaning we carry to the world (and which carries us 
within it). Nothing is without context. 57 No man is without context. And in this sense 
context is frustrating. Context gets in the way; it obstructs our efforts to touch anything, 
although at the same time it facilitates any and all touching. If the Muselmann were truly 
abstract (hence not abstract at all, as abstraction is itself a form of context) and de- 
contextualised, it would be unrecognizable to us. If Agamben could place the Muselmann 
on the outside of context it might in fact be the ethical thing to do. The Muselmann would 
be immediate. But this ethics located in the outside of context would be an impossible 
ethics. Ethics are in context. It would also make nonsense of Agamben's desire to ground 
ethics in witnessing. Witnessing is usually understood to operate within contexts of 
recognition. 58 If the Muselmann were rendered unrecognizable it would also be made 
invisible, it could not be attested to. It would be outside the relational. All contexts relate; 
this is what allows us to move in and out of them. Agamben, for whom the witness is of 
paramount importance, does not therefore seem to be interested in this kind of 
(impossible) ethics. The remnant requires terms of relation within which to reside, these 
provide its context. 
Whilst Bernstein is not suggesting that a photograph can have no context, he feels 
it can be oriented towards such an absence. It is difficult however to talk of degrees of 
context. A photograph looked at face down might be said to have less context than one 
face up. This would however be a senseless statement because nothing `has' context in 
the sense of possessing and inhering that having `has'. It would also not make sense 
57 There is no context of contexts, a context which could be found that would be sufficient to Auschwitz. 
This is not to say that Auschwitz should not be placed in context, it always already is. Some contexts 
should be favoured over others but judgements upon a given context must be made in the knowledge that 
they are never made out of context. 
58 For an example of an attempt to think witnessing outside of recognition see Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: 
Beyond Recognition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). Oliver gives a succinct 
summation of her key arguments in Witnessing in the essay `Witnessing and Testimony, ' in parallax 30 
10: 1 (January-March 2004), pp. 78-87. 
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because the contexts we carry (and that carry us) are individual to us. A photograph face 
down for example - revealing the photographic paper in its almost whiteness, perhaps 
imprinted with the name of the paper manufacturer, possibly marked with the history of 
those who have handled it and the surfaces it has rested upon - might have more context 
carried to it by an admirer of abstract art than its figured front. That said, our individual 
contexts usually overlap, we have shared carryings. There are also good and bad contexts 
which can, at least in part, be gauged against those carryings. 59 This is why I feel 
Bernstein's point about the loss of context in Agamben's figure of the Muselmann is still 
a highly important one. It is certainly true that when the subject is greeted with an image 
of suffering without any encouragement to context that a pity approaching abstraction is 
generated. We see suffering only in the context of its haecceity, it is a now without 
history. Because this suffering is encountered with little to facilitate context, it comes to 
feed only `our moral sensibility, our sentimental attachment to our own moral 
sensitivity'. 60 The loss of context encourages a moral narcissism in the viewer. Moral 
narcissism, as Judith Butler has explained, is a form of ethical violence. It institutes a 
citadel self, one that refuses to relate to the other. 61 If this non-relating were ever total, 
the self would become inhuman. 62 The self would cease to be. By paring context as he 
does, Agamben may make possible the very outcome that he seeks to prevent. He risks 
severing the relation between the human and the inhuman. The remnant - that which is 
supposed to testify to the enduring relation - becomes instead a caesura, a gap that 
separates the human and the inhuman. 
Geoffrey Hartman shares Bernstein's concerns about context. He is similarly 
disconcerted by Agamben's privileging of the Muselmänner, especially at the expense of 
the `thousands of survivor testimonies that actually exist'. 63 Hartman, despite his avowed 
59 For a discussion of the varying contexts which have been bought to photographs of the Holocaust, see 
Barbie Zelizer's Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera's Eye, (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1998). 
60 Bernstein, `Bare Life, Bearing Witness, ' p. 12. 
61 What I am calling the citadel self here should be understood as the microcosm to the macrocosm of O. K. 
Werckmeister's citadel society, which he gives an account of in the much neglected Citadel Culture 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 5-9. The citadel society should therefore be understood as 
a society founded on ethical violence. It is a form of society that cannot look beyond itself. 
62 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, p. 60. 
" Geoffrey Hartman, Scars of the Spirit: The Struggle Against lnauthenticity, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 
p. 90. 
163 
misgivings, is, however, somewhat reassured by Agamben's decision to include 
testimony from the Muselmänner at the end of Remnants of Auschwitz. M It is true that the 
book does conclude with testimonial excerpts from survivors who felt they had been 
Muselmänner, but Agamben's professed desire to let them have the last word is 
paradoxical. These testimonies are retrospective, they are not from the death-in-life but 
from lives rescued from that living-death. The excerpts act to reinforce Agamben's claim 
that the Muselmann cannot be attested to in ordinary speech. These testimonies exist in 
the realm of the relation of a survivor to what has been survived, the voices are distinct. 
The coda testifies to the Muselmann but these survivors do not speak as the Muselmann, 
they speak of the relation rather than from the relation. For Agamben resistance resides in 
relating to the relation. The relation is attested to but never testifies. In Remnants of 
Auschwitz, even the Muselmänner, the bodies that are made to matter, remain strangely 
absent. 
The Remnant II 
The remnant - as it is figured by Agamben in the context(s) of Auschwitz - 
prompts further questions. As the relation between bios and zoe, between political life 
and bare life (which is almost equatable with the relation between life and death), the 
remnant, whilst outside the structure of sovereignty cannot be said to be beyond the 
machinations of power. In fact the remnant as relation might be said to be the very locus 
of power. In the everyday we are always, in a sense, outside power. We occupy the end- 
points of the relations that constitute power. We experience its effects. The Muselmann 
when described as a remnant, as what remains between the human and the inhuman, 
becomes a figure in power. The death-in-life becomes a hypostatization of power as the 
relational. Perhaps the only way to be outside power is to be within it, nonetheless to read 
the Muselmann as a figure of resistance seems misplaced. Resistance occurs in response 
to the effects of power. Surviving in the camps is resistance. If we read the Muselmann in 
terms of Foucault's conception of power then we might contend that the production of 
this life-in-death (the remnant) is the crowning achievement of National Socialism. 
64 Ibid. p. 245 (n 20). 
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Power usually traverses the body; the docile body that Foucault describes in Discipline 
and Punish is `manipulated by authority'. b5 Here the body is no longer in power, it is 
power. The Muselmann as it is described by Agamben (the relation that remains between 
the human and the inhuman, the remnant that is this emaciated body) is nothing but the 
relation that is power. Power is not something that can usually be given form - power is 
not possessed by the leader of a country, or the high-court judge, or the camp guard. To 
see power in these people is not to see clearly. Power is insubstantial and invisible. We 
only register its effects. Relations are ethereal. In the Muselmann the relation is made 
palpable. To bear witness to this relation is therefore to attest to an abominable 
manifestation of power. The Muselmann does need to be attested to but not within the 
context of resistance. Resistance requires the preservation of the relational. It could even 
take the form of the preservation of this relation. It is not however to be found in 
becoming the relation. The remnant appears a useful concept but elaborated in this 
context it becomes deeply troubling. How is relating to the relation as a strategy of 
resistance against the structure of sovereignty to be differentiated from relating to the 
relation as a bodying of power? Can an ethics be situated in such an ambiguous 
witnessing? For what is it that we actually witness in the Muselmann as remnant? 
Perhaps we replicate the gesture of the SS if we do privilege the remnant, if we 
accept Agamben's belief that that relating to relation is as close as words can get to the 
bodies that matter. For Agamben language is an out of body experience. A gap prevents 
the matter that is (not) me from speaking. I cannot coincide with the I that I say or write. I 
am apart. The definition of testimony that Agamben elaborates in Remnants of Auschwitz 
originates in this cleft between speech and soma. The living being (the breathing, feeling, 
pulsing being of the body) and the subject (the speaking, thinking, writing being) never 
coincide. The living being and the subject share an intimate distance, a proximate gap. 66 
In the moment I begins to speak a split between the living being and the speaking being 
occurs. It cannot be undone. I lose me to be me. I as body am always behind speaking, 
behind writing. `I' appears on the page as a tangible, touchable character, yet this column 
of ink that is I supports nothing other than itself. I am not in I. You are not in You. The 
65 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: 
Penguin, 1977), p. 155. 
66 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwitz, p. 125. 
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materiality of the letters that make up you and I do not coincide with the matter that at 
this moment is following them across the page.. . the matter of the reader. 
The eyes that 
scan these words are not yours, you never occupy them. You are disembodied, 
immaterial. "'I" is neither a notion nor a substance, and enunciation concerns not what 
is said in discourse but the pure fact that it is said, the event of language as such, which 
is by definition ephemeral'. 67 Ephemeral event of your reading these lines. Signs without 
substance, these substitutions are the stuff that lives are made on. I live as and in 
language, a space outside of the not-me that is my matter. Writing demonstrates this gap. 
As I write my hand rests upon the page not within it, the ink flows from a pen not from 
my fingers. Were I instead to scratch these words that I write now into the page, I would 
still not be within the scratches. There is always mediation, the nib that gets in the way of 
my body and my language, my `mys'. I relate to me through this nib. I want to argue here 
where `I' am not that in Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben's conception of language is 
wanting. I want to break the nib, blend the blood and the ink, blink and find my I's 
together. If I were to write `I' in my blood would I be in this bloody `I'? No, I would not. 
Agamben's conception of language does however limit the ink. Looking back at Delbo's 
writing (a writing which forms part of the context Agamben sacrifices in his almost 
exclusive on the trope of the Muselmann68) with its semiotic intensity; it seems possible 
to read her work as pushing the subject back from the body, back towards the symbolic. 
For Agamben, desubjectification is a state in which the human being ceases to have 
language. If we construe language differently though - working with a Kristevan 
understanding of signification instead - then desubjectification is not a not-having 
language but a having language in which the symbolic aspect has been made almost 
inoperative. Desubjectification is another way of describing the subject's descent into 
psychosis. The Muselmann is in an equivalent state to the psychotic, close to a return to 
the night out of which the subject became. The Muselmann is the `person who is about to 
67 Ibid. p. 138. 
6" Delbo also does not mention the Muselmänner by name, and writes of many aspects of camp life. This 
makes her testimony deniable in Agamben's terms. As I will discuss later, for Agamben it is only when 
`the survivor bears witness not to the gas chambers or to Auschwitz but to the Mucelmann, ' when `he 
speaks only on the basis of an impossibility of speaking, ' that 'his testimony cannot be denied (Ibid. 
p. 164). Delbo's testimony is therefore questionable. 
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die and is alone, ' a physical manifestation of Celan's `dark and truncated language'. 69 
Both Delbo's prose and Celan's poetry speak from where - in Agamben's conception of 
language - speech is impossible. 
Their writings contain elements of both bios and zoe. The semiotic is the bare life of 
signification. It is the remnant of the noise that continues to reverberate within the sound 
of sense that is the symbolic. In times of crisis the noise resurges and threatens to engulf 
all sounds. The Muselmänner were becoming noise, the testimonies at the end of 
Remnants of Auschwitz mark a return to sound. The survivor writes back to sound (to be 
and to be heard). The Muselmanner are a unique category of inmates within the camps, 
but the danger of falling out of shape, of succumbing to the horror, was one shared by 
many others. To focus on the Muselman at the expense of all others seems a violent act of 
censorship and as a strategy to refute Holocaust denial it is also fraught with danger. 
Denying the Denier 
For Agamben it is only the survivor who bears witness to the Muselmann - who 
speaks `only on the basis of the impossibility of speaking 70 - who gives undeniable 
testimony. This undeniable testimony constitutes the coda which concludes the book. The 
Holocaust deniers of this world (as opposed to those that exist solely in the world of 
thought) are unlikely to be troubled in their opinions by these six pages of testimony, 
testimony that `absolutely and irrrefutably' proves Auschwitz. 71 Denial is anyway a kind 
of acceptance. If the testimonies of writers such as Jean Amery, Tadeusz Borowski, Paul 
Celan, Charlotte Delbo and Elie Wiesel are deniable then this as much affirms the value 
of their work as it repudiates it. 
72 The refusal to acknowledge testimony requires an 
acknowledgement of its existence prior to the act of refusal. The testimony is there to be 
denied. The denier must disavow the troubling matter that is the testimony upon which 
the action of denial is founded. Denial requires something to deny. In a sense the 
69 Primo Levi, `On Obscure Writing, ' in Other People's Trades, Trans. Raymond Rosenthal, (London: 
Abacus, 1991), p. 161. 
70 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 164. 
71 Ibid. 
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Holocaust denier relies upon the Holocaust more than any other person, if there was no 
Holocaust then the denier would and could not be. I am certain that this argument has 
been made many times before but it needs reiterating. Agamben's thinking is dangerous 
here. By removing Auschwitz and the gas-chambers he is removing the deniable. This 
may indeed cause the end of denial but at what expense. The figure of the Muselmann 
(the trope that is Agamben's argument) may be undeniable, but perhaps this is because it 
is not anything. It is not testimony; it is nothing but an exercise in thought. It does not try 
to bear witness to the matter of Auschwitz but rather to the limits of a particular way of 
thinking. That way of thinking may have contributed to the production of Auschwitz but 
cannot be equated with it. To privilege the Muselmann - construed as the remnant - as 
the proof of Auschwitz might end denial but could also cause that which is denied to be 
understood as irrelevant. My concern is that the Muselmann as it is conceived by 
Agamben - as the figure of which the attestation is ultimate and irrefutable - actually 
relies upon the Holocaust denier. In a gesture designed to deny denial Agamben actually 
inadvertently reaffirms it. Auschwitz would not need to be `absolutely and irrefutably 
proven' without the presence of the denier. Therefore the Holocaust denier is integral to 
Agamben's argument. The Holocaust denier is not however integral to the memory of the 
Holocaust, only the witness is. The Holocaust denier is admittedly a form of witness, but 
certainly not the only form and obviously the least desirable and the most loathsome. The 
film-maker, the historian, the philosopher, the survivor, all are forms of witness who 
ensure the memory of the Holocaust. These forms however are not central to Agamben's 
argument, only the denier is. Agamben's position is one which presupposes and therefore 
perpetuates Holocaust denial, despite an obviously deep desire to refute it. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben quotes from the beginning of Jean-Francois 
Lyotard's The Differend. Part of the passage that he cites is quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter. Agamben, however, in his emphasis on `the impossibility of speaking' as the 
sole basis for an adequate (undeniable) testimony, shifts the focus of witnessing away 
from the gas chambers, away from what might be called `the impossibility of their 
seeing'. He briefly mentions the Sonderkommando (Special Squad) in his preface and in 
72 Works by all these writers (with the exception of Tadeusz Borowski) are cited elsewhere in this thesis. 
For a translation of many of Borowski's stories from his time in Auschwitz see This Wavfor the Gas, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, (London: Penguin, 1976). 
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the opening chapter. 73 The special squads worked in the gas chambers on an almost daily 
basis, at times. It is during his discussion about the insufficiency of all ethical categories 
that possess a juridical origin, that Agamben mentions Levi's `grey zone', `where the 
oppressed becomes oppressor and the executioner in turn appears as victim'. 74 He quotes 
from Levi's remarks about Miklos Nyiszli's account of a football match that took place 
between the SS and the Sonderkommando, before stating that `this moment of normalcy' 
is `the true horror of the camp'. 75 Agamben, however, then fails to respond to Levi's 
injunction not to `close one's mind' to thinking about the special squads. 76 The special 
squads are not easily transformed into a remnant and cannot be integrated into the 
specific argument Agamben wants to make about biopolitics. They are therefore 
extraneous to Remnants of Auschwitz. I would like to consider what is lost by `closing 
one's mind' to these particular inmates. Obviously I am not seeking to privilege the 
testimony of the Sonderkommando over those accounts that attest to the Muselmann. I do 
however want to offer an alternative to a testimony based on the `impossibility of 
speaking'. 
The Writings in the Earth 
The Sonderkommando were `entrusted with the running of the crematoria'. 77 As 
Levi explains, their task was `to maintain order among the new arrivals (often completely 
unaware of the destiny awaiting them) who must be sent into the gas chambers; to extract 
the corpses from the chambers, pull gold teeth from jaws, cut the women's hair, sort and 
classify clothes, shoes, and the contents of luggage; transport the bodies to the 
crematoria and oversee the operation of the ovens; extract and eliminate the ashes'. 78 At 
Auschwitz, the members of the Sonderkommando were mainly charged with emptying 
the gas chambers and operating the ovens, they transported and burned bodies. Wolfgang 
73 For a discussion of Agamben's rather loose use of the testimony of Zelman Lewental (a member of the 
Sonderkommando) in his Preface see Philippe Mesnard & Claudine Kahan, Giorgio Agamben: A 
L'Epreuve d'Auschwitz, (Paris: Editions Kime, 2001), pp. 23-27. 
74 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 21. 
's Ibid. p. 26. 
76 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (London: Abacus, 1989), p. 37. 
" Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, p. 34. 
79 Ibid. 
169 
Sofsky writes that the behaviour of the Sonderkommando `cannot be judged by the 
conventional moral conceptions of civil society'. 79 The members of the Special Squads 
form part of the ethical grey zone that Levi writes about, a zone `with ill-defined outlines 
which both separate and join the two camps of masters and servants' . 
80 Levi urges the 
reader to bear witness to these men, to resist the temptation to label them abject and 
unthinkable. 
In the previous chapter I briefly discussed the testimony of the Sonderkommando 
member Filip Müller in relation to the works of Celan and Delbo. Müller wrote his 
account after the liberation of Auschwitz. He survived. There are however other accounts 
from others who died in the camp. Several members of the special squads buried 
manuscripts in the vicinity of the crematoria which gave an account of their experiences 
or expressed their belief that it was impossible to so do. In 1945 writings by Haim 
Herman, Lejb Langfus and two by Zalmen Gradowski were found. In 1952 another text 
attributed to Langfus was located. The first manuscript by Zalmen Lewental was found in 
1961 and a second was recovered a year later. Finally, in 1980 a text by Marcel Nadsari 
was unearthed. 8' Agamben cites the testimony of Lewental in his preface. He does not 
consider the matter of this piece of writing though. A piece of writing that lay beneath the 
ground for over fifteen years, until it was finally discovered on the 28`h July 1961. 
Agamben does not describe the condition of the manuscript, the effects of its time below 
ground in the damp and darkness. He does not date it. He also does not mention the other 
writings I have detailed which survived, such as the second much longer piece by 
Lewental, a piece which consisted of eighty eight fragments that had to be painstakingly 
put back together by Ber Mark. 82 He does not discuss the physical condition of the 
writings, especially those found later, `ronge par l 'humidite et donc partie/lenient 
illisibles'. 83 This corpus of testimony is decayed. Parts of the writing have become 
unwritten. I wrote in my first chapter about the problem of reinvigoration inherent in any 
engagement with the pamphlets of Louis-Ferdinand Celine. The quotation from one of 
79 Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, Trans. William Templer, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 267. 
80 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, p. 27. 
R' The discovery of these manuscripts is discussed in Mesnard & Kahan, Giorgio Agamben, pp. 19-20. 
82 Ibid. p. 23. 
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the pamphlets cannot carry with it the context of the page upon which it was originally 
printed. A similar problem exists with these scrolls rescued from the earth. To quote a 
part of one of these pieces of writing necessarily entails a parting from the writing itself. 
It requires the loss of the visible effects of the scroll's burial beneath ground, the loss of 
the evidence of this burial. The traces of the concealment of these manuscripts - the 
discolouration, the fading, the remaining indications of words that were once but are no 
longer - are as important as the accounts themselves. The condition of the writing is 
another form of giving an account. It is a kind of witnessing. And these are handwritten 
records. The hands that penned these words and then buried them were the same hands 
that carried the dead into the ovens. These were written by the hands of men who went 
into the gas chambers to retrieve the dead. They are in the hand of men who were then 
themselves killed. The curls, lines and pressures which form these writings - the marks of 
the individual behind the ink - are lost in the transcription into print. 
84 It is also important 
to mention that Lewental, for example, wrote in Yiddish (something Agamben 
acknowledges) and that these characters, that constitute his scription -a scription which 
carries an account of the horror from out of someone working in the crematoria into the 
present - is written in a language that was then commonplace. Lewental was probably 
taught how to shape these letters as a child, taught to write in Yiddish. The printed words 
(in translation or not) against the pristine white of the page, the re-citing of these scrolls, 
leaves behind their history, the matter of the ink and the paper. 
The Remains of a Day in August 
The scrolls that the members of the Sonderkommando buried in the earth 
(sometimes within a squashed piece of metal, sometimes without, using instead whatever 
else was to hand) were not the only testimonies left by these `bearers of a horrendous 
"; `Eaten away by humidity and hence partially illegible'. Georges Didi-Huberman, Images Magre Tout, 
(Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 2003), p. 15 (n15). 
xa For example Zalmen Gradowski's handwriting might be described as angular. It often has sharply 
demarcated characters; at time his pen zigzags to produce the letters, the words. There is a certainty to the 
shape of this prose and also perhaps a sense of the rapidity of its execution. It looks like it was written 
quickly. Printed words do not demonstrate belief and have no velocity. 
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secret' . 
85 There are also a series of four photographs taken by a Greek Jew called Alex 
(who worked in one of the squads) one day in August 1944 to provide evidence of the 
atrocities that were being committed at Auschwitz. The film from which these pictures 
were developed was smuggled out of Auschwitz hidden in a tube of toothpaste. 86 These 
photographs are discussed at length by the French art historian Georges Didi-Huberman 
in his ground-breaking work Images malgre tout. Two of the images depict members of 
the Sonderkommando at `work, ' a third shows a group of naked women on their way to 
the gas chamber, the final picture is almost abstract - tree tops and light - an exhaustion of 
content. Here is Didi-Huberman's description of the taking of the first two photographs 
(figs. 3-4): 
Terrible paradoxe de cette chambre noire: pour reussir ä extraire 1 'appareil du 
seau, ä caler le viseur, äI 'approcher de son visage et ä prendre une premiere 
sequence d'images, le photographe a dii se cacher dans la chambre b gaz ä peine 
- peut-etre pas encore completement - videe de ses victimes. II est en retrait dans 
1 'espace sombre. Le biais, 1 'obscurite oü il se tient le protegent. Il s 'enhardit, 
change d'axe et s'avance: la seconde vue est un peu plus frontale et legerement 
plus rapprochee. Plus risquee, donc. Mais aussi, paradoxalement, plus posee: 
plus nette. Comme si la peur avait un instant disparu devant la necessite de ce 
travail, arracher une image. On y volt, justement, le travail quotidien des autres 
membres de 1'equipe, celui d'arracher aux cadavres, qui gisent encore au sol, 
leer derniere semblance humaine. Les gestes des vivants disent la pesanteur des 
corps et la täche ä mener dans l 'immediatete des decisions ä prendre: tirer, 
trainer, jeter. La fumee, derriere, est celle des fosses d'incineration: corps poses 
en quinconce sur 1,50 metre de profondeur, crepitements de la graisse, odeurs, 
recroquevillements de la matiere humaine, tout ce don't parle Filip Müller est lä, 
sous cet ecran de fumee que la photographie a fixe pour nous. Derriere est le bois 
de bouleaux. Le vent souffle au nord, peut-titre au nord-ouest. 87 
RS Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, p. 36. 
86 Didi-Huberman, Images malgre tout, p. 23. 
s7 'The terrible paradox of this black chamber, in order to get the camera out of the bucket, to set the view- 
finder, to bring it up close to his face and to take this first sequence of images, the photographer must have 
had to hide himself in the gas chamber which had just been - and then perhaps not completely - emptied of 
its victims. He sets himself back in this gloom. The angle, the darkness in which he keeps himself, 
protecting him. Growing emboldened, he shifts position and moves forward: the second view is a little 
more frontal and slightly closer. Riskier then. But also paradoxically more staged: cleaner. As if fear had 
briefly disappeared in the face of the importance of the task, to snatch a picture. One can see, in fact, the 
everyday work of the other members of the team, that of snatching from the bodies - which are still lying 
on the ground - their final human resemblance. The gestures of the living speak of the weight of the bodies 
and of the work to be done within the immediacy of the decisions to be taken: pull, drag, throw. The smoke 
behind is that of the pits used for burning the dead: bodies laid in staggered rows to a depth of one and a 
half metres, the cracklings of grease, the smells, the shrivelling of human flesh, all those things that Filip 
Müller speaks of, are here, in that veil of smoke that photography has made permanent for us. Behind is the 
Figure 3. Anonymous (member of the So1uclerkomnrun(lO at Auschwitz), Burning of corpses in u pit ins front cif thc' , as c"hcunthcr at Crematorium 5 at AuschK'itz, August 1944. State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau. (Negative 277). 
Figure 4. Anonymous (member of the Snirclc"rkc0(10 at 
Auschwitz), Burnin of*corpses in u pit in. frou t of the /; ns e/uz, nhc'r tit 
Crematorium 5 tit Auschwitz, August 1944. State \lnsenm of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. (Negative 278). 
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These photographs are taken from within the gas-chamber, a part of the chamber is 
visible; this is the blackness that surrounds the squad who are disposing of the dead 
bodies. Janina Struk writes that `from a window a few photographs were taken of the 
burning pyres and women being sent to the gas-chamber'. 88 This is incorrect. The black 
frame marks the entry way to the chamber, it is not a window but a door. This is made 
more evident in the second clearer photograph, the one which Struk chooses to 
reproduce. The blackness is both more and less than the outline of an entry and an exit. A 
tenebrous frame. `Augen und Mund stehn so offen und leer, Herr' . 
S9 This emptiness in the 
image is the gas-chamber. It is masonry, it is matter. Yet what it is cannot be seen. 
Opaque, obscure, almost nothing. Only colour - the non-colour of night - almost 
immaterial. Didi-Huberman describes how often, when they are reproduced, these two 
photographs are recentred. The black expanse is removed in a process of purifying `la 
substance imageante de son poids non documentaire'. 90 This action is reminiscent of 
Agamben's gesture in Remnants of Auschwitz; where he sheds the camps of all context 
that does not lend weight to his argument. The darkness is rejected because it is perceived 
to interfere with the integrity of the images. It shows us nothing. Didi-Huberman writes 
that this: 
`... masse noir qui entoure la vision des cadavres et des fosses, cette masse ou 
rien n'est visible donne, en realite, une marque visuelle aussi precieuse que tout 
le reste de la surface impressionnee. Cette masse oü rien West visible, c 'est 
1'espace de la chambre a gaz: la chambre obscure oh il a fallu se retirer pour 
mettre en lumiere le travail du Sonderkommando, dehors, au-dessus des fosses 
d'incineration. Lette masse noire noun donne donc la situation mime, 1 'espace de 
possibilite la condition d'existence des photographies memes'. 
91 
wood of silver birches. The wind is blowing to the north, perhaps to the north-west'. Didi-Huberman, 
Images malgre tout, p. 22. 
" Janina Struk, Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 
p. 113. Struk is wrong to state that all the photographs were taken from the same place. The photographs of 
the women running and of the tree tops were taken later at some distance from the gas chamber. See Did- 
Huberman, Images malgre tout, p. 23. 
89 'Our eyes and our mouths are so open and empty, Lord' (Trans. Michael Hamburger). Paul Celan, 
`Tenebrae, ' in Selected Poems, (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 114-115. 
In a process of purifying `the substance of the image of its non-documentary force'. Didi-Huberman, 
Images malgre tout, p. 51. 
91 This `black expanse which surrounds the spectacle of the corpses and the pits, this expanse where 
nothing is visible gives, in reality, a visual marker as precious as all the rest of the exposure. The expanse 
where nothing can be seen is the space of the gas-chamber, the dark chamber where it was necessary to 
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The blackness provides the trace of the conditions of possibility that made the 
photographs possible, concealment within the gas-chamber. It is, of course, Didi- 
Huberman who brings to light this context, who exposes the violence that inheres in the 
refraining of the image. If there is a contextual ethics, however, then the returning of this 
darkness to the image would seem to be the ethical thing to do. This not just because, as 
Didi-Huberman rightly states, it returns to Alex the danger of his endeavour. To crop the 
image is to `faire comme si Alex avait pu tranquillement prendre ses photos ä Pair 
libre'. 92 It is to make the photographs safe. These images were the end-result of a great 
amount of risk-taking. The returning of this darkness is also important for other reasons. 
The black frame is part of the noise of the photographs. These images are edged by 
horror, the blackness is the boundary that permits the photograph to be. To remove this 
ambiguous edge is to avoid confronting the origin of the horrors within the pictures. The 
dark surround troubles the viewer because it appears to be nothing, it resists signification. 
It is the `weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant'. 93 It is the 
showing of death, in some sense similar to the black border of Victorian letters of 
condolence. This darkness contains no expression of sympathy though; it marks `the 
utmost of abjection'. 94 Especially in the second photograph the corpses that lie upon the 
ground have too much shape. We are used to seeing piles of corpses. We are accustomed 
to such sights, we contour them with the violence of familiarity: `It is a pile of dead 
people'. It is possible to grow used to these images of mass murder: `The shock of 
photographed atrocities wears off with repeated viewings, just as the surprise and 
bemusement felt the first time one sees a pornographic movie wears off after one sees a 
few more'. 95 The corpses are contaminated by a certain kind of context, that of 
retreat to to bring to light the work of the Sonderkommando outside, above the incineration pits. This black 
expanse gives us then the situation itself, it is the space of possibility that allows the photographs to exist'. 
Ibid. p. 52. 
92 To `make as if Alex was able to take his photographs without risk in the open air'. Ibid. 
93 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 2. 
94 Ibid. p. 4. 
95 Susan Sontag, On Photography, (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 20. In the later book Regarding the Pain of 
Others, Sontag argues however that there are some photographs the impact of which does not diminish, 
'there are pictures whose power does not abate, in part because one cannot look at them often'. She 
suggests that there are some images of facial disfigurement - such as those of the survivors of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki - which we cannot become inured to. They will always cut the eye. Sontag, Regarding the 
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habituation. Atrocity photographs sear the eye, they cause pain but then - with repeated 
viewing - they also cauterize the very wound they have caused. The darkness however is 
plaintive. It does not shock the spectator but instead empties them. These pictures can be 
given the appearance of coherence - this is precisely what Didi-Huberman does, and what 
I also cannot help but do - they can be named, shaped, made into some thing, filled. Yet 
always a part of the darkness will resist this desire to contour it. It is rather that out of 
which contour arises, bordering all interpretations rather than being delimited by them. 
Shape momentarily disappears in this darkness. 
The Disappeared 
There is honesty in the insubstantiality of the expanse of blackness; in its refusal 
to be representative. The corpses that are bordered by this blackness - whilst manifestly 
present as representation - are unrepresentable. As they exist in the photograph they are 
given too much substance. That which was reduced to ash (that which was rendered 
shapeless) continues to appear in the photograph as a something rather than the nothing 
that it would actually become. The bodies that continue to lie upon the ground in the 
photographs; were dragged to the pit and then burned soon after the pictures were taken. 
These bodies have vanished yet they remain. To remove the nothingness that borders 
them is to perpetuate the travesty of this kind of representation, the travesty of the illusion 
of shape where now there is none. Ricco writes that in `the time of AIDS, a disappeared 
aesthetics may be the only way to ethically relate to the historicity and sociality of AIDS; 
to avoid sparing loss as has occurred in the history of symbolizing, narrativizing, and 
putting a face to AIDS'. 
96 We might similarly write about the necessity of a `disappeared 
aesthetics' in the time of Auschwitz. The only way to find an adequate representation of 
loss is to lose representation, `the problem is not simply the question of representational 
content, but the question of representation itself . 
97 Images too often recuperate what they 
depict; they keep that which has disappeared in the realm of appearance. There is always 
Pain of Others, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2003), p. 74. For a review of this book see Nicholas Chare, 
`Pain in camera, ' parallax 34, (January-March 2005), pp. 88-89. 
96 Ricco, The Logic of the Lure, p. 40. 
97 Ibid. pp. 40-41. 
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something where there should be no thing. The darkness in these photographs approaches 
the non-status of being no thing. A disappeared aesthetics is one in which it is not the 
visible or invisible that matters but the imperceptible. It is `a refusal of either/or logics, a 
non-dialectical double refusal that is "no-longer-being" and "not-yet-being, " at once'. 98 
It is the falling of difference back into sameness, the return of sounds to the noise. It is 
not disappearance as we usually conceive of it (the making absent of a presence) but the 
reappearance of the beneath of appearances. Ricco explains that `a disappeared 
aesthetics disappears aesthetics, making it difficult to determine art factuality, authorial 
presence, even form and content - those things that constitute aesthetic and art historical 
discourse'. 99 In the case of these photographs the presence of the photographer (Alex, 
whose surname we will now never know, and of whom all that is left is his first name and 
these four photographs) and the content of the images are, of course, vital. So too, 
however, is the disappeared aesthetics which surrounds rather than supersedes them. This 
blackness is the nothing that is loss, it contains the non-quality of no longer being a thing. 
The blackness is and is not part of the photograph, it is the light-writing of darkness, the 
unwriting of light. It is an unphotographing within the photograph. 
The shapeless frame of these images must never be sacrificed, but the shape is 
equally important. These images were acts of resistance taken by inmates at Auschwitz. 
They represent the unrepresentable. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt 
wrote: 
It is of some importance to realize that all pictures of concentration camps are 
misleading insofar as they show the camps in their last stages, at the moment the 
Allied troops marched in. There were no death camps in Germany proper, and at 
that point all extermination equipment had already been dismantled. On the other 
hand, what provoked the outrage of the Allies most and what gives the films their 
special horror - namely the sight of human skeletons - was not at all typical of 
for the German concentration camps; extermination was handled systematically 
by gas, not by starvation. 
Sontag reiterates Arendt's assertion about these pictures from the camps, writing that 
`what makes the images unbearable - the piles of corpses, the skeletal survivors - was 
91 Ibid. p. 41. 
99 Ibid. p. 42. 
100 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, 1994), p. 446 (n 138). 
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not at all typical for the camps, which, when they were functioning, exterminated their 
inmates systematically (by gas, not starvation and illness), and immediately cremated 
them'. '01 These photographs demonstrate that not all pictures of the camps are 
misleading; on the day in August when the Greek Jew Alex took these images the gas 
chamber was operational. These prints preserve a horrible narrative. Taken from the point 
where life ended, they display the after death, they show the bodies that are soon to 
become or have already become ash. The first blurred picture shows two members of the 
Sonderkommando pulling a corpse towards the burning pit, whilst another member is 
bending down, perhaps preparing to drag another body in the same direction. 102 This 
physical exertion tells a story. As does the taking of each picture which as well as 
showing these scenes of horror also testifies to the pressure of Alex's finger upon the 
button of the camera. He depressed the button to take the image. It attests to the life 
behind it as well as to the lives and deaths within it. The negative contains the trace of the 
picture taker as well as the picture taken. Narration is action, it is movement. Here an 
arrested act is visible. A body is being pulled from somewhere to somewhere. It is 
motionless yet in motion. In the second picture the men have disappeared. They are 
perhaps enveloped by the smoke. In that screen of smoke that rises up from the pits Didi- 
Huberman sees `crepitements de la graisse, odeurs, recroquevillements de la matiere 
humaine'. He sees sounds, smells and physical degeneration. This synaesthesic quality to 
'01 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, p. 75. In her book Memory Effects, Dora Apel also states that 
photographs were `nonexistent in the camps'. Apel, Memory Effects: The Holocaust and the Art of 
Secondary Witnessing, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 117. 
102 As Sofsky explains, pits as well as ovens were used for burning the dead at Auschwitz. Sofsky's horrific 
description of this process is instructive because it demonstrates the desire to destroy the bodies beyond all 
recognition, to void them of all substance: `... the dead were also burned on gigantic pyres in Auschwitz in 
the summer of 1944. Behind bunker 2, prisoners working in alternate shifts had to dig deep ditches. A 
Kommando of twenty-five men piled the corpses in three layers on a large iron grating. Fifteen stokers laid 
sawed-up beams, wood . shavings, and pieces of wood 
into the pits, ignited them with torches and rags 
drenched in oil, and then tended to the fire. They constantly jabbed with long iron pokers between the 
charred smoldering carcasses, and poured oil, methanol, or boiling human fat that had accumulated in the 
receptacles at the two ends of the pit into the f ames. It took about five to six hours to turn the twelve 
hundred corpses in a pit into ashes. The water was directed from all sides onto the ashes and the remains 
of bones. As soon as the surface had cooled somewhat, wooden floorboards covered with black metal plate 
were tossed into the pits. The thirty-five men of the Aschenkommando now climbed down into the pit and 
shoveled out the glowing-hot ashes. The only f imsv protection the men had against the danger of being 
burned or blinded were fat caps and protective goggles. The remains were transported in wheelbarrows at 
double time to the ash-deposit site. The charred limbs and torsos were removed with . special forks there, 
and burned a second time in a smaller pit. The remaining ash was pounded to a pulverized mass on a 
rectangular concrete surface'. Sofsky, The Order of Terror, p. 270. 
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the photographs makes them similar to Celan's poetry and Delbo's prose. The visual 
conjures up the acoustic, the olfactory and the tactile. The smoke is a kind of interference, 
of noise. This smoke-screen hides the pits and the dead within them. It gets in the way of 
witnessing. Yet perhaps this getting in the way is what is needed. This smoke is like the 
black frame in that it is not easily shaped. Insubstantial yet given substance by the paper 
upon which it is preserved, the smoke is fixed yet unfixable. The clouds of cinders 
prevent the photographs from becoming still. Geoffrey Hartman describes atrocity 
photographs as `brutal, mechanically frozen images, ' that enact a shameless assault upon 
the spectator . 
103 The smoke in these pictures taken by the Sonderkommando can be 
understood as a manifestation of shame, an involuntary veiling of atrocity. This evidence 
of burning matter is a kind of horrific modesty. It conceals the bodies that are being 
consumed by fire, whilst also revealing them. The smoke moves. It tells a story. It tells us 
that the bodies in front of the conflagration are destined to have a `Grab in den 
Wolken'. 104 The smoke is in motion, a motion made measurable by the motionless 
corpses (this especially in the second photograph). 
105 The smoke makes the photograph 
dynamic and it makes it so through the matter that matters, the matter of its immateriality. 
Ash 
Ash is the body made almost imperceptible. It is the horror of the body unshaped; 
the horror of the murder not just of the individual but of their unique contour. The ash is 
the beyond of the Muselmann. If the ultimate aim of biopower was to sever all connection 
between the human and the inhuman; then it had set itself an impossible aim. 106 A broken 
connection requires a connection; the break preserves this connectivity in order to be. A 
broken glass requires the trace of the unbroken glass in order to break. The human is the 
necessary condition of the inhuman. Ash, however, is beyond the human and the 
'03 Geoffrey Hartman, `The Struggle Against the Inauthentic: An Interview by Nicholas Chare, ' in parallax 
30 10: 1 (January-March 2004), p. 77. 
104 A `grave... in the clouds' (Trans. Michael Hamburger). Paul Celan, `Todesfugue, ' in Selected Poems, 
pp. 62-65. 
105 The corpses act as a gauge against which to measure change in a similar way to the way the mouth does 
in Bacon's Study after Vela: quez. 
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inhuman, it is beyond bios or zoe. The ultimate aim of National Socialism (as opposed to 
biopower) was not to divide the human and the inhuman but to do away with division, to 
destroy. To turn our back on the gas chambers as Agamben implicitly invites us to do, is 
to deny this odious objective. Raul Hilberg's monumental study of the Shoah, The 
Destruction of the European Jews, is so named because destruction is precisely what the 
Nazi's set out to achieve. 107 The Muselmänner were ash in the making. Ash was the 
consummation of the Nazi project. The leading sense of the word `destroy' is `to undo, 
break up, reduce into a useless form, consume, or dissolve'. 108 Ash is the body undone, 
the body unbodied. It is the dissolution of shape. 
We all have our own contours, we are all distinct, and this `difference is absolute 
because each human being is different from all those who have lived, who live, and who 
will live'. 109 Even the dead have their differences, something which both archaeology and 
forensic science often reveal. Ash is indifferent. It is beyond alterity. The individual 
exists in relation to the other. We shape each other. As Adriana Caverero explains, we 
exist through our exposure to others; `the who is simply exposed; or better, finds herself 
always already exposed to another, and consists in this reciprocal exposition'. ' 10 The self 
and other engage in a mutual shaping, a mutual developing. The other does not even have 
to be alive for us to be exposed to their otherness, for us to be shaped by them. The other 
does however have to be recognisable, have to be shapeable. '" Ash approaches the 
unrecognisable, approaches nothingness. It must be prevented from attaining the non- 
state of nihility. The ash must be attested to. These photographs taken by the 
Sonderkommando bear witness to the ash. It is important that the photographs were taken 
by them. These are not photographs intended to celebrate destruction. These are 
photographs that attempt to prevent it. That we know who took these pictures - the 
'06 As quoted previously; `biopower's supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body, the absolute 
separation of the living being and the speaking being, zoe and bios, the inhuman and the human - 
survival'. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 156. 
10' Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (Chicago: 1961). 
los The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Ed. C. T. Onions. (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1973), 
p. 53 1. 
109 Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and selfhood, Trans. Paul A. Kottman, (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 89. 
"o Ibid. 
"' The M(Other) is shaped into some thing, into something recognisable, through a process of abjection. 
That which is abject has shape even as it threatens all shaping. 
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context of their taking - is of vital importance. There is an ethics to all context, to all 
shaping. 
This Way for the Gas Chambers 
Lyotard writes of the Holocaust denier that `his argument is: in order for a place 
to be identified as a gas chamber, the only eyewitness I will accept would be a victim of 
this gas chamber; now, according to my opponent, there is no victim that is not dead; 
otherwise, this gas chamber would not be what he or she claims it to be. There is, 
therefore, no gas chamber'. 112 The gas chamber must be seen to be believed. The dead 
are required to speak of what they have seen, to say their own death. It is not enough for 
the living to say that the dead died. It is not enough to have witnessed the inside of the 
gas chambers. At one point Filip Müller resolved to die with a group of his countrymen 
and hid himself inside the gas chamber: `The atmosphere in the dimly lit gas chamber 
was tense and depressing. Death had come menacingly close. It was only minutes away. 
No memory, no trace of any of us would remain'. 113 He was persuaded to leave by some 
of the other prisoners before the chamber was sealed. Müller's book is called Three Years 
in the Gas Chambers. He is often in the chambers; his is a story from the inside of death. 
More than once he describes the entry of groups into the gas chambers and their eventual 
exit, the story of their journey from life to death. His does not die however, he does not 
write back from the dead. For the denier Müller's testimony is not enough. 
The denier seeks the undeniable testimony of the dead. A photograph of a gassing 
in process - of the dying and the dead - would seem to provide the kind of witnessing 
Lyotard's denier professes to need. ' 14 Didi-Huberman suggests that claims that there was 
insufficient light to take pictures in the gas chambers are false. ' 15 Müller writes however 
of `the subterranean labyrinth into which the gas chamber... turned when the lights went 
112 Lyotard, The Differend, pp. 3-4. 
113 Filip Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers, Trans. Susan Flatauer, (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 1999), p. 113. 
114 Although, of course, the denier will often not be denied. No matter what photographs do exist the denier 
can always claim that they are simulated. 
115 Didi-Huberman, Images malgre tout, p. 78 (n26). 
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out'. 116 This suggests that people died in the dark. A photograph taken through the 
peephole which enabled someone to look into the chamber whilst it was in operation - or 
a photograph taken from within the chamber itself - would be black. 
117 It would show 
nothing. The two photographs taken by Alex from within the gas chamber are edged by 
this nothing but also show us death; and beyond this death, the ashes. The eyewitnesses - 
the victims of the gas chamber - speak. The impossible testimony is made possible. 
Roland Barthes writes of shock photos - reiterating the remark of Genevieve Serreau - 
that `it is not enough for the photographer to sign i the horrible for us to experience 
it'. 118 He complains that in these kind of pictures the photographer `has almost always 
overconstructed the horror he is proposing, adding to the act by contrasts or parallels, 
the intentional language of horror'. ' 19 Yet particularly in the first out of focus image 
there is no manifestation of this intention that would mediate the horror. The blurring is 
not the result of artifice. It is accidental testimony to the fragility of life in the camps. The 
photographer risks death by taking the picture. He is afraid; his hands may be trembling, 
he is too hurried. The result is a haze that will forever refuse resolution. Kristeva 
describes semiotic activity as introducing a `wandering or fuzziness into language'. ' 20 
The blurring in the photograph disrupts its capacity for communication - its symbolic 
aspect - and frees up the semiotic. Here the horror is both signified and shown, the 
something and the nothing, the shape and the shapeless co-existing. The noise - the 
blackness and the blurring - are the dead once they are beyond shaped death. The 
blackness and the blurring constitute a semiotic force within the images. They manifest 
the power of horror. . . the 
horror of an end to contour... the power of the unbounded. The 
dead speak out of this obscurity. 
"' Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz, p. 117. 
117 Müller mentions the existence of this peephole on p. 116 of Eyewitness Auschwitz. 
Roland Barthes, `Shock-Photos, ' in Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies, Trans. Richard 
Howard, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 7 1. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Julia Kristeva, `From One Identity to Another, ' in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Art and 
Literature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 136. 
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The Photograph of Nothing 
Once he had left the `security' of the gas chamber, Alex walked towards the rows 
of birch trees. It is here that he came across the women who were being led or about to be 
led to the crematorium. It is now that he takes `deut cliches ä la sauvette, sans regarder, 
peut-titre en continuant de marcher'. 121 The first image is fuzzy and at an odd angle but a 
group of women can be seen in the bottom right hand corner (fig. 5). 122 The second, `est 
pratiquement abstraite: on subodorejuste le time des bouleaux' (fig. 6). 123 The sun is in 
the photographer's eyes: `1'image est eblouie par le soleil qui perce ä travers les 
ramures'. 124 This photograph is difficult to describe. It is not anything. The `suspicion' of 
treetops that Didi-Huberman perceives is seeable, especially when this picture is looked 
at in relation to the previous image (without this first picture to act as a guide it would be 
less easy for Didi-Huberman to make the kinds of observations he does). The picture is 
reproduced infrequently. What does it bear witness to? It is a picture of nothing. In 
Images malgre tout, Didi-Huberman suggests that the photograph attests to a great deal: 
Lorsqu'on dit de la derniere photographie qu'elle est simplement <sans utilite> - 
historique, s'entend -, on oublie tout ce dont, phenomenologiquement, eile 
temoigne chez le photographe: 1 'impossibilite de viser, le risque encouru, 
l 'urgence, la course peut-etre, la maladresse, Peblouissement par le soled en 
face, 1'essoufflement peut-etre. Cette image est, formellement, ä bout de souffle: 
pure <enonciation>, pur geste, pur acte photographique sans visee (donc sans 
orientation, sans haut ni bas), eile nous donne acces ä la condition d'urgence 
12' He takes `two exposures, hurriedly, without looking, perhaps whilst still walking'. Didi-Huberman, 
Images malgre tout, p. 23. 
'22 This picture has also suffered in reproduction from the violence of retouching. In one instance, `/a 
premiere photographie de la sequence exterieure a Bubi tonte une serie d'operations: le coin inferieur droh 
a ete agrandi; puis orthogonalise, de facon ä restituer des conditions plus normales ä une prise de vue qui 
n'en beneficiait pas; puls recadre, isole (tout le reste de l'image devenant rebut). Pire, les corps et les 
visages des deuxfemmes au premier plan ont ete retouches, un visage invente, meme les seins remontes'. 
`From the sequence taken outside, the first photograph has undergone a whole series of processes: the 
lower right hand comer has been enlarged; then made rectangular, in such a way as to recreate more 
familiar conditions from a point of view which did not benefit from this; then recentred and isolated (all the 
rest of the picture becoming superfluous). Worse, the bodies and the faces of the two women in the 
foreground have been retouched, a face invented, even the breasts put back'. Ibid. p. 50. 
123 The second 'is practically abstract: there is just a suspicion of the tops of the silver birches'. Ibid. p. 23. 
124 `The image is eclipsed by the sun which bursts through the foliage'. Ibid. 
Figure 5. Anonymous (member 
Auschwitz), Women on their ºt'1iE to 
of the SoIIdc'rhoinnmcu, clu at 
the 
, bus chamber at 
Crematorium 
5, Auschwitz, August 1944. State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
(Negative 282). 
Figure 6. Anonymous (member of the SonderkonlI1iun1lu at 
Auschwitz), Women on their H'UV to the gas chanth'r at Crc', natori[i, » 5, Ailse/,, v tz, August 1944. State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
(Negative 283). 
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dans laquelle furent arrachees quatre lambeaux 'a 1'enfer d'Auschwitz. Or, cetle 
urgence aussi fait partie de 1 'histoire'. 125 
The photograph does not show these things, a person breathing heavily, blinded by the 
sun, afraid yet overcome with the urgency of the task in hand; with the need to bear 
witness. It is Didi-Huberman who brings this context to the image - the photograph is 
exposed by his words, he develops it - and he is right to do so. He does not, however, 
look at the photograph itself, beyond saying that he perceives the hint of treetops. This is 
because there is very little to see. The image is predominantly black. The top left of the 
picture contains most of the light. Towards the middle left there is a thin `thorn' of 
darkness jutting out into the patch of white. Towards the centre of the upper half of the 
image there is the most detail, what must be boughs and branches are visible. Didi- 
Huberman uses few words to give an account of the image itself because it resists 
wording. It refuses shape. Roland Barthes describes the experience of looking at some 
photographs in terms of a wounding, he writes: 
A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a 
pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in that it also refers to the 
notion of punctuation, and because the photographs 1 am speaking of are in effect 
punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points; precisely these 
wounds are so many points. 12 
The Latin word Barthes is referring to is punctum. In Camera Lucida Barthes 
differentiates between the Studium - that which is of general interest in a photograph - and 
the punctum - which is a second element (not always present) that punctuates the 
Studium. It fills the spectator with sensation. Barthes's punctum should be understood as a 
site of resistance. He suggests that we do not seek out the punctum, we do not understand 
it, rather it seeks us out, it understands us. 127 The punctum is not part of the meanings that 
we give to an image, rather it gives us meaning. Through the injury it causes, I feel 
125 `When we say of the final photograph that is simply `without use' - historically, of course - we forget 
everything that the photograph attests to phenomenologically: the impossibility of aiming, the risk that was 
taken, the urgency, maybe the walk, the awkwardness, the dazzling by the sun in front, the breathlessness 
perhaps. Formally, this picture is out of breath: pure enunciation, pure gesture, pure photographic act 
without aim (without direction, without top or bottom), it allows us access to the conditions of urgency 
within which these four fragments were snatched from the hell of Auschwitz. Because this urgency also 
forms a part of history'. Ibid. p. 54. 
126 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, Trans. Richard Howard, (London: Vintage, 1993), pp. 26-27. 
127 Ibid. p. 26. 
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something and I must ask why have I felt and what have I felt. As punctuation it has an 
asemantic element to it, an aspect.. .a point that resists the 
formation of meaning which 
constitutes the process of reading. '28 It eludes, evades, escapes our efforts to ensnare it 
and catch it in meaning. It gives sense without being sensible. The punctum is a stop, 
punctum's are ellipses `... '. They are holes in the image. When reading and writing an 
image, when travelling across it, those details and destinations... black... white... 
treetops... sunlight... become less important than that which exists between them, which 
remains unsaid and in a sense therefore invisible. In any picture there is a between, a 
space that always opens between the words and what is in the picture. There is a remnant 
which is beyond writing. The punctum is the detail which stands out... it acts as a sting of 
responsibility... as a part of the picture that must be seen to and needs to be looked at, 
which demands a writing. 
The final photograph taken by Alex would seem to have no detail that wounds the 
eye. In some images though the punctum is `a kind of subtle beyond'. 129 The punctum is 
not in the image but is pointed towards by it. For Barthes this kind of punctum occurs 
around the erotic image as distinct from the pornographic. The erotic photograph has a 
blind field. It does not reveal everything. The pornographic photograph, on the other 
hand, does not need to be sought. It is all there. The horrific photograph might also be 
thought to have a blind field. The picture that attests to Auschwitz must do so as much by 
what it fails to show as what it does. In this final photograph the spectator is directed 
towards the punctum by the black milk, by the grey zone that is this shapeless non- 
representation. Gerhard Richter writes of grey that: 
It has the capacity that no other colour has, to make 'nothing' visible. To me, grey 
is the welcome and only possible equivalent for indifference, non-commitment, 
absence of opinion, absence of shape. But grey, like formlessness and the rest, 
can be real only as an idea, and so all I can do is create a colour nuance that 
means grey but is not it. 130 
128 On the subject of the asemantic aspect of punctuation see Giorgio Agamben's essay Absolute 
Immanence in Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essaus in Philosophy, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 220-239. and in particular p. 223. 
129 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 59. 
130 Quoted in Herman Rapaport, `Gerhard Richter and the Death of Poignancy, ' in parallax 32 10: 3 (July- 
September 2004), pp. 104-105. 
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Grey is the impossible colour. It is the colour beneath all colours. It is that out of which 
shape emerges. The horror is this boundlessness that the photograph gestures towards. 
The Sonderkommando were placed out of bounds. They existed as noise. On the other 
side of abjection. This is something that Levi recognized, he realized the need to give 
shape to the members of the special squad, to bear witness. The grey zone is nothing. It is 
not a remnant. It is beyond good or bad, death or life, beyond the couplings that shape our 
world and make sense of it. The final photograph taken by Alex shows the dissolution of 
shape. It shows no thing. The non-object in the noise, `elusive, fleeting, and baffling as it 
is... can be grasped only as a sign'. 131 Kristeva writes that `it is through the intermediary 
of a representation, hence a seeing, that it holds together'. ' 32 The no thing can be known 
only through some thing. This photograph is the thing. It is abject. It is the matter of 
horror. In this opening to the nothing that lies beneath meaning, the photograph may be 
understood as providing a visual correlative to the writings of Celan and Delbo. The 
photograph is a representation that does not represent. It allows us to see the horror rather 
than its depiction. It shows nothing. 
1'1 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 46. 
132 Ibid. 
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